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Contemporary democratic theory is marked by two politically distinctive but 
epistemologically similar radicalisms: Deliberative and Platonist. Deliberative democrats 
seek to enhance the legitimacy and value of democratic outcomes by ensuring deeper, 
more discursive participation so as to approximate rational consensus around the self-
evident public interest or to inculcate the ideal of public reasoning among citizens. 
Platonist democrats, responding to widespread evidence of public ignorance and 
irrationality, argue that participation should be limited to those who can do so from a 
position of expertise.  
What these radical positions have in common is an implied readiness to reject the 
fundamental democratic principle of minimal political equality for practically all citizens. 
In so doing, they risk subverting the desirable consequences of the institutional norms of 
today’s democracies: stability, anti-experimentalism and assumed non-contestability. 
Democracy’s main virtue – its tendency toward stability and resistance to revolution – is 
contingent upon the confidence that is placed in it by its citizens, which itself may be 
contingent upon the universal franchise. 
This thesis argues that theories of democracy are best understood in terms of their 
underlying presuppositions as to the scope – and potential scope – of human knowledge. It 
offers a new justification of democracy, suggesting specific consequentialist grounds while 
critiquing instrumental and deontic approaches to the problem. The thesis then turns to a 
consideration of the evidence for widespread public ignorance, and argues that such 
evidence cannot form a sound basis for Platonist, epistocratic arguments against the 
universal franchise. Deliberative democracy is similarly problematic, founded upon either 
the unattainable ideal of political consensus, or the badly-understood concept of ‘public 
reason’. Formal, demotic deliberation is intrinsically threatening to the democratic 
principle of political anonymity, and therefore, due to a host of well-documented social-


















Man is a deeply illogical being, and must be ruled illogically. Whatever that frigid 
prig Bentham may say, there are innumerable motives that have nothing to do 
with utility. In good utilitarian logic a man does not sell all his goods to go 
crusading, nor does he build cathedrals; still less does he write verse. There are 
countless pieties without a name that find their focus in a crown. It is as well, I 
grant you, that the family should have worn it beyond the memory of man; for 
your recent creations do not answer – they are nothing in comparison of your 
priest-king, whose merit is irrelevant, whose place cannot be disputed, nor made 
the subject of a recurring vote. 






Introduction: Democracy and the 
Interpretation of Disagreement 
 
All the great evils which men cause to each other because of certain 
intentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles … originate in 
ignorance, which is absence of wisdom. … [V]arious classes of men, 
each man in proportion to his ignorance, bring great evils upon 
themselves and upon other individual members of the species. If 
men possessed wisdom, which stands in the same relation to the 
form of man as the sight to the eye, they would not cause any injury 
to themselves or to others: for the knowledge of truth removes 
hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual injuries. 
Maimonides1 
 
The quotation offered above, a rumination on the nature of evil from the medieval Jewish 
theologian and philosopher Moses Maimonides, may seem an unusual choice for the 
beginning of a project that deals with the theory of democracy. Maimonides speaks to the 
overarching possibility that ‘evil’ and ‘quarrels’ are created by ignorance, and that 
ignorance is itself a version of self-interested behaviour; that the solution to the former 
problem is to be found in addressing the latter, by grasping the fundamental truths and 
wisdoms that are available through the application of human reason. Sufficient knowledge, 
this quotation implies, will make the doing of evil an impossibility. After all, good human 
attributes are necessarily derived from general characteristics that are common to all 
humans (having been created in the image of the divine). By the same token, negative 
attributes are best understood as deviations from the template of human nature. Evil is 
individual, and goodness is collective and normal. Wisdom – or at least knowledge that is 
good – lies in recognising and atoning for the evils that arose when humans chose to 
deviate from their natural template (Maimonides, Part 3, Chapter VIII). As John Locke 
argued, the ‘natural law’ may not be innate to human beings, but is self-evidently true 
when observed as part of the exercise of human reason (Locke, 1689 [1975], pp. 100-102). 
If all individuals shared this knowledge, then disagreement on fundamental questions 
would become impossible.  
                                                             






These instances of religious thinking, built around the possibility of a norm of consensus, 
or of unanimous agreement around self-evident goods, bear a striking resemblance to the 
epistemological and moral presuppositions that inform many theories of democracy. 
Despite sustained challenges from a tradition of liberal political thought that insists that 
reasonable value pluralism is an inescapable aspect of human societies, many versions of 
deliberative democratic theory are built around the idea of the value of consensus 
(Dryzek, 1990; Cohen, 1989; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Just as importantly, the most 
widespread conception of democracy held by the general public appears to be built 
around a ‘folk theory’ that accepts, unproblematically, the idea of ‘common sense’. This 
folk theory of democracy incorporates the view that controversies of social justice have 
self-evidently right answers, and that questions of politics and policy should be met with 
answers based upon simple and readily-understood axiomatic principles – and all this in 
the face of disagreement from other citizens who are themselves exactly as certain of their 
own correctness.  
This type of democratic reasoning, which implies that a successful, reasonable democratic 
procedure will effectively rule out the possibility of legitimate disagreement, seems 
incommensurable with the paradigm that underlies Rawlsian, pluralistic, or agonistic 
conceptions of democracy: that the primary feature of democratic politics is in fact to be 
found in the range of diverse yet reasonable perspectives that are held by citizens. 
Democracy, from this perspective, represents a family of procedural arrangements for 
reaching decisions in the face of unavoidably pluralised public opinion (Rawls, 1993; 
DeWiel, 2000, p. 9; Mouffe, 2005, p. 83). 
Very often, democratic theory that is informed by either perspective – on the one hand, 
that humans are basically similar and disagree on the basis of mistakes or accidents, and 
on the other, that humans are basically dissimilar, disagree as a matter of course, and yet 
must find some basis for legitimate collective action – recommends procedures and 
approaches which, tellingly, are able to serve both perspectives simultaneously. Liberal 
pluralists are likely to be as interested in the achievement of a strong majority favouring 
some proposal as their religiously-thinking counterparts will be in the achievement of an 
outcome that approximates outright consensus around the true public interest.  
Here, however, we begin to encounter problems. The real value of democracy may not be 
based in either of the above possibilities, but in the fact that such possibilities seem to us 
to be plausible, making democratic norms themselves unarguable. Yet the tendency of 






processes less inclusive and more exclusive as they seek more robust decision-making and 
more epistemically valuable participation.  
This project is concerned with the unexpected benefits – and unintended consequences – 
of the mythology of democracy, and in particular the variety of mythic values and 
advantages with which it is commonly associated. It addresses the implausibility of the 
usual justifications of democracy, and the paradoxical importance that at least some of 
these justifications are nevertheless held by citizens as articles of democratic faith. It 
discusses the democratic radicalisms that are motivated by the worthy goal of 
epistemically improving democratic participation, and the risks that such radicalisms may 
themselves pose to the very institutions that they seek to strengthen. To begin this 
process, this introductory chapter will first discuss in a schematic way the prevailing 
concerns as to citizens’ inadequacy as democratic participants, before turning to an initial 
consideration of the justification of democracy itself.  
Ignorance and Selfishness 
It is increasingly commonplace in political philosophy and democratic theory to bemoan 
most citizens’ epistemic inadequacy for productive engagement in public life.2 Usually, it is 
felt that they fall short in two key regards. First, they are considered to be ignorant, in so 
far as they lack knowledge of political, economic and societal facts, are disinterested in 
attaining such knowledge, and tend to assume that there are simple and obvious solutions 
to complex problems. Moreover, they are often radically ignorant – that is, individuals tend 
to be ignorant even of the extent of their own ignorance (Converse, 2006 [1964]; 
Friedman, 2007, pp. 11-13). Secondly, it is thought that citizens generally tend to 
disappoint republican-styled expectations that engagement in the public sphere ought to 
involve the adoption of a mode of public rather than private reasoning; in other words, 
they fail to be 'other-regarding' or 'selfless' to the extent that their democracies may 
operate in a desirable way. Most political institutions currently make no distinction 
between selfish and selfless votes or preferences, just as they do not recognise any 
difference between informed and uninformed participation. The epistemic critics of 
democracy ask: should this be the case? 
                                                             
2 This thesis will address one broad category of such assertions in Chapter Three. It is also worth 
noting that deliberative democrats often take note of widespread public ignorance and propose 






This basic assertion – that citizens tend toward ignorance and, if not outright self-interest, 
then at least the failure to wholly justify their politics with reasons that their peers find 
acceptable – is supported by a great deal of evidence. The third chapter of this thesis will 
set out some of the empirical evidence that is thought to support the claim of 
commonplace political ignorance, but in short: individuals tend to be ignorant about social 
and political questions; worse, they tend to be ignorant as to the depths of their own 
ignorance. By the same token, the majority of individuals are often modelled by social 
scientists as self-interested actors. This set of assumptions is usually captured within the 
term rationality, and underpins the most dominant methodological assumption within 
contemporary political science, informed by an economistic conception of human 
behaviour that posits human beings as utility maximisers. This thesis does not directly 
contribute to this literature, but accepts the realism of many of the assumptions behind 
rational choice – accepting, for example, that a great deal of public ignorance is rationally 
motivated (in line with the economistic arguments put forward by Downs, 1957, and 
further developed by, for example, Hardin, 2006 and Arneson, 2009).  
The combined effect of ignorance and self-interest could imply that individuals are not 
generally capable reason-givers; if so, this would constitute a significant challenge to 
advocates of ‘public reason’ (a concept that receives specific discussion in Chapter Four). 
Perhaps more importantly, there is the possibility that, even if citizens are capable of 
rendering publicly reasonable arguments, their public-spirited votes and preferences will 
necessarily remain indistinguishable from their privately-interested ones.  
These epistemic claims cross ideological boundaries. Social democrats and socialists tend 
to be concerned about selfish citizens; classical liberals and conservatives, whose general 
politics is normally founded on the rationalistic assumptions regarding human behaviour 
that are loosely described above, emphasise the tendency towards the ignorance and 
irrationality, wilful or otherwise, of most citizens. Indeed, many theorists, explicitly or 
implicitly, combine these epistemic concerns. Is ignorance not a form of selfishness in 
democratic terms? Isn’t the failure to reason publicly a by-product of a lack of 
understanding about the real public good – the result, fundamentally, of ignorance? 
This thesis will closely consider these branches of criticism – and their overlaps – in order 
to argue that there is no totally persuasive version of the argument that these epistemic 
limitations are good reason for the exclusion of some – or most – individuals from 
democratic participation. It argues in favour of at least a minimal political equality as a 






seems, are capable of producing positive outcomes even from the participation of 
plausibly self-interested citizens, and the ignorance of voters may be less important than 
we at first suppose if we adopt a reasonable conception of the real institutional utility of 
voting.   
The tendency for theory to engage with questions about the intentions and epistemic 
qualifications of a polity’s citizens is an ancient one. Our presumptions about the human 
capacity for both selfish and public-spirited motivations find early expression in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, with the metaphor of the chariot pulled by two unwieldy horses: one noble, the 
other selfish. Then, as is so often the case now, it is human reason – symbolised by the 
charioteer – that is expected to marshal these two often conflicting centres of motivation, 
and so drive the chariot forward (Phaedrus, 246a-b). Plato’s own response to the 
possibility of democracy was accordingly sceptical: only the very virtuous could be 
expected to harness both private and public selves under a mantle of reason, and so the 
enterprise of democracy, like a ship that is commanded and navigated by its oarsmen 
rather than its captain and navigators, is likely to run into trouble (Republic, Book 6, 488e–
489d). The Platonic tendency to question some of the central tenets of democratic norms 
on epistemic grounds is alive and well in the contemporary literature on democracy, as we 
shall see. 
This thesis does not reject such epistemic arguments – indeed, at several points it suggests 
grounds by which to critically question not only the reach of human reason, but the 
common assumption of a clear distinction between these ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ passions. 
If we cannot reliably distinguish between private and public reasons, then we will need 
some other basis for the justification of democracy.  
The Desirability of Democracy 
Such justificatory questions are capable of eliciting a great range of contradictory 
responses. On one side, the value and importance of democracy is considered by the public 
to be obvious, so that taking the time to defend it appears pointless. According to such a 
view, democracy represents a route to guarantee certain absolute values, or even 
constitutes such a value in itself. It is a living ideal, ripe for export to places where it is not 
yet sufficiently respected or used. Yet for others the project of democracy may be well-






human behaviour, motivating governments to populism, and licensing states to grow to 
unwieldy and intrusive size.  
This thesis is preoccupied with a significant debate among the many disagreements within 
democratic theory. It starts with the simple possibility that a citizen’s perception of their 
best interests may not align perfectly with the reality of those interests. As George Lakoff 
writes, citizens will often “vote against their obvious self-interest; they allow bias, 
prejudice, and emotion to guide their decisions; they argue madly about values, priorities, 
and goals. Or they quietly reach conclusions independent of their interests without 
consciously knowing why” (Lakoff, 2009, p. 8). Given all this, can there be any meaningful 
justification of democracy? If a citizen does not vote in line with their own objective best 
interests – and not even in accordance with the best interests of the wider public, should 
these fail to coincide – then what value can we hope to assign to their vote, and what value 
to the process of voting itself?  
This problem can be taken further. We are, after all, presupposing that the citizen is voting 
in line with some notion, though possibly misguided, of their best interests (and not on 
some other basis altogether), and indeed that there is an epistemically retrievable, 
objective measure of what constitutes their best interests with which to compare their 
perception. We are also assuming that it is possible to vote in line with our interests, that 
one or another of the possible candidates or alternative options to be voted for at least 
somewhat approximates the interests of our citizen, and can be perceived as such by them. 
But none of these things is necessarily true – our citizen may operate with no preconceived 
idea of their own interests, or may be utterly mistaken about them, or the citizen’s ‘real’ 
interests may not exist at all; in any case, the candidates and options available to our 
citizen may well diverge from these perceived interests, or incorporate elements of policy 
and ideology that seem at once good and bad to them – and so the desirability of voting, if 
not democracy itself, must be in doubt.  
Several academic literatures have developed which contribute to or attempt to address the 
kinds of concerns briefly indicated above. A raft of theories produced by social choice 
theorists in the mid-to-late 20th Century generated a considerable body of work on the 
plausible instability or arbitrariness of aggregative democracy – that is, democracy whose 
primary mechanism is the counting of votes (Arrow, 1951 [1963]; Riker, 1982). Updating 
the insights of the Marquis de Condorcet, Kenneth Arrow and his contemporaries argued 
that aggregative democracies were always plausibly arbitrary, in that various ‘fair’ 






Elsewhere, a ‘deliberative turn’ was taking shape within democratic theory, one that 
would later be argued to offer a solution to, among other things, the assertions of the 
social choice theorists (List, Luskin, Fishkin, & McLean, 2013; Dryzek, 2000; Miller, 1992). 
Perhaps an involvement in or improvement of the process of preference formation could 
help to avoid unstable outcomes and reduce the possibility of a disconnection between 
interests and votes. 
What characterises both of these approaches – though originating from academic 
positions divided by theoretical assumptions, political preferences, and often geography as 
well – is their shared and particular concern for the nature of the preferences formed at 
the level of the general citizenry, and how these then feed into participation. Social Choice 
theorists present a critique of vote aggregation that centres on the difficulty of satisfying 
democratic principles once deeper preference arrangements – the kind not often collected 
by votes – are taken into account. I may vote for candidate B, but I might prefer candidate 
C to candidate A as well; and what if most people consider A to be their least-preferred 
candidate, but their varying preferences between B and C leave A as the winner? Can this 
really be a democratic result? None of this is likely to become problematic if only the ‘top 
layer’ of preferences enter our consideration. To reject the relevance of deeper preference 
orderings is also to reject most of the potential for arbitrariness in democracy. But to look 
to the more complete preference-arrangements of individual citizens – to question their 
implications, their reasonableness, or their rationality – instantly produces problems for 
democracy.  
Similarly, deliberative democrats and public reason theorists construct arguments around 
the idea of maximising certain republican-styled values in an electorate through public 
discourse. Thus they place a greater emphasis on the participants of a democratic system: 
their capacities, their epistemic situation, and the ways in which they engage with each 
other and the institutions of governance. Once again it is not the “external act” of voting 
that is the focus of the analysis of democracy, but the “more internal acts that precede and 
underlie it”, as in Robert Goodin’s Reflective Democracy:   
For political outcomes to be democratic in a suitably strong sense, 
people's votes ought to reflect their considered and settled judgements, 
not top-of-the-head or knee-jerk reactions. ... They are supposed to 
ponder long and hard what they want and why ... [i]n the course of 
that, they are expected to reflect seriously upon what others want and 






Democratic citizens are supposed to act responsively, taking due 
account of the evidence and experience embodied in the beliefs of 
others (Goodin, 2003, p. 1). 
This necessarily leads us to reflect upon a divide – the first of many – that exists between 
the scholarly theorisation of democracy, and its actual implementation in polities and 
institutions. Regardless of this academic preoccupation with voters and participants, 
modern liberal democracies continue to place fairly minimal epistemic, communicative 
and normative burdens on their citizens. In order to engage in the political process, the 
citizen of a liberal democracy must meet no pre-set standard of relevant knowledge, must 
demonstrate no particular capacity for other-regarding, public-spirited preference 
formation, and is not required to conform with other citizens beyond the requirements 
established by the rule of law. Citizens may vote, or they may choose not to,3 with little 
regard for expectations of these kinds. However, few democratic theorists are satisfied by 
this state of affairs, and many present theoretical alternatives to the current model of 
effectively burdenless enfranchisement.  
Shouldn't citizens be knowledgeable about the things they are voting about? If citizens are 
to vote, should they not, as many theorists implore, at least vote well (an argument that is 
particularly well-developed in Brennan (2012))?  Perhaps the emphasis on voting is itself 
the problem; could not the pursuit of deliberative procedures, as supplements to or 
replacements for vote-aggregation, lead to more desirable outcomes?   
This thesis asserts that the addition of various epistemic burdens along these lines, as 
conditions for (or even, merely, as systematic expectations prior to) participation in 
democracy, constitutes a challenge to the principle of the universal franchise. Asking 
citizens not only to vote, but to try to vote well, in accordance with some set of pre-defined 
standards, will necessarily diminish the practical size of the electorate. This is not 
necessarily an intrinsically undesirable outcome. Different choice aggregation mechanisms 
could be argued to be far more robust in the face of the epistemic limitations of the general 
public, and capable of being responsive to narrow, private interests while also, in the 
aggregate, producing outcomes that are beneficial to society as a whole.4 Indeed it would 
                                                             
3 Although some liberal democracies legally require citizens to register to vote or even to travel to a 
polling station on election days – for example Australia, Brazil and Singapore – there are very few 
(such as Luxembourg and Cyprus) that insist that every such citizen votes, even if only as a result 
of the difficulty of confirming properly-filled-in ballot papers under the norm of anonymous 
polling.  
4 This is an argument put forward by many classical liberal academics, perhaps most notably in 







seem naive to endorse the universal franchise as being somehow absolutely valuable, or to 
totally discount alternative approaches to the aggregation of citizens’ preferences. Yet 
there is a clear tension - mirroring the central debate within democratic theory since the 
time of Plato - between the desirability of high-quality voting, and the argument that all 
citizens should be entitled to equal political liberties. This thesis will address those 
theorists who, in various ways, render arguments that the assumption of this entitlement 
to political equality is less valuable than the possibility of a more thoughtful electorate - 
and can thus be read as a response to a single, overarching research question: in modern 
democracies, why not disenfranchise citizens that are ignorant, irrational, or self-
regarding?  
Of course, this central question provokes a complexity of sub-questions. Who is really 
arguing that such people should be disenfranchised, and how are their arguments 
justified? What value should we attach to the universal franchise, and why? Could 
democracies be improved by becoming more direct and participatory? Could more 
desirable outcomes be achieved by the improvement of citizens' epistemic capacities and 
the promotion of preferences that are based on an idea of the public good, rather than self-
interest? 
Some approaches to the justification of democracy are to do with the instrumental benefits 
of democratic procedure. For example, we may find grounds to value democratic systems 
on the simple basis that they are better able to incorporate a diverse range of perspectives 
into decision-making than other institutional arrangements are – an argument from 
cognitive diversity (Knight & Johnson, 2011; Landemore, 2012). John Dryzek lauds the 
potential for information-aggregation and sharing within the particular context of a 
deliberative democracy, which would “place little faith in invisible hands, seeking instead 
more cognition in interaction” (Dryzek, 1990, p. 69). Arguments along the lines that the 
diverse perspectives produced by “reasonable pluralism”, as Rawls (1993, p. 36) would 
put it, can be aggregated to the epistemic benefit of the entire polity are usually contingent 
upon such processes being self-conscious and intentional (rather than spontaneously 
ordered). Otherwise, the argument from cognitive diversity is not greatly different to, for 
example, a Hayekian endorsement of market orders (wherein markets are simply very 
good at accessing disparate, localised ‘bits’ of distributed information, via the actions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  







buyers and sellers in the market, and aggregating them through the “marvel” of the price 
system) (Hayek, 1945). 
Not all arguments from cognitive diversity go so far as to argue that democratic processes 
can be ‘truth-tracking’, as David Estlund’s does (2008, pp. 100-102), perhaps primarily 
because of a general preference for relativism and an understanding of the basic 
subjectivity and contestability of truth-claims.5 An assertion of democratic truth-tracking 
certainly invokes questions relevant to a Rousseauian approach to politics: can a given 
democratic outcome define the ‘truth’, to all intents and purposes, for a given polity? In 
which case, is democracy approximating the truth, or is it generating it? How unanimous 
must a decision be for that decision to achieve the status of ‘truth’, and are we able to 
allow that a truth can therefore change, if and when public opinion itself shifts?6  
This thesis argues that the universal franchise is valuable, and worth preserving in the face 
of the theoretical challenges that it will outline. These challenges come from several 
politically disparate quarters. It will argue that a great deal of academic literature dealing 
with the ideas (and desirability) of 'public reason' and 'deliberative democracy' are 
implicitly constructing arguments justifying the exclusion, limitation or 'laundering' of the 
preferences of the section of the citizenry whose conception of their interests does not 
coincide with a particular notion of the public good, and that the longstanding literature 
on the dangers of the ignorance of voting publics are often used as the basis for ethical 
arguments to exclude or dissuade the participation of those who do not fulfil one or 
another definition of "voting well".  
This project therefore includes both positive and negative arguments. Positively, it 
promotes a certain theory of, and approach to, democracy.  It will argue that 
contemporary representative democracies that are built around a maximisation of the 
voting franchise permit the most desirable forms of mandate-driven governance. This is 
not to say that representative democracies based upon a maximised voting franchise 
never produce undesirable policies. They do, and often. They create new problems and fail 
to solve existing ones, infringing upon important individual rights or failing to act in 
response to serious issues. Nevertheless, this thesis puts forward the following central 
claims: 
                                                             
5 For a very well-argued sceptical response to Estlund’s epistemic claims, Gerald Gaus’s ‘On Seeking 
the Truth (Whatever That Is) through Democracy’ (2011) should be the first port of call.  
6 These questions will be revisited in the second chapter’s discussion of Rousseau’s political 






a. Whatever their theoretical justification, increases in the epistemic burdens 
attached to the practice of voting (or otherwise participating) will result in some 
form of exclusion, and a narrowing of the franchise. 
b. The improvement of ‘input’ that could be derived from such changes will not 
necessarily result in better or more desirable outcomes, either in terms of policy 
formation or democratic accountability. 
c. A ‘broad and shallow’ model of participation - that is, one with a maximised 
population bearing political rights but a fairly minimal conception of what those 
political rights should entail - ensures desirable, widespread civic engagement on 
the part of citizens, a sense of the procedural fairness of their political system, a 
mandate-limitation on the ability for government or state to grow too large, and 
the protection of a private sphere, essential for the maintenance of  various 
productive, non-statist social orders. 
Or, to phrase these claims in simpler terms: 
a. Requiring better participation involves having fewer participants. 
b. Better participation probably does not mean more desirable outcomes overall. 
c. Breadth of participation is more desirable than depth. 
Claim c. is arguably the most controversial of these three, and so will be specifically 
explored in the next section.  
The Mythology of Democracy 
Theoretical justifications of democracy revolve around either a notion of the absolute 
values that it embodies (as in the cases of scholars such as Beetham (1991), Brighouse 
(1996), Cohen (2002), or Christiano (2003)) or promotes or a kind of instrumentalism 
where we are told that democracy ought to be valued in so far as it produces outcomes 
which reliably meet with some threshold of relative desirability, and can reasonably be 
said to do so more effectively than some alternative system of governance (see, for 
example: Riker (1982), Arneson (2004), or Landemore (2012)). This thesis comes much 
closer to the latter approach. However, it also criticises naïve instrumentalism. This 
project does not conclude that democracy is a reliable source of ‘better’ policies, or even of 






Rather, I argue that the culture of democratic participation itself creates valuable social 
stability. Regardless of the evidence, which is at best indeterminate as to the instrumental 
value of democracy, it is normal to value and have confidence in democracy as a matter of 
course – a phenomenon which I refer to in later chapters as the folk theory of democracy. It 
is the assumption of the value of participation which may be the most significant value of 
participation, creating a non-revolutionary outlet for political frustrations which is quite 
robust to the impact of selfish or ignorant citizens.  
This basis for the justification of democracy may be thought to generate a minor paradox: 
by most measures, citizens are wrong to value their democratic rights. Ignorant of this, 
they continue to do so - thus generating a basis by which to value their democratic rights.  
Just as an atheist might find a reason to value organised religion – “There may be no God, 
but the people who believe in one often do nice things and form mutually supportive 
relationships as a result”, she might say – the sceptical democratic theorist can 
nevertheless find grounds to endorse universal suffrage. As the very beginning of this 
introduction suggested, democracy is really a kind of mythos, presenting a pantheon of 
unreliable or implausible benefits and demanding certain ritualised behaviours from its 
adherents.7 As long as citizens continue to endorse and maintain their faith in the mythos 
in sufficient numbers, then the value of democracy becomes self-fulfilling. And, like all 
religions, democracy is threatened not only by its sceptics, but by the efforts and ideas of 
its most zealous followers.  
                                                             
7 I am certainly not the first to render this comparison. Friedrich Nietzsche famously described 
democracy as an outgrowth of the ‘herd morality’ that had been, in part, carefully cultivated by 
Christian religiosity: “the democratic movement is Christianity’s heir” (Nietzsche, 1886 [1990]).  
Patrick Deneen’s Democratic Faith (2005) offers a book-length disquisition on democracy using a 
similar metaphorical framework, and also a more literal one: for Deneen, democracy is not only 
like a religion, it is a religion. Where ultimately Deneen rejects both outright faith in democracy 
and overblown cynicism in favour of a carefully-drawn ‘democratic realism’, the reader will find 
that my thesis comes to endorse our ‘faith in things unseen’ as the producer of substantial 
desirable side-effects. From the perspective of the mainstream of democratic theory, both this 
work and Deneen’s will doubtless seem deeply cynical; an outright sceptic of democracy, 
however, will presumably see my piece as the work of an apologist: the political equivalent of 
Pascal’s Wager. Carl Schmitt, whose political and constitutional theories have been the subject of 
renewed scholarship in recent years following an extended period of marginalisation due to his 
significant engagement with the Nazi regime, also offers an account of “political theology” that is 
very pertinent here. Schmitt pointed out the simple transposition of assumed political authority 
from a divine rule of law, based upon the moral precepts and commandments of an omnipotent 
rule-giver, to a temporal one (Schmitt C. , 1922 [2005]). The essay Political Theology offers, among 
other things, an account of academic jurisprudence which relates the idea of authority – and 
legitimacy – to the root of a theological mindset. Bryan Caplan also makes the case that ongoing 
support for democracy in the face of various critiques is best understood as a kind of religiosity, 






This is a political theory which attempts to contrast many of our assumptions and intuitive 
ideas about politics with a generalised argument about the best way to ‘do’ democracy, 
and – as will have become clear from the above – the claims presented here will generally 
revolve around consequentialist, rather than deontic, arguments. Similarly to Knight and 
Johnson (2011), this thesis discusses how it seems sensible to doubt arguments in support 
of democracy that are founded upon absolute principles, or principles that are not 
explicitly justified in terms of consequential instrumentality. Plausible political theory 
should be robust in the face of moral (and other kinds) of relativism - that is, plausible and 
persuasive to those who do not necessarily share many of my own normative assumptions 
(even as it must be acknowledged that such assumptions are impossible to exclude from 
theory altogether), and certainly not dependent on the value of certain perceived moral 
goods, even if this perception is thought to be widespread. This leads me to agree with 
Knight and Johnson when they begin a democratic justification from the acknowledgement 
of "the plurality of feasible social institutions" (ibid., p. 105). My question, like theirs, 
becomes clear: from among the range of feasible social institutions, why value democracy? 
If, in other words, we discount the possibility that there can be any substantive epistemic 
or instrumental improvement in policy outcomes as a result of democratic procedures 
(rather than any other non-democratic procedures), and if we set aside the possibility of 
justifications of democracy that are founded upon pre-existing and non-consequential 
moral or ethical commitments to abstract fundamental principles such as freedom, justice 
or equality, are we left with any persuasive arguments in favour of democracy 
whatsoever? Can democracy, on balance, be justified without any assumptions about the 
moral norms that it fulfils or the epistemic benefits that it brings to policy? 
My answer to these questions is 'yes', with a single proviso. The perception of democratic 
efficacy in these two regards - that democratic procedures either produce better outcomes 
or satisfy our moral expectations, or both - forms the bedrock of the most robust utility of 
democracy: its capacity to generate a public sphere and civil society in which most citizens 
have confidence. The democratic public life that is generated by popular faith in 
democratic institutions carries with it numerous self-evidently beneficial side-effects, not 
least several that may appear rather conservative in nature. Confidence in democracy 
reduces the likelihood of revolutionary or otherwise destructive forms of radical social 
upheaval, a source of unconsciously meta-agreed social stability that is the prerequisite for 






In this analysis, then, democracy forms a kind of self-reinforcing mythology, riddled with 
apparent contradictions. It is considered to be absolutely morally fulfilling, even as we 
object to the idea of absolute moral truth; it is, in the Churchillian mode, identified as a 
‘least-bad’ system of governance, even as we question the epistemic virtues of citizens, the 
motivations of representatives, and struggle to locate evidence that proves substantively 
improved policy under democratic norms. Democracy is imagined to be fragile, vulnerable, 
susceptible to usurpation and weak in the face of anti-democratic opposition - but it is 
exactly this imagined weakness that motivates the forces that make democracy robust. 
We ought then to value democracy because the fact of our valuing it lends it authority and 
utility. Democracy is valuable because we, by and large, value it: a potentially paradoxical 
stance, certainly, yet also one that clearly captures a classic principle of democracy in its 
emphasis on the beliefs of its citizens. 
As a form of instrumental justification, it is worth noting that this analysis would strike 
many theorists as some species of non-instrumental reasoning. It appears to coincide, for 
example, with Elizabeth Anderson’s reading of Dewey, which hinges upon an 
epistemological account of certain non-instrumental values thought to arise from 
democratic practices (Anderson, 2006, p. 10). Here, democracy is valuable not because it 
gives the public influence over the institutions of government, and not because it improves 
citizens directly. Democracy is valuable because it gives citizens a reason to value their 
shared institutions and each other. It creates the basis for a sense of common cause, and a 
set of presumptions that can be embraced by individuals with wildly divergent political 
beliefs and private interests. We may extrapolate from this that, by embodying a culture of 
procedural fairness, democracy is able to undermine revolutionary ferment: it 
systematically discourages all opposition but the political, and makes political dissent 
itself seem “epistemically productive, not merely a matter for error” (Ibid.). And all the 
while, the 'failings' of 'mere' aggregative, representative democracy minimise the 
influence of individual citizens who are, according to social science, unlikely to be either 
publicly-reasoning or sufficiently expert as they go about formulating and expressing their 
preferences.  
This project represents, in part, an effort to develop a justification of democracy that is not 
contingent on any optimistic epistemic assumptions about a democracy’s constitutive 
participants. In this sense it is a rather ‘Austrian’ or ‘Classical Liberal’ effort. By taking as 
given the fact of knowledge problems (and attendant large-scale coordination problems) 






predict their own social requirements or the consequences of the political actions they 
take in order to realise whatever improvements they do target, this thesis concerns itself 
with the possibility of a consequentialist account that does not require any of the ‘usual 
suspects’ of supposed democratic benefits – truth-tracking, epistemic improvement, 
citizen improvement, and so on.8  
A Note on Epistemology and Methodology 
This discussion signposts a number of important methodological decisions that underpin 
the following chapters. First, a key component of this project is an acceptance that many of 
the variables salient to social science and political theory are subject to fundamental 
uncertainty. This has ramifications not only for the epistemic value of democracy itself, but 
for any serious attempt to study or render normative arguments about democracy as well. 
The boundaries of human knowledge (and potential human knowledge) are almost 
impossible to draw, as they are themselves subject to the uncertainties that they 
circumscribe.  
This project opts to leave such questions open, and to focus on the plausible 
communicability of presumed knowledge. In other words, individuals usually believe that 
they grasp a certain idea or can support a belief with an argument or evidence. What 
pertains most for democracy – and democratic theory – is the question of whether these 
understandings can be successfully communicated between individuals, or from 
individuals to institutions and back again.  
Ignorance and uncertainty are significant factors in the shape of human interaction and 
their study. It is likely that non-ignorance and certainty, even when observed by a student 
of human behaviour and politics, will not be recognised as such. For example, the vast 
majority of democratic theory – and of social science in general – operates on the 
assumption of the existence of individual preferences that are, at any given time, both 
static and recoverable (Green & Shapiro, 1994, p. 14; Amadae, 2003).9 When Susie is 
                                                             
8 Justifications of democracy will be dealt with in a more sustained way in the first chapter of this 
thesis. For an example of an approach that takes as its starting point the paucity of most 
instrumental justifications of democracy due to human epistemic limitations which then goes on 
to endorse democracy as a stability-generating system, see various contributions by Jon Elster 
(1997; 1993). 
9 It is worth noting that, while deliberative democrats believe in the plasticity of preferences in the 







ordering her dinner, the social scientist would often presume that she has formulated a 
certain constellation of preferences - the chicken is preferable to the lasagne, which she in 
turn prefers to the pizza, for example. The assumption is that Susie has certain motivations 
for this arrangement of preferences, and that she can both recognise her own preferences 
and, when necessary, find a way to successfully communicate them. Without assuming 
such reliable and relatively orderly sets of information, the prospect of modelling human 
behaviour so as to understand it better becomes hopeless.  
Yet the abstractions that form a basis for such models are in doubt. It is likely that reality 
is significantly more complex, and more easily subject to change, than the social scientists 
and political theorists would prefer: even our perceptions of reality may be impossible to 
then codify into language and then transmit, because there is no particularly reliable way 
to verify the successfulness of our attempts at communication. Hence a great deal of social 
science is conducted in a language of plausibilities, rather than certainties, and the 
predictive value of such ‘science’ is assumed to be extremely limited. The very existence of 
social science – and the broadly ‘analytical’ approach to political theory that is its 
counterpart – is predicated upon a widespread epistemological realism, wherein we agree 
to set such considerations aside so as to make progress in our arguments and inquiries. 
This work recognises the difficulty of arriving at certainties in the ways described above – 
and, indeed, rejects the notion of certainty in a way that may be reminiscent of 
dialecticism’s rejection of the ‘reification’ – the attempt to render as wholly objective – of 
the abstract, the complex, or the essentially contestable (Lukacs, 1923 [1971]).10 Common 
ground may also be found here with the fundamental assumptions behind the ‘Austrian 
School’ of economics; this thesis’ broad-based uncertainty principle is similar to that 
which underpins Hayek’s arguments against the central planning of complex systems – 
which he uses to argue that necessary information may be too well-hidden, too widely-
scattered, for efficient planning (Hayek, 1967).  
One of the risks of fundamental assumptions of this sort – we could call them a-priori 
theory – is that one may unconsciously incorporate (or intentionally smuggle) 
controversial or at least contestable claims into a preliminary statement of the ontological 
fundamentals that underpin a certain work rather than actually expounding or defending 
such claims directly. For example, Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Democracy: The God that Failed 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
turn’ in deliberative democracy must also necessarily depend upon a set of positivist 
presuppositions with regards to the gatherability of individual preference arrangements. 
10 Of course, the risk of thorough-going dialecticism – that as an intellectual approach it is capable 






explicitly incorporates, as a matter of first-order a-priori theory, the claims that “[e]very 
action is aimed at improving the actor’s subjective wellbeing”, “[i]nterpersonal conflict is 
possible only if and insofar as resources are scarce”, and “[d]emocracy … is incompatible 
with private property”. For Hoppe, these are not essentially contestable claims, but a 
matter of “common sense”, and do not necessarily need to be subject to any standard of 
falsification (Hoppe, 2001, p. xv). This thesis, by contrast, will aim to establish (as far as 
possible) its theoretical priors whenever they exert significant influences on the claims 
and conclusions that it offers.  
Some parts of this work will make use of extended case-studies in an attempt to analyse or 
demonstrate a certain phenomenon in microcosm rather than engage with larger, more 
unwieldy bodies of evidence or literature. For example, the practices of the Occupy 
movement will be considered in some detail because they appear to be exemplary of the 
processes – and possible costs – of deliberative democracy. Elsewhere, an extended, 
critical consideration of Gerry Mackie’s Democracy Defended (2003) is used to engage with 
a debate between ‘instability theorists’ and their opponents. Extrapolating wider 
conclusions from these narrower examinations is necessarily fraught with difficulties, and 
so this thesis will always supplement them with a more generalised discussion of the 
evidence that is to hand elsewhere.  
This thesis also makes some use of qualitative and quantitative evidence, none of which 
was gathered for its own specific purposes. Rather, it offers fresh analyses and 
considerations of data that are gathered and presented by other researchers in other 
works – for example, the extended discussion of group behaviour and the possible effects 
of political anonymity-loss in Chapter Six depends upon a combination of classic studies 
and contemporary findings in the field of social psychology. In other parts of the thesis 
many of my claims – such as those regarding the extent of public ignorance – are founded 
upon survey data from a range of sources. This project has involved an attempt to assess 
the validity of such research, and the dependability of the methods employed by such 
studies, and sets out to explain the limitations of such evidence, or to exclude altogether 
such research as seems to me to be especially problematic. In some cases it will borrow 
the data, though usually very few of the conclusions, from a certain study, in order to 
render some original analysis. The intention, when this is the case, is to make explicit the 
particularities of the usage of others’ data, and justify its use in-context. 
The engagement with social psychology that is both prescribed and put into practice by 






may constitute its most tangible contribution to the literature on deliberative democracy. 
Chapter Six explains the potential for collaborative academia between the fields of social 
psychology and democratic theory, as many theories of democracy make insubstantial 
claims that may be testable by social-psychological studies, while a great deal of 
psychological studies could benefit from being interpreted through the analytical lens of 
political theory. Without a sophisticated understanding of the effects of various 
democratic practices on human psychology, and the impact of psychological 
predispositions on the efficacy of democratic participation, democratic theory will remain 
at a significant analytical disadvantage. 
Chapter Outline: Two Routes to Disenfranchisement 
As an initial step, I will elucidate the broader theoretical context for my concerns, with a 
pair of chapters that attempt to set out the current state of the debates taking place in 
academic democratic theory.  
Chapter One focuses on the difficulty of establishing a justificatory standard for 
democracy. It posits that neither deontic (or intrinsic- or inherent-value) nor purely 
instrumental justificatory systems are wholly satisfactory. Instrumental justifications of 
democracy, in particular, do not specifically allow for a more fine-grained distinction 
between the realisation of subjective and objective interests, overlooking the spontaneous 
and unintended consequential benefits that constitute the true value of democracy. 
Paradoxically, it is the fact of public confidence in democratic norms and institutions that 
itself gives rise to reasonable conditions for such confidence, and thus justifies democracy.  
Chapter Two is concerned with an exploration of the commonplace, Enlightenment-
informed perspective that democracies are able to benefit from plausible substantive 
agreement, and consensus, on political questions. This leads to a discussion of various  
theoretical responses to a central ‘epistemic dilemma’ between the cognitive diversity and 
epistemic compatibility of democratic participants, and goes on to elucidate two areas of 
scholarship that are central to the development of consensus-oriented democratic theory: 
first, the contractualisms of Hobbes and Rousseau, and second, the diversity of 
deliberative democratic theories. All of these are contingent upon some presupposition on 
the plausibility of collective rationality and consensus-targeting politics.  
Following from the wide-ranging literature surveys that inform most of the first two 






of anti-democrats and radical reformists, primarily focusing on those theories that attempt 
to address the epistemic inadequacies of voting publics. Chapter Three concentrates on a 
category of anti-democratic or radical-democratic theories which includes thinkers who 
believe that many (if not most) voters are too ignorant (or radically ignorant) to plausibly 
contribute to good democratic decision making. This, it is thought, can only encourage the 
populism of representatives who seek only to satisfy the requirements of their own re-
election by a majority of people whose political ignorance is such that their satisfaction 
cannot reliably coincide with the real interests of the public. The chapter outlines the 
evidence for public ignorance, its implications for politics, and attempts to refute the 
arguments of the Platonists who use it as a basis for arguing against the universal 
franchise. This chapter also codifies the ‘folk theory of democracy’ whose satisfaction – 
through the maintenance of a universal franchise – may be central to sustaining 
confidence in democratic institutions. 
Chapter Four is the first of three consecutive chapters dealing with deliberative 
democracy. It attempts to fully explicate the concept of ‘public reason’ as hybridising the 
act of reason-giving and the epistemic state of ‘being reasonable’, and the source of 
plausible meta-agreement given the implausibility of substantive consensus on answers to 
political questions. As a result, public reason functions as a stringent epistemic 
requirement for would-be deliberative participants. The chapter will take into account the 
approach of a range of contributors to the literature on public reason, including Habermas 
and Rawls. It will then attempt to narrow its analysis by casting doubt on the commonly-
adopted distinction between ‘consensus’ and ‘convergence’ accounts offered by public 
reason liberals, arguing that ‘convergence’ is not recognisable as a version of public reason 
at all.  
Chapter Five is concerned with the debate between theorists who hold that aggregative 
democracies are implicitly prone to arbitrary outcomes (such as Arrow and Riker), and 
those who question or seek to escape the implications of such conclusions. A discussion of 
the most significant criticisms of the social choice critique of democracy yields the 
conclusion that the critique remains, in large part, relevant to democracy. Deliberative 
democracy has been put forward as a possible ‘escape route’: by fostering deliberative 
meta-agreement, it may inculcate ‘single-peaked’ rationality on the part of citizens, 
markedly reducing the plausibility of the social choice argument about democratic 
arbitrariness. The chapter will cast some doubt on both the efficacy of deliberation as a 







Chapter Six argues that any form of deliberative participation would necessarily entail the 
loss of political anonymity that is enjoyed as part of secret balloting. This anonymity-loss 
could entail several undesirable consequences. First, there is the danger that individuals 
or minorities with views which are popularly held to be less-justifiable will be filtered out 
of such a public decision-making process by effective self-selection. Second, self-interested 
choices carrying a greater argumentative 'weight' may be abnegated by such a process. 
Using evidence from social-psychological studies, chapter 6 will show that the side-effects 
of group dynamics and risk of ostracism in a deliberative forum could greatly undermine 
whatever epistemic benefits could be gained from deliberation itself.  
The thesis will then offer a Conclusion, revisiting the principal themes and claims of the 
preceding dissertation, inter-relating them and using them as grounds for a more 
extended discussion of the thesis of democratic confidence in a wider context that 
assumes the presence of democratic crisis. This final section will also consider whether 
the conclusions of this thesis leave any room at all for deliberation in democracy, before 
rounding out the argument that the myths of democracy’s virtues are spontaneously 







Chapter One: The Justification of 
Democracy 
 
In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed  
definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is  
almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are  
praising it: consequently the defenders of every kind of regime  
claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to  
stop using that word if it were tied down to any one meaning. 
George Orwell (1946) 
 
In some possible worlds, probably some past states of the  
actual world, and possibly in some future actual scenarios,  
autocracy wins by the best results test and should be  
installed. Democracy is extrinsically not intrinsically just. 




This chapter will argue that neither deontic (intrinsic values-based) nor instrumentalist 
justifications of democracy are wholly satisfactory. Rather, political theory must attempt 
to find grounds to value democracy in a consequentialist way that will sometimes deviate 
from the content of instrumentalist claims. The methodological issues raised by such an 
approach are discussed. In closing the chapter offers one possible consequentialist 
argument in favour of aggregative, representative democracy, establishing the 
groundwork for the following chapters (which primarily seek to critique theoretical 








The Diversity of Democratic Justifications 
Democracy may be best understood as the ‘normal’ form of government – for, as Ian 
Shapiro has put it, democracy of some kind is “close to non-negotiable” in practical 
political terms (2003a, p. 1). The range of possible democratic subtypes, and the potential 
for academic debates over whether one or another system of government really counts as 
democratic, is very large indeed. Confronted by these two facts, that many social orders 
are democratic in some way, and that those social orders whose democratic credentials 
are questionable will often seek to self-describe as democracies anyway, we can 
legitimately conclude that democracy, to use an analysis along the lines of those often 
deployed by Michael Freeden, is a concept with enough perceived value to motivate 
attempts at its decontestation by ideological groups (Freeden, 1998).  
Why, then, might we value democracy? Is it because we prefer the “public ownership” of 
the institutionalised basis of authority in a society, best understood when distinguished 
from the “privately owned” political systems of aristocratic or monarchical regimes 
(Hoppe, 2001)? Do we believe that it can help us to ‘track truths’, as Estlund (2008) claims, 
or are we satisfied that it offers us the best way to achieve certain collective goals given 
the fact of multifaceted social pluralism? Is it valuable in a procedural way, or due to its 
promotion of a certain mind-set in citizens? Might we value democracy because it seems to 
us to approximate the literal rule of the many, which seems to us to be more legitimate 
and fair on some instinctive or intrinsic level? Or do we value contemporary democracy 
because it tends toward representative systems, ‘outsourcing’ the hard work of political 
participation?  
This multiplicity of questions has invited a multitude of academic responses, each of which 
contributes to a literature of democratic justification. This chapter (and, to an extent, the 
next) will incorporate a survey of relevant literature that amounts to only a small cross-
section of classic and contemporary democratic theory, since a truly exhaustive review of 
such a large body of work would be an impossibility.  
One important preliminary consideration is that, in essence, democracy is more diversified 
in theory than it is in practice. One of the central subjects of this thesis, deliberative 
democracy, blends an explicit political programme with a theoretical foundation that 
draws directly from the classic contributions of ideal theory. Whereas democratic theory 
has a longstanding tradition of discussing the internal preferences and real interests of 
citizens, real-world democracies (and the theories that underpin them) have operated 






(or any other participatory mechanisms open to them). Deliberative democracy, by 
specifying an idealised system of democratic engagement, necessarily implies an ideal 
conception of democratic participants as well, and suggests ways in which to instil within 
real participants these preferable epistemic qualities, or filter for them. It therefore 
constitutes an attempt to bridge this ideal/real division, and this has implications for the 
extent of its persuasiveness from either perspective.  
Democracy existed as an ideal in the modern era long before any attempt at its 
implementation as a political system, and the practical demands of real politics have often 
led to a cannibalisation of the democratic ideal. Democracy both persists as a realistic 
political proposition and subsists on the idealised notions at the heart of its original 
conception. Contemporary democracies do not tend to effectively embody even the most 
abstract of the principles with which they are routinely associated, but it is these 
principles that lend them an almost undeniable rhetorical power. It is difficult to argue 
against the concept of democracy as a means for realising personal political equality and 
the legitimacy of government, even as democracy makes negligible difference to the 
practical limits of our autonomy and does not offer much in the way of a government-
legitimating mechanism either. The result is that very few would today dare to object to a 
political structure as hegemonic and as intellectually dominant as democracy, however 
loosely-defined that structure remains, and however weakly extant democracies 
incorporate foundational democratic values. 
Those who do object to or critique democracy tend to limit their discussion to either the 
‘real’ or the ‘ideal’ version of that concept; and thus all mainstream theoretical criticisms 
of democratic systems tend to be answered with recourse to either idealised notions or to 
pragmatic realism. If one were to claim simply that democratic procedures are unreliable 
aggregators, and that they will plausibly generate arbitrary outcomes from legitimate 
preference sets (as, for example, Kenneth Arrow (1951 [1963]) and William H. Riker 
(1982) have done), one need not attempt the kind of detailed practical rebuttal offered by 
Gerry Mackie (2003) in order to continue to venerate the ideal of democratic 
governance.11 Similarly, an ethical objection to democracy – for example, a complaint 
about equal political access being afforded to individuals with varying epistemic capacities 
– may be dismissed with recourse to what we might call the Churchillian endorsement of 
                                                             
11 See Chapter Five of this thesis for a specific consideration of Arrow and Riker’s criticisms of 






democratic pragmatism: it is the best option only in so far as it is the worst option 
excluding all other options.  
Thus, from a certain perspective, the prevalence of democracy as the ‘normal’ form of 
human government is not hard to explain. Wherever it is implemented, the ideals at the 
heart of democracy are largely perceived to be similar, and the attempted 
implementations of these ideals themselves seem to take on one of a few familiar forms. 
Representatives are elected on a regular or semi-regular timetable, constitutional 
questions or issues of foundational importance are referred to a plebiscite, and political 
parties coalesce in various ways in order to set the political agenda. Under a presidential 
republic or a Westminster-style parliamentary system, these essentials are unquestioned, 
and largely unquestionable – from among the various systems depicted in David Held’s 
survey of democratic models, for example, it is striking how limited the variations are at a 
macro level, just as in Arend Lijphart’s comparative study of democratic institutions in 36 
countries (Held, 2006; Lijphart, 1999 [2012]). Democracy is not often associated with the 
classical forms that it took in antiquity, and its more radical templates are under-theorised 
in practical terms, lying far from the political mainstream. The consistency of the 
pragmatic liberal democratic form may almost seem to justify Fukuyama-styled theses as 
to the basis of its hegemony.12  
It is reasonable, therefore, to assert that democratic theory has been far more diverse than 
democratic practice, and has been subject to a variety of proposed typologies and 
category-systems. This thesis will offer several overlapping approaches to distinguishing 
between various contributions to the literature on democratic theory. 
Instrumental and Intrinsic Reasons to Value Democracy 
Democratic theories may best be distinguished from one another in terms of their 
justification for democracy over other possible forms of social order, or, indeed, by their 
                                                             
12 Francis Fukuyama famously, and perhaps prematurely, described a kind of culmination in the 
patterns of political and ideological contestation that had marked history until the close of the 
cold war and collapse of the USSR, meaning that liberal democracy could be the most-evolved and 
final system of human government, in his The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Of course, 
the ideal-theory version of democracy has never been implemented. From the perspective of an 
idealist, liberal democracies (or polyarchies, or electoral oligarchies) appear to be wholly 
toothless. Yet the uniformity of the liberal-democratic form, in so far as we can agree to label it as 






conclusion that democracy is in no significant or measurable way preferable to competing 
forms of social order.  
When theorists understand democracy as being in need of justification relative to other 
social orders, their efforts generally appear to operate in one of two basic ways. On the one 
hand there are intrinsic-value (or deontic) justifications, and, on the other, instrumentalist 
ones. Estlund (2008) handily summarises the nature of this distinction when he writes 
that democracy cannot really be considered to be consequentially valued by democratic 
citizens. Citizens do not, after all, lose faith in democracy every time it gets something 
wrong or produces a sub-optimal decision. Rather, we accept that democratic decisions 
have force – or authority – even if they are not “right” (p. 7).13 “Political nihilists” (as he 
calls them), who hold “that the only political values are procedural”, are thus required to 
determine whether there is “any reasoned basis of normative support for one form of 
politics over another” (pp. 26-7). This very question, inviting the justification of 
democracy as one plausible social order among many, is the real subject of this chapter 
(and the one tackled by many important contributions to democratic theory – see, for 
example, Knight and Johnson (2011)). 
Some theorists, such as Richard Arneson (2004) or Ian Shapiro (2003b), use the ‘intrinsic 
vs. instrumental’ distinction quite explicitly in their discussions of democratic theory. It is 
appealing in so far as it allows easy comparison with the similar organising 
differentiations used in related fields of theory. This simple distinction, however, does fall 
somewhat short of total persuasiveness, and some of the reasons for this weakness shall 
be outlined below in order to problematize the instrumentalist category in particular, and 
further subdivide the theories which fall within it. Let us nevertheless proceed for now 
with this classic distinction in place. In approaches to democratic justification, we may 
encounter: 
1. Intrinsic-value, inherent-value or deontic theories, wherein the fundamental (and 
often quite abstract) values embodied or upheld by democracy are considered to 
establish justifications prior to, and even irrespective of, democracy’s measurable 
performance in satisfying the preferences and desires of citizens. 
                                                             
13 This is best understood as a rejection of the notion that citizens endorse democracy in an act-
consequentialist way, leaving open the possibility of a rule-consequentialist justification of 
democracy, where, notwithstanding specific outcomes that are undesirable, the overall 
consequences of democracy are considered to be preferable those of competing social orders. 
This argument is made particularly clear by Estlund in his essay ‘Beyond Fairness and 






2. Instrumentalist theories, wherein democracy’s ability to realise desirable 
objectives and/or satisfy the preferences of citizens is the main basis of its value. 
From this perspective, democracy’s possible embodiment of fundamental 
conceptual goods is only important in so far as it contributes to its efficacy as a tool 
for the realisation of certain outcomes. 
These conceptions of democratic justification naturally overlap, as we shall see in the 
following discussion. If all one wants from democracy is a measurable increase in equality, 
then one might be able to justify it in both instrumental and intrinsic terms: Democracy is 
inherently characterised by increased political equality (in that some extent of political 
equality is entailed in the definition of democracy), and this is itself a consequence of 
democracy. Nevertheless, let us consider this divide in the justificatory literature before 
further problematizing it. 
1. Intrinsic-Value, Inherent-Value or Deontic Justifications 
In the first type of theory, the underpinning values embodied by democracy are judged to 
be more important than the outcomes of democratic procedures, and capable of 
establishing the desirability of democracy irrespective of actual outcomes. For example, if I 
believe that human dignity or freedom are inherently embodied and fulfilled by democratic 
social orders, and that the realisation of these intrinsic goods is sufficient for a justification 
of democracy even if I suspect or observe that democracies (by some metric) perform less 
well than other forms of government, then I am valuing democracy intrinsically, 
inherently, or deontically. Theory of this sort is well-represented in the literature, and 
deontic arguments are often employed alongside more obviously instrumentalist claims. 
The essential contention of a justificatory approach that attaches inherent value to 
democracy as constitutive, rather than contributive, to some desirable state, is expressed 
very clearly by Seymour Lipset: “Democracy is not only or even primarily a means through 
which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good of society; it is the good 
society itself in operation” (Lipset, 1960, p. 403). To accept the central value that 
democracy embodies is thus to accept democracy itself.  
Thomas Christiano, though orienting his defence of democracy around a mixed approach 
that aims to incorporate both procedural and instrumentalist justifications (Christiano, 
2003, p. 3), often collapses his arguments to the extent of such an “intrinsic moral value” of 
democratic institutionalism. The principle of “public equality”, in particular, is described 






p. 2). Indeed, many of Christiano’s lines of argument are founded upon powerful examples 
of inherent-value claims, as in his discussion of various possible justifications  of 
deliberative democracy: “To the extent that mutual respect and concern is demanded by 
justice, it is intrinsically important that people treat each other in this way” (1997, p. 245). 
Democracy, to the extent that it is constitutive of the minimal requirements of a notion of 
justice, may thus be valued deontically. For Christiano as for other democratic theorists 
who are primarily concerned with egalitarianism as an overriding social good, the facts of 
reasonable pluralism, public diversity and pervasive disagreement are not an obstacle to 
the realisation of an instrumentally valuable democratic procedure, but an argument for 
the necessity of equal standing between those with divergent moral claims (Singer, 1973; 
Christiano, 2003; 2008, p. 75). As Christiano explains, “[a]nyone who is excluded from 
participation in discussion and decision-making can see that his or her interests are not 
being taken seriously and may legitimately infer that his or her moral standing is being 
treated as less than that of others” (2008, p. 88). In so far as justice is defined by public 
equality, exclusion is constitutive of injustice – meaning that inclusion, and thus 
democracy, is constitutive of justice.14  
Harry Brighouse, both in his discussion of democracy as the state of an equal availability of 
political influence and his rather less persuasive argument (with Marc Fleurbaey) in 
favour of a democracy that is oriented around a principle of proportionality, makes 
sustained use of intrinsic justifications (Brighouse, 1996; Brighouse & Fleurbaey, 2010). 
Brighouse characterises democracy simply as the state of political equality, which is itself 
important to the realisation of meaningful egalitarianism. For Brighouse, Democracy is 
thus justifiable on an intrinsic level rather than in terms of instrumental egalitarianism, 
which would simply stipulate that democracy is desirable to the extent that it is 
productive of material equality. Under Brighouse’s approach, the just distribution of 
material resources is not the objective of democracies, but may in fact form the basis for 
the realisation of political equality, and thus democracy, itself: democracy (or “equal 
access to political influence”) is not really a means, but a desired end (1996, p. 128).  
                                                             
14 This deontic justification of democracy on the basis of the justice of inclusivity may have 
significant implications for any epistemically-driven democratic theory that requires the 
narrowing of democratic participation, as the following chapters of this thesis shall discuss. For 
now, it is worth asking: is deliberative democracy, with its emphasis on those reasons that are 
acceptable to others, fully inclusive or respectful of the contributions of those whose reasons are 
found to be less acceptable? This is not a problem that Christiano himself appears to be concerned 






Brighouse later shifts emphasis to the idea that the influence of each citizen should be 
proportional to the extent to which they are affected by the outcome of a given decision 
(and since the least-wealthy tend to feel the effects of political decisions more keenly than 
the most-wealthy in general, therefore realise a certain conception of redistributive 
justice). Political egalitarianism is thus justifiable in cases where the ‘stakes’ of all citizens 
are roughly the same; under other circumstances, it behoves democratic institutions to 
treat participants differently. As before, the ‘resource’ that must be distributed justly is 
political power itself. This shift may involve a redefinition of the intrinsic attributes of 
democracy, but does not alter Brighouse’s mode of argumentation, which is centred on the 
realisation of democracy-as-justice (2010, p. 152) – though, as we shall see in the next sub-
section’s discussion of Estlund’s rather similar (and earlier) line of argument, the line 
between the instrumental realisation of just outcomes and the positing of democracy as 
the embodiment of some conception of justice can be very indeterminate indeed.  
Other intrinsic justifications operate around democracy’s embodiment of reasoned, 
evaluated, and thus legitimated decision-making. The justificatory force of these 
arguments is not contingent on some external assessment of the quality of decisions 
themselves, but rather on the inherent value of a legitimised politics (Beetham, 1991; 
Weale, 2010). Indeed, for Albert Weale, the centrality of democracy’s capacity for 
legitimation also forms the basis for valuing the analytical framework of political theory 
itself. An approach that centres legitimation as an inherent justificatory value will come 
under discussion as this thesis turns its attention to theories of deliberative democracy in 
following chapters. 
2. Instrumental Justifications 
In order to be categorised as a theorist of the second type, one must, irrespective of 
whether democracy embodies the condition of freedom or dignity (or something else) for 
its constituents, value democracies because they tend to produce desirable outcomes. This 
implies a certain conditionality, for if I am presented with evidence that some other 
system of government will produce outcomes that are more desirable to me, then as an 
instrumentalist I will then endorse this other non-democratic system. This is generally 
thought to require both a notion of what it is that I desire – my preferences – and, from 
these, some way of measuring the extent to which my preferences have been fulfilled – a 
metric.  
Many instrumentalist accounts engage with democracy as a catch-all description for a 






and others less-so. Ronald Dworkin particularly questioned the value of a democratic 
proceduralism that does not simultaneously foster a culture of rational public discourse 
and mutual respect between interest groups. The onus, then, is on theorists and political 
practitioners to develop “a conception of democracy that matches that sense of 
democracy’s value: We need an understanding that shows us what is so good about 
democracy” (Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 2000, p. 363). It is arguably the case that most 
democratic systems will be majoritarian in nature, and majority rule, for Dworkin, is not 
intrinsically valuable. Here, then, is an argument for a degree of equality and “partnership” 
between citizens that is not constitutive of an endorsement of democracy’s inherent value, 
but rather the necessary precondition for attaching any instrumental value to democratic 
processes whatsoever. Indeed, in presenting inequalities as ineluctably generated by 
democracy in the absence of corrective constitutional and cultural norms, Dworkin 
essentially provides grounds to question egalitarian claims about the inherent value of 
democracy (2000, p. 201), and sets the stage for a difficult examination of the possibility of 
redeeming contemporary democracies (Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, 2006). 
In his important discussion of democracy’s value relative to alternative social orders, 
Robert Dahl approaches the problem of democratic justification from a different angle. 
Addressing the idea that the objectives of good governance would be best served not by an 
epistemically questionable democratic public but by some narrower group of more-expert 
“Guardians”,15 Dahl argues that there is no Guardian who could reliably establish moral 
truth – not least because moral truths are essentially contested – or get to grips with 
“instrumental knowledge” without needing to fall back upon democracy anyway (Dahl, 
1989, p. 66). This is because the preferences that establish the requirement for their own 
fulfilment (and so instrumentally justify democracy) are contained within the public good, 
and dissemination of such concepts of the public good is that which is established by a 
successful democratic process. Guardians would have to be able to distinguish between 
partial or private interests from this public good, and the procedure that would allow 
them to do so would essentially be democracy (p. 74). What this argument establishes is 
the idea that democratic processes are inherently productive of a notion of the public 
good, but not necessarily of that notion’s realisation. Dahl’s instrumentalism leads him to 
compare democratic social orders directly with plausible alternatives such as 
‘guardianship’ (as well as anarchism). Interestingly, only when an idealised, virtuous and 
                                                             
15 ‘Guardians’ is Dahl’s term for these theoretical experts; we might also use the term ‘technocrat’ or 
‘meritocratic oligarch’. This thesis refers to this entire family of arguments as ‘Platonist’, and does 
not necessarily view them as intrinsically anti-democratic. In any case, an engagement with such 






omniscient Guardian is compared to a similarly idealised democracy is a degree of deontic 
justification introduced in Dahl’s argument: a perfect Guardian would still be unable to 
compete with democracy’s capacity for giving citizens freedom (p. 78).  
Estlund is very direct in addressing the inadequacies of purely egalitarian justifications of 
democracy, arguing that unequal distributions of political power may at least plausibly 
deliver more just outcomes than a system that prioritises a Brighousian requirement for 
equal availability of political power (Estlund, 2000).16 The possibility put forward here is 
that not every deviation from principled egalitarianism need itself be unfair. One could 
establish procedurally ‘fair’ rules for the deviation of fairness in instances where an 
instrumental end is better served by, for example, epistemically-justified inequalities in 
democracy (p. 140). Just as Rawls is able to tolerate deviations from resource-
egalitarianism if inequalities are at least beneficial to the worst-off  (in line with his 
‘difference principle’ (Rawls, 1971)), Estlund suggests that a kind of difference principle 
could be applied  to the distribution of political power. Brighouse’s recent turn to a 
democracy of proportional influence may be understood to be undertaking a similar 
egalitarianism-weakening project on the basis of a different principle for the fair deviation 
from fairness.  
One important part of the instrumentalist literature orients an endorsement of democracy 
around its potential to yield and incorporate a wide range of alternative perspectives, 
understandings and approaches as policies are formulated and problems are solved. This 
may be expressed as a version of Deweyan ‘experimentalism’ or, more commonly, as an 
argument from the idea of ‘cognitive diversity’, or what Estlund describes as “the 
epistemic value of discussion among diverse participants” (Why Not Epistocracy?, 2003, p. 
56). Helen Landemore, for example, bases her justification of democracy upon the 
empirical claim that the ability to make use of cognitively diverse participants gives 
democratic institutions a marked advantage over non-democratic counterparts (2012, p. 
331). Epistemically speaking, democracies can therefore be expected to do at least as well 
as, and sometimes better than, a benevolent dictator or a group of experts. This is a 
                                                             
16 In the same piece, Estlund also makes the interesting point that Rawls chose the term ‘fairness’ 
over ‘equality’ while making a similarly narrow (but recognisable) case for the worth of 
democracy (2000, p. 132). Rawls’ semantic preference is echoed by Charles Beitz in his book, 
Political Equality: “were it not for a desire to respect the traditional usage, we should dispense 
with the phrase political equality altogether and refer instead to the more fundamental value of 
political fairness” (Beitz, 1989, p. 218). This makes sense, given Beitz’s clearly Rawls-inspired 
emphasis on contractualism. In the case of neither Rawls nor Beitz is it particularly clear how 
much their reciprocal and mutually respectful version of political egalitarianism (or fairness) is 






“strong” epistemic argument (a “weak” version of this argument would claim only that 
democracies can be relied upon to perform better than some randomised decision 
system).  
Cognitive diversity is potentially important to the justification of democracy because a 
wide range of perspectives will be more likely to include all information that is crucial to 
the making of a decision. A narrow epistocracy, even one composed of genius-level 
experts, will leave decision-making in the hands of a group that is likely to be less 
experientially diverse and more intellectually (and descriptively) similar than in any 
democracy. Elizabeth Anderson describes this as the ‘Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem’, 
which suggests that where the following premises pertain: 
 a hard problem (one which no individual will always be able to solve it correctly), 
 a group of problem solvers who converge on a limited set of possible solutions,  
 Said problem solvers are epistemically diverse (that is, they "don't all converge on 
the same local optimum"), and  
 There are many problem solvers who work together in "moderate sized groups", 
- then a "randomly selected collection of problem solvers outperforms a collection of the 
best problem solvers” (Anderson, 2006, p. 13; Hong & Page, 2004). In other words, there 
appears to be evidence to support the hypothesis that a democracy of diverse, lay 
participants is capable of trumping a technocracy or epistocracy of experts.  
Of course, extant liberal democracies are built around procedurally narrowing the 
epistemic diversity of citizens’ inputs, which suggests that arguments along these lines are 
actually dealing with a rather abstracted, idealised notion of democratic procedure 
(Dryzek, 1990). Democratic representatives, and the citizens who choose to vote for them, 
already represent a kind of ‘biased sample’ of the general population. They must all (with 
the exception of places with compulsory voting) have in common a political mind-set, a 
sense of civic duty, or something along these lines. Perhaps more importantly, large-scale 
electoral democracies are based upon a range of options or candidates that have already 
been narrowed-down, pre-selected by a much smaller set of (cognitively non-diverse) 
politicians, administrators, or bureaucrats. By setting the agenda in this way, everyday 
democracies rather limit the realism of arguments from cognitive diversity. 
While cognitive diversity arguments seem to take the pluralism of contemporary societies 






democratic process on the idea that democratic citizenship is more improving and 
educative – more conducive to a republican-styled ‘good life’ of civic virtue – than the 
citizenship of alternative systems could be. John Stuart Mill saw grounds for the 
justification of democracy in terms such as these (Mill, 2004 [1861]), as, ultimately, does 
William Nelson (1980). Nelson doubts that inherent-value claims can survive exportation 
to a real world filled with actual questions of policy or procedural justification posited by 
democratic citizens (The Epistemic Value of the Democratic Process, 2008), and 
recognises that a democracy needs to be at least somewhat sensitive to the possible 
epistemic failings of its public (1980, p. 91). The justification of democracy arises instead 
from democracy’s ability to incentivise a citizenry with a principled morality, in particular 
due to the “salutary effects of publicity” (1980, pp. 109, 111; 2008, p. 30).  
This line of justification holds significant promise. If, as Arneson writes, “political 
democracy might work to improve people’s character on the average,” then the other 
important measures of democratic outcomes might be dismissible: “[A] democratic 
political order might be preferable to a nondemocratic alternative all things considered 
even if the laws and public policies generated by the nondemocratic order would be 
superior to those the democracy would produce” (Arneson, 2009, p. 198). 
Some of the potential obstacles for epistemic instrumentalism – justificatory accounts 
based upon cognitive diversity or civic virtue – will be addressed in a detailed way by later 
chapters of this thesis. However, it is worth noting that neither of these accounts can 
clearly compensate for the issues associated with public ignorance, and the possibility that 
such ignorance is rationally motivated. As Arneson notes, “[d]emocratic instrumentalism 
becomes plausible by successful rebuttal of the claims that rational voter ignorance and 
unequal distribution of political wisdom across citizens can be parlayed into arguments 
for nondemocratic political order” (Ibid., p. 203) . One might be tempted to argue that such 
unequal distribution of wisdom is precisely what calls for a democracy capable of 
capturing cognitive diversity, but the risk entailed here is that one rather common 
epistemic position among the variety present in a contemporary society will be the 
position of ignorance. Any system capable of aggregating cognitively diverse perspectives 
will have to deal with a great deal of perspectives that are simply uninformed, and it is 
unclear that these will be readily distinguishable from more valuable contributions.
17
  
                                                             






By contrast, Knight and Johnson advocate an experimental instrumentalism. The "priority 
of democracy" they defend is based on its ability to select, implement, and maintain 
"effective institutional arrangements", by "maintaining an experimental environment that 
can enhance our knowledge of the relationship between different institutional forms and 
the conditions under which they produce good consequences … [and] that democracy is 
especially, almost uniquely, conducive to these undertakings" (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 
19). 
One of the most significant elements of the Knight and Johnson argument is the 
importance they place upon the "equal opportunity of political influence" to "effective 
democratic decision making". Their account justifies freedom and political equality on the 
grounds of their producing good conditions for democracy, rather than vice-versa (Ibid., p. 
20). 
All this leads to a situation where various modes of democratic participation are deemed 
as potentially equally desirable. Voting is normatively desirable in so far as it implies a 
certain set of freedoms and political equalities; similarly, deliberation can be normatively 
desirable, simply because it implies a similar set of attractive norms of freedom and 
equality (Ibid., p. 143) – given, of course, the presence of an important set of “cognitive 
capacities and skills necessary to effectively articulate and defend persuasive claims” on 
the part of participants (Ibid., p. 239).  
Problematising the Deontic/Instrumentalist Dichotomy 
This basic deontic/instrumental typology of justificatory-value standards is highly 
contestable. On an intuitive level, we can already see that the abstract, deontic values 
which serve as justifications for the first type of theories outlined above could also serve 
as the basis for the preferences or expectations of citizens against which the instrumental 
desirability of democracy would have to be measured. To endorse democracy 
instrumentally – say, on the basis that democracies tend to have peaceful relationships 
with each other, or tend to be more economically productive than other systems – is to 
establish a set of external values (peace and economic performance) which are themselves 
only desirable due to some other instrumentalist or deontic values-system. It seems likely 
that all such instrumental evaluations will eventually be reducible to ‘intrinsic’ desirability 
at some fundamental level, so that, at root, democracies are instrumentally valuable to me 






to me because I desire human flourishing, human flourishing is instrumentally desirable to 
me because I am a human and flourishing is intrinsically preferable to non-flourishing.  
This simple distinction is also problematized by the possible existence of democratic 
outcomes which appear to be valuable in ways which cannot be wholly described in either 
deontic/intrinsic or instrumental terms. Van Parijs (1998) essentially straddles this divide 
with his consideration of the value of the universal franchise. He does this by assembling 
an argument based on there being "two distinct grounds" from which to oppose a policy or 
constitutional change: The instrumental, where a policy might be judged as being "unable 
to generate any promising non-trivial proposal", or in terms of moral (or ethical) 
repugnancy - "prone to make recommendations inconsistent with some of our considered 
moral judgements" (Ibid., p.301).  
Van Parijs raises an important problem – the apparently disproportionate influence of  
older voters - and considers the key policy question that this problem invites: why not 
weight votes based on age (rather as Mill would have weighted votes based on education)? 
Indeed, why not disenfranchise the elderly altogether? (1998, p. 305) Ultimately, the 
argument for the maintenance of the universal franchise arises from an instrumental 
source of justification: we may uphold a maximally inclusive model of voting because 
"maximum inclusion of all those affected" by a policy brings "the actual objectives of key 
political actors closer to the demands of social justice" (p. 333). Van Parijs seriously 
considers, and then rejects, a consequentialist case for reductions in political equality, and 
along the way he presents the possibility that, if some alternative social order were more 
capable of producing social justice, we would be better-off endorsing such a system over 
democracy. Inclusivity in this case is not inherently valuable, but a (convenient) means to 
another end.  
To return to David Estlund, meanwhile, it is clear that, although primarily deploying 
justifications that fall within the instrumentalist category (as discussed above), he also 
holds some foundational or intrinsic value to be present in democracies – he argues, for 
example, that the public interest is basically comparable with truth in the foundational 
sense, so that general acceptability can be indicative of truths (Estlund, 2008, p. 23). This 
suggests that Estlund’s other contributions to democratic theory should be read as 
pragmatic in nature – offering instrumental and epistemic justifications on the basis that 
the intrinsic justifications are of themselves unlikely to be persuasive to others in a 






Jon Elster is another scholar whose contributions to democratic theory seem to straddle 
the divide between deontic and instrumental justification. Van Parijs effectively situates 
Elster as a kind of anti-instrumental democratic theorist (1998, p. 331), and Cass Sunstein  
appears to agree with this assessment (1993, p. 349). Elster is certainly sceptical as to the 
value of purely instrumentalist argumentation, on the basis that a prospective politics can 
only operate on the basis of suppositions as to the likely outcomes of a certain policy or 
system, and that these suppositions (and their likelihood of being desirable) are similarly 
unlikely to come to fruition. For Elster, a constitutive political process that concerns itself 
with the formation of political alternatives and possibilities must be founded upon some 
conception of what would be intrinsically desirable, even if only because of our limited 
predictive abilities (Elster, 1993, p. 308). From this perspective, democracy is ultimately 
justifiable because it is intrinsically a fairer form of social order, and thus more able to 
gain demotic endorsement and achieve longer-term stability. This approach is generally 
redolent of instrumentalism, in its emphasis on the achievement of desirable outcomes, 
yet presupposes at least the perception of inherent democratic value as the means to such 
instrumental ends. 
Elizabeth Anderson also takes steps to problematise any simple deontic/instrumentalist 
distinction. She outlines several candidates for what she calls “non-instrumental values” 
informed in part by Deweyan democratic theory: democracy, from this perspective, is 
desirable because, in participating, “we express sympathy for fellow citizens, exercise our 
collective autonomy, and manifest a form of collective learning” (Anderson, 2009). 
The opportunity to project sympathy or revel in the kind of autonomy that is only possible 
within a polity: these outcomes, in so far as they are perceived to be valuable and create 
grounds for an argument in favour of democracy, would certainly be thought by most 
theorists to constitute instrumental grounds for the justification of democracy. Anderson, 
however, makes use of a more limited conception of instrumentalism – or, more 
accurately, seeks to point out an internal typology within the kinds of justifications that 
would usually be collectively referred to as instrumental. Under this view, 
instrumentalism entails straight-forward preference satisfaction (p. 213), and Anderson 
argues that there is an additional body of non-deontic but also non-instrumental reasons to 
value democracy. Importantly, while these non-instrumental values are descriptively 
distinct from instrumental preference-satisfaction, they are also contingent upon it: 
democratic participation, “in virtue of its instrumental value … acquires a noninstrumental 






of democracy: “Even if a dictatorship could give them what they wanted … citizens would 
prefer to govern themselves” (p. 214).  
What distinguishes non-instrumental from deontic values? Anderson appears to set out 
two grounds for distinction: first, non-instrumentally valuable outcomes are still 
nevertheless outcomes of a given democratic process. She uses the example of a shopping 
trip: shopping is instrumentally valuable in so far as it satisfies our desires and needs for 
certain goods. Shopping is also potentially non-instrumentally valuable, in that the act of 
shopping may be capable of being pleasing to us on a level that is contingent upon, but not 
identical to, the satisfaction of those desires and needs. Shopping might make us happy (p. 
213). This is different, it seems from saying that the act of shopping embodies, or is 
intrinsically constitutive of, some higher value.  
The second of Anderson’s grounds for distinction between non-instrumental and deontic 
justification lies in the reversal of the usual ‘order’ of justificatory thinking. Where we 
usually imagine that our intrinsic values are fixed and identified prior to the instrumental 
pursuit of their satisfaction, ‘non-instrumental’ values are wholly contingent upon the 
pursuit of instrumental ends: “Among reflective persons, judgements of intrinsic and 
instrumental value interact bi-directionally” (p. 214). 
For Anderson, then, values such as sympathy and satisfaction in practical collective 
autonomy reduce to neither outright instrumentalism (when narrowly defined as the 
satisfaction of individual preferences, as Anderson argues it should be) nor deontic 
justification. Anderson is essentially specifying a mode of justification for democracy 
which demands an outcomes-oriented values system that is also not particularly 
concerned with the satisfaction of preferences. She calls these ‘non-instrumental values’, 
but I think they may be best described as a kind of pragmatic consequentialism.  
By adopting this more nuanced understanding of democratic justifications, we are left 
with a tripartite typology: 
1. Intrinsic/inherent/deontic justifications, where the value of democracy is 
found in the fact that democratic participation embodies some fundamental or 
foundational good or goods, 
2. Instrumental justifications, where the value of democracy lies in its ability to 
satisfy the established objectives of the polity that it governs and the individual 






3. Consequentialist justifications, where the value of democracy lies in its ability to 
produce outcomes that are judged to be desirable, whether or not such outcomes 
are intentional or satisfy individual preferences.18 
There are several complicating features to this typology that are worth noting 
immediately.   
First, the definition of consequentialism offered above is clearly founded upon the 
assumption of the existence of real, or at least better, interests for citizens. It presupposes 
that there can exist a desirable outcome for the democratic citizenry which may not be 
captured by their conscious preferences (or the set of them that achieved consensus or 
majority support) and that desirable outcomes can entail something other, or more, than 
the satisfaction of said preferences. This suggests that the notion of consequentialism 
suggested here shares some common ground with inherent-value accounts, since the 
justificatory power of the fundamental principles that democracy upholds in such 
accounts must also be predicated upon the existence of real interests. 
Second, it is also clear that, in a great many cases, the instrumentalist and consequentialist 
justifications of democracy will be very similar, or identical. If my individual preferences 
closely resemble (or map perfectly on to) my real interests, then an instrumentalist 
justification of democracy (“democracy is good because it more closely approximates my 
preferences than any other system”) will be functionally identical to a consequentialist 
one (“democracy is good because it produces outcomes that I consider to be desirable, and 
the assessment of this desirability is predicated upon my preferences”).  
However, it is also conceivable that citizens can be mistaken about best interests. For 
example, Calvin may want (or prefer) a doughnut for his lunch. What he needs (or what is 
in his better interest) is a salad. He can instrumentally value a food dispenser in so far as it 
gives him a doughnut (or, conceivably, persuades Calvin that he wants a salad and then 
                                                             
18 A note on the semantics of this typology: distinguishing between instrumentalism and 
consequentialism may seem immediately problematic or arbitrary to some, primarily because the 
two terms are used more-or-less interchangeably in political theory. I hope that my decision on 
the semantics of this typology is made more clear by the ensuing discussion. The difference 
between instrumentalism and consequentialism suggested here could also be partially expressed 
as a contrast between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ consequentialism, where subjective 
consequentialism concerns the performance of a system’s ability to satisfy the the known 
preferences of actors, and objective consequentialism is concerned with the assessment of all of 
the outcomes of a given system (whether or not these overlap with subjective preferences). 
Instrumentalism seems a more natural term for the former kind of consequentialism (since we 
cannot design an ‘instrument’ to deliver a certain outcome without first having some conception 






proceeds to give him a salad). He can consequentially value a food dispenser in so far as it 
gives him a salad, irrespective of whether or not he still would prefer the doughnut. 
Instrumentalism, in this definition, necessarily incorporates a telic, or ends-driven, 
component. One must be able to at least conceive of the ends that one wishes to realise in 
order to recognise the realisation of such ends and instrumentally evaluate the 
performance of a democracy with respect to them, even if the desired ends are as simple 
as ‘avoidance of authoritatianism’. Having conceived of their desired ends, the 
instrumentalist sets about creating the circumstances for those ends’ plausible fulfilment. 
Consequentialism, however, leaves space for the possibility that all of this ends-driven 
activity is producing, in the aggregate, a spontaneous order whose unforeseen 
consequences are of considerable significance, perhaps even more so than the successfully 
realised ends of individual constituent agents. Such consequences are as likely to be 
undesirable as they are desirable, and so a great deal of classical liberal political thought 
revolves around the idea of being rationally risk-averse, and so minimising radical policies 
and reforms so as to avoid the host of potential negative outcomes that may arise from 




Yet the probability for unanticipated outcomes that are also, retrospectively, desirable, is 
logically as great as the probability of unforeseen consequences in the negative sense.
20
  
Much of this thesis revolves around the recognition of such ‘knowledge problems’ in 
politics, and this can be understood in epistemic terms as well, as an ‘argument from 
ignorance’: the knowledge problem here is that I am unaware of what my interests are, 
and have thus formulated preferences that cannot be sensitive to those interests. This 
                                                             
19 The archetypical argument of this type can be found in Hayek (1960 [2006], pp. 53-55; 1982 
[2003], pp. 30-34). Russell Hardin also points out that versions of an argument that essentially 
specifies that attempts at effective governance are strongly impeded by our limited knowledge 
can be found in Tocqueville and JS Mill: "No one person or even significant individual could 
oversee or master all of this [diverse, social] knowledge, even in the small society of Athens. ... [I]f 
we wish to defend democracy ... we should make the Austrian theory of knowledge a centrepiece 
of our argument. Mill seems to agree with this theory when he says a central administration 
cannot know enough to govern well. Similarly, Tocqueville assumes a version of this theory in his 
claim that central administrative power cannot know enough to do its job; it excels at preventing, 
not doing" (Hardin, 2009, p. 233). 
20 One decent argument in favour of risk-averseness in policy and reform could be something like 
the following: Unforeseen events are a fact of living linearly through time. To be a political radical 
is to create additional conditions for unforeseen consequences which will be added to those that 
occur completely spontaneously. It is preferable to encounter unforeseen events from the static 
position of a stable social order than to do so while multiplying the chaos with radical changes to 







argument also bears a resemblance, however, to the kind of Rousseauian perspective as to 
the public good that I treat with scepticism elsewhere. To presume the existence of ‘best’ 
or ‘real’ interests beyond the stated preferences of citizens is to invite methodological and 
ethical complications. Such interests may often be indeterminate – that is, subjectively 
established and therefore a matter of opinion.  
Differentiating between consequentialist from instrumentalist justifications of democracy 
allows us to orientate our justificatory standards around the extent to which we accept 
that institutional arrangements can be centrally designed, and the extent to which we 
accept that outcomes, whether desirable or undesirable, are necessarily always intended 
or predicted. To measure democracy’s value in an instrumental way is merely to measure 
the extent to which it satisfies our predictions of our requirements. If my capacity for 
prediction is limited by the extent of my epistemic capacities as a human being – see, for 
example, Tetlock’s work on the predictive limitations even of supposed experts (Tetlock, 
2006),  Philip Converse on the systematic pathologies of public ignorance (1964 [2006]), 
or the contributions of Austrian economists such as Joseph Schumpeter (1943 [1965]) 
who have exported their ‘knowledgeproblemonomics’ to the central questions of public 
competence – then purely instrumentalist justifications are clearly an unsatisfactory basis 
for politics, as Elster has argued (1993).  
Since it must be possible for our interests to sometimes fail to coincide with our 
preferences – and since this is not the same thing as asserting that we are able to 
consistently distinguish one from the other, or recognise best or real interests when we 
see them (which represents another level for our epistemic quandary) – we must consider 
two further questions: 
1. How can consequentially desirable outcomes be measured? 
2. In the absence of a reliable measurement for consequentialist performance that is 
not contingent on pre-existing individual preferences or intrinsic values, can 
democracies be consequentially justified at all? 
Question 1 is essentially the statement of a methodological problem. Without some pre-set 
standard of desirability – entailed by either our predictions about our best interests or our 
endorsement of some fundamental set of overarching values – then democracies will 
simply produce a series of outcomes, variously liked and disliked by citizens on wholly 
subjective bases, with little justificatory value to speak of. The fulfilment of real interests, 
paradoxically, implies the existence of an elite or epistemically favoured group that is 






Unfortunately, such a group must be subject to the same epistemic limitations as everyone 
else. The most we can reliably assert is that better interests certainly exist, and while they 
may be captured by our preferences in such a way as to be fulfilled, it is possible that they 
may be unknown to us, or that the details of their realisation will remain beyond our 
reach.  
This methodological problem is arguably insuperable, leading us to the challenge of 
Question 2. I propose, however, that there may be a way to approximate the measurement 
of consequentially valuable outcomes. If an arguably beneficial outcome – with the proviso 
that the benefits of such an outcome would plausibly be subject to contestation – is 
produced as a result of a democratic system, but in a non-deliberate way – that is, as a side-
effect of democratic procedures and not as the outcome of any specifically-targeted 
technocratic or ends-driven objective – then this may plausibly be said to form the basis of 
a consequentialist (spontaneous desirability) justification for democracy. In the final 
section of this chapter, I outline the kind of outcome that I consider to be plausibly 
consequentially justificatory in this way. For now it is worth re-iterating that this does not 
rule out the possibility of preference-fulfilling (instrumentally justificatory) outcomes 
being consequentially valuable as well; rather, the independence of a seemingly 
consequentially valuable outcome from the widespread preferences of citizens would 
demonstrate the reality of a distinction between real and perceived interests and suggest 
that democracies, for various reasons, are spontaneously and procedurally productive of 
desirable consequences that may not even appear on the ‘radar’ of individual preferences.  
Meanwhile, a wide range of democratic theory and practice is preoccupied with the 
establishment of a specific conception of real interests, and the promotion of these 
interests’ realisation at the level of individual preferences. The theory of deliberative 
democracy, for example, may arguably be said to work in this way, as it is an approach to 
democracy that is explicitly oriented around preference-shaping procedures.21  
Non-Experimental Pragmatism: An Argument for Democracy  
The epistemic basis for a deliberative mode of democratic participation, founded upon 
either the pursuit of a rationalistic consensus or a certain concept of public reason, is 
                                                             
21 Preference-shaping features greatly in the important literature around the question of political 
power. Chapter Two will establish the relationship between the overlapping justificatory systems 
described here and the intellectual framework that has emerged in the literature on political 






highly questionable (as Chapters Two, Four, Five and Six of this thesis will explain in more 
detail). At the very least, if all of the supposed benefits of deliberation are to be realised, 
then the advocates of such a shift in the emphasis of public participation must make peace 
with the idea that the ideal of universal participation cannot plausibly survive the 
transition.  
This is a negative argument, however. The fact of widespread public ignorance – and the 
persistent questions surrounding the ethical motivations of the average voter – also 
appears to damage the case for non-deliberative (aggregative, representative) democracy 
as well (the subject of Chapter Three), while liberal democracies may appear to be 
vulnerable to accusations of arbitrariness at a systemic or institutional level (as shall be 
discussed in Chapter Five).  
This chapter has explained the difficulty entailed in establishing a justificatory argument 
for democracy. Deontic or intrinsic-value approaches will seem unsatisfactory to many 
kinds of democrats – technocrats, for example, who are more interested in measurably 
improved outcomes, will not be interested in sacrificing the pursuit of such outcomes in 
the name of more high-minded moral objectives. Pluralists and moral relativists, 
meanwhile, will be hard-pressed to recognise the legitimacy of a system that cannot 
plausibly embody the often incommensurable values of all of its constituent members.  
But this chapter has also shown that instrumentalist justifications – if we define 
instrumentalism, like Anderson, around the fulfilment of conscious ends – are not wholly 
satisfactory either. By orienting success around the fulfilment of individual preferences, 
instrumental accounts simply analyse the extent to which some social arrangement is able 
to reflect our epistemically limited predictions as to our own interests. Not only are we 
capable of being wrong about our best interests, but democracy is capable of delivering 
desirable outcomes that citizens and central planners did not necessarily directly target.  
Consequentialism, as I use the term, entails an emphasis on the desirability of outcomes 
without special emphasis on the fulfilment of agentic expectations. A consequential good 
may therefore be produced spontaneously and unintentionally, and even enhance a 
society for some time without necessarily ever being specifically noticed or recognised in a 
widespread way.  
The final problem for this argument, then, is to establish an argument about the nature of 
such spontaneous, unintended consequential goods. What does aggregative democracy 






ask for? Are we even capable of recognising a social good if it lies beyond the range of 
explicitly understood preferences and normative commitments? 22 
The side-effect of a generalised faith in the fairness and incontestability of democratic 
norms results in a political stability and a form of pragmatism that is, quite unlike 
Dewey’s, counter-experimental. By being resistant to rationalist, experimental desires, 
democracies safeguard working social order and create stable conditions for other 
productive social forces. This counter-experimental side-effect forms grounds for the 
consequentialist endorsement of democracy, and disincentivises attempts to engage in 
radical policy experiments (such as, for example, drastic changes to democratic 
procedures or significant reductions to the voting franchise). The very notion of social 
experimentalism in a scientific sense is misguided, since the complexity of social 
conditions can never be perfectly replicated for successive iterations of a study, ruling out 
the possibility of adequate control of variables and rendering causal theses about social 
outcomes essentially unfalsifiable (Popper, 1961, pp. 64-66; Popper, 1963 [2008], pp. 456-
457).  
Democracies do not, in reality, model various alternative institutional arrangements – not 
even under deliberative circumstances, as Dewey appeared to assert (Dewey, 1939 
[1976]; Dewey, 1922). Elizabeth Anderson’s analysis seems soundest when she describes 
Dewey’s vision of deliberation as “a kind of thought experiment, in which we rehearse 
proposed solutions to problems in imagination, trying to foresee the consequences of 
implementing them, including our favourable or unfavourable reactions to them” (2006, p. 
14). The ‘best’ proposals are then implemented, and deliberative failure is taken to be 
indicative of falsification in the scientific sense.  
Even if democracies could operate as venues for social experimentalism, they would be 
unlikely to do so perfectly. Institutions and policies are tied to contexts; there is no way to 
deploy the same context in each new experiment. Secondly, we cannot satisfactorily 
compare the 'success' and 'failure' states of the various institutional arrangements or 
policies. So while democracy, generically deployed, might provide the only reasonable 
conditions under which some kind of metric could be applied to the desirability of a 
certain arrangement - that is, 'is it popular?', and perhaps also 'why?' - we have done 
                                                             
22 In its emphasis on unintended consequences and emergent orders, this notion of 
consequentialism owes a debt to classical liberalism. For an argument that literally posits 
democracy as a spontaneous order, see diZerega (2000). Gus diZerega undertakes the project of 
justifying democracy as a “fundamentally a self-organising system”, defending its working in 






nothing to address the question of whether popularity is itself a desirable adjudicator of 
success or failure. This problem is magnified if there is no plausible, objectively 
measurable qualitative improvement between the judgement of an entire polity and the 
judgement of a single individual.  
Knight and Johnson outline similar problems with the idea of democracy as a venue for 
experimentalism even as, in the main, they endorse democracy on experimentalist 
grounds. The paradox they gesture toward is worthy or re-iteration: if democracy 
provides the capacity for experimental recombinations of alternative institutional 
arrangements, then we have already preliminarily selected democracy as our arch-
institutional assumption, without subjecting it to these kinds of ‘democratically 
competitive’ pressures itself (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 156). In other words, for 
democracy to be democratically legitimate, we must already have chosen democracy as the 
basis for legitimation, on an illegitimate basis! This is an arresting observation, but not as 
important as an objection to experimentalism as the unfalsifiability of ‘social science’.  
Neither Dewey’s brand of pragmatic social experimentalism nor Popper’s advocacy of a 
fallibilist, piecemeal social engineering is entirely persuasive. Dewey’s account is far too 
epistemically optimistic, which makes the possibility of democracy forming the basis for 
effectively experimental politics unrealistic. Popper, while cognisant of the limits to 
scientific knowledge, does not fully account for the extent of political ignorance, making 
even incremental experimentalism difficult to achieve (Friedman, 2005, p. ii). In Chapter 
Three, this thesis will present the very substantial evidence of widespread, radical public 
ignorance, as well as presenting the argument that it would be foolish to reserve political 
decisions for those who are deemed to be more epistemically capable simply in order to 
safeguard the justificatory basis for democratic experimentalism.  
Having rejected intrinsic, instrumental and experimentalist justifications of democracy, it 
is clear that we must look elsewhere for persuasive reasons to value democratic 
institutions. Democracy is valuable not because it creates the conditions for 
experimentalism, nor because it gives the public influence over their government (which 
would be an outcome of only questionable wisdom, as Chapter Three shall discuss). 
Democracy is also, it seems, not a reliable source of direct improvement in citizens 
themselves, though deliberative approaches may be more effectively educative than the 
current, aggregative norm. Just as with the results of social experimentalism, our 
epistemic frame is far too limited for democracy to be a reliable source of procedural 






tenable when it asserts instead that democracy is valuable because it spontaneously 
creates a plausible and difficult-to-challenge source of social and political order: the fact of 
its acceptance as a procedural norm is at the root of its value.  
Democracy creates a set of meta-agreed presumptions regarding the apparent procedural 
value of democracy that can be embraced by individuals whose political beliefs and private 
motivations may otherwise vary drastically. Unchallenged by serious competition as an 
institutional order – ‘meta-agreed’ as the fairest possible decision-making procedure 
without, necessarily, having been consciously agreed-to at all – democracy is robust in the 
face of radical or revolutionary impulses: a structural bias, perhaps, but one that is 
productive of stability. Meanwhile, the very unresponsiveness that direct and deliberative 
democratic theorists consider to be problematic – liberal democracy’s failure to constantly 
adjust in the face of public opinion or properly reflect the input of its citizenry – functions 
to both incorporate and minimise the influence of a public that is, by and large, not 
epistemically qualified for real decision-making power (see Chapter Three).  
By equating democracy with good outcomes, and imagining that an undesirable 
democratic outcome would best be solved by more democracy, citizens unwittingly 
contribute to a self-reinforcing doctrine very like a mythology. The basis for this 
mythology – a kind of folk theory of democracy – will be explored in more depth in Chapter 
Three, which will test the premises of the folk theory against theorists who use empirical 
evidence of public ignorance to render elitist or epistocratic arguments.  
For now, however, it is worth suggesting that this consequentialist justification of 
democracy may most clearly reflect what diZerega meant by positing democracy as a 
spontaneous order form of government (diZerega, 2000, pp. 193, 218). By accepting the 
somewhat paradoxical justification offered here – that confidence in democracy is the most 
reasonable basis for confidence in democracy – we may also approximate describing 
democracies as being what some classical liberals describe as “the results of human action, 
but not of human design” (Hayek, 1967, p. 96). Spontaneous orders create the basis for 
institutions, rules, interactive norms – and even for desirable consequences – without 
being consciously designed, worked-toward, or thought about (Hayek, 1982; Pennington, 
2003, p. 726). Traditionally, we might consider human language or market forces to be 
examples of such spontaneous orders, and it may be stretching at least the Hayekian 
definition of such orders to categorise aggregative democracy among them. However, the 
self-reinforcing confidence-paradox of democracy is certainly an unintended consequence 






that is not conscious in the sense of being instrumentally targeted by central planners or 
individual citizens.  
Others, like diZerega, have gone far further in drawing from the Hayek’s writings the basis 
for an ‘Austrian theory of politics’. Dan Greenwood has pointed out Hayek’s own 
endorsement for the basic components of political liberties and democratic rights (Hayek, 
1960 [2006], p. 109; Greenwood, 2010, p. 779). Like Greenwood, we may then trace a 
Hayekian epistemology of democracy through to the contributions of Joseph Schumpeter, 
whose democratic theory will be discussed as part of a wider tradition of democratic 
scepticism in Chapter Five.  
Conclusion: The Politics of Unintended Consequences 
The limits of standard justificatory approaches to democracy – which this chapter has 
attempted to explicate – impose a real methodological obstacle in the path of any theory 
that attempts to espouse democratic norms. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overstate the 
importance of this preliminary ‘positive’ argument as an underpinning for the more 
‘negative’ lines of analysis that are to follow, which will attempt to establish the weakness 
of several types of radicalism that, intentionally or otherwise, would likely result in 
reduced inclusivity, contradicting the folk theory of democracy and thus weakening the 
probable basis for public ‘faith’ in this form of social order. 
This chapter has differentiated between instrumentalism and consequentialism in a way 
that is not necessarily explicitly recognised by other democratic theorists. 
Consequentialism, as it is understood in these pages, suggests the existence of desirable 
outcomes whether or not such ‘desires’ are conscious preferences. To propose any specific 
grounds for consequential justification is to establish a preference for some outcome, at 
least in the mind of one individual, and so, for some, it will appear that consequentialism 
(if it is to be marked by the recognition of unintended consequences) will at some level 
always collapse into instrumentalism. Certainly instrumentalism and consequentialism 
can, and often will, overlap in terms of content. Plausibly, I will often know that which is in 
my best interest. However, sometimes I will not – and the argument in this chapter intends 
to draw attention to the idea that our epistemic limitations establish instrumentalism, 







This distinction, I argue, remains productive, as it illustrates the epistemic pitfalls that 
await the reformist arguments that the following chapters will explore. To argue that 
arguments from public reason should be employed to limit participation to a narrower 
group of more epistemically capable and other-regarding citizens is to imagine that social 
experimentalism can be guided – and internally falsified – by  entire publics, in line with 
the assumptions of what I refer to in Chapter Two as a ‘Rousseauian’ approach to 
democratic theory. This next chapter will establish that deliberation, even under ideal 
circumstances, cannot account for the possibility that best interests may lie beyond the 
range of perceived best interests and preferences – and, indeed, they may arguably be 
responsible for a manipulative form of systematic preference-shaping. If deliberation is 
capable of generating positive unintended consequences, then its mechanism for this is 
unclear.  
Contrastingly, aggregative, liberal democracies are already justifying themselves 
consequentially. By making alternative social orders seem implausible, they are generative 
of counter-experimental political norms that effectively embody the ideal conditions for 
non-radical policymaking, and creating a politically legitimate centre of state action that 
also cannot justify overly coercive or intrusive politics, safeguarding the individual 
autonomy that is required for other desirable social outcomes. This is a line of argument 
that this thesis will refer to throughout the following chapters, and return to specifically in 








Chapter Two: Deliberation and the 
General Will 
 
A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance  
of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. 
Thomas Paine (1775 [1995]) 
 
Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of deliberative democratic theory before introducing 
an important and often-overlooked dichotomy in the literature. This thesis distinguishes 
between theories of deliberative democracy that argue for a version of radical consensus, 
in line with the Rousseauian notion of a ‘general will’, and those which take into account 
the fact of value pluralism and are thus constructed more around a particular notion of 
public reason. The latter type of deliberation theory is the subject of Chapter Four of this 
thesis. This chapter, meanwhile, will examine in detail the core components of ‘general 
will deliberative democracy’: the idea that, through deliberation, entire publics can attain a 
kind of collective rationality that is able to generate political alternatives, design social 
orders and achieve highly legitimate, widely supported and mandate-maximising 
decisions. On a fundamental level, this perspective incorporates the idea that it is possible 
to be incorrect about our real or best interests, and promotes other-regarding deliberation 
as the crucible within which such incorrectness may be melted away. This chapter begins 
with the real-world example of deliberative politics within the Occupy movement, before 
embarking on a discussion of the nature of deliberative democratic theories, their 
foundations in the literalist contractualisms of Enlightenment thinkers, their apparent 
tendency to avoid prescriptions that aggregative processes should be replaced wholesale 
and preference for falling back upon mixed systems. The chapter concludes by arguing 
that it seems implausible that diverse publics can attain a collective rationality and 
standard of epistemic agreement that is capable of effective politics and social design, and 






Deliberative Democratic Theory: An Overview 
All approaches to democratic theory are necessarily also approaches to questions around 
the distribution and exercise of power in societies. Power can operate in an observable, 
measurable way – where one agent influences a change in the behaviour of another 
through authority or coercion – or it may plausibly operate covertly and unmeasurably, 
with the exclusion of certain agendas from the realm of political possibility, or with 
structural biases that are designed to pre-empt disagreement and foster shared 
preferences. This last conception of power – though probably entirely unfalsifiable in 
nature – constitutes a central pillar in Marxist and socialist thought, as it operates around 
a notion of ‘false consciousness’, or what a critical theorist of the Frankfurt School might 
refer to as ‘false reconciliation’: in this case, for example, the false consciousness that may 
lead an individual to prefer something other than that which would be in their best 
interests.  
The problematisation of preference-shaping sits uneasily with democratic theory, much of 
which rests upon the notion of legitimate persuasion and the inculcation of shared 
values.23 Deliberative democracy, in particular, with its emphasis on central values of 
possible substantive consensus, or of a ‘public reason’ that necessarily reduces the 
accessibility of democratic participation (as I shall argue in Chapter Four), often entails the 
encouragement of consensus, or at least meta-agreement, and the provision of formalised 
venues for the persuasive power of popular or well-reasoned arguments.  
At the beginning of this chapter, it would be best to establish a firmer understanding of the 
broader development of theories of deliberative democracy themselves.  This thesis has 
already referenced deliberative democracy at several points. It is the main topic of 
discussion for the current chapter of this thesis, as well as chapters four, five and six, and 
operates within the literature as both a discrete democratic theory and a mode of 
democratic justification. 
Stephen Elstub offers a helpful overview (2014, p. 1) of the development of the theory of 
deliberative democracy, interpreting the rather complex and messy progression of the 
‘deliberative turn’ as a series of discrete ‘waves’ of scholarship, framed as reactions to a 
common set of perceived inadequacies in contemporary liberal democracy (several other 
                                                             
23 Simone Chambers, for example, raises the concerning possibility that persuasive speech-acts may 
be effectively indistinguishable from coercion, and follows Habermas in distinguishing between, 
on the one hand, being talked-into a belief, and on the other, being convinced of the strength of 






accounts are available, including Zsuzsanna Chappell’s excellent critical introduction  to 
the sub-field (2012), which offers a thematic approach that is less streamlined but perhaps 
more sensitive to complexity than Elstub’s, or Simone Chambers’ overview in the Annual 
Review of Political Science (2003). The best survey of the deliberative democracy literature 
up to 1998 is James Bohman’s The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy (1998)). 
Crucially, Elstub frames deliberative democracy as a response to the “crisis” of liberal 
democracy, wherein citizens appear to be participating less in democratic politics, 
ascribing less legitimacy to social institutions and, quite simply, in many places beginning 
to “hate” politics and politicians (see, for example, Hay (2007); for an account of liberal 
democracy as stumbling between, and somehow surviving, successive waves of such 
crises, see Runciman (2013). For an account of a participatory crisis in democracy being 
produced by an over-emphasis on liberal, rather than democratic, values, see Barber 
(1984)).
24
 Deliberative democracy’s basic commitment (with varying emphases) to 
reciprocal reason-giving, knowledge-sharing, increased public participation and the 
pursuit of consensus25 appeared to establish it as a strong basis for the defence and 
productive reform of democracy.  As Joshua Cohen explains, deliberation is very often seen 
as a way to "enhance the mandate and legitimacy of elected representatives and other 
officials" (Cohen, 2009, p. 260): an ideal solution to what some perceive to be a global loss 
of confidence in existing democratic institutions. It is thus unsurprising that various 
theorists now view contemporary democratic theory in terms of efforts to "decenter the 
role of voting in democratic politics" altogether (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 128) – an 
undertaking that may not be entirely plausible, as this chapter later suggests.  
Elstub (2010; 2014) suggests that scholarship on deliberative democracy is now in its 
“third generation”, with each successive wave further shifting the academic focus away 
from the realms of ideal normative theory, and closer to practical and empirical 
considerations. The first generation consisted of classic contributions from central figures 
from several traditions of political theory, particularly John Rawls (1971; 1993; 1997), and 
Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1990; 1996) (but also, presumably, incorporating John Dryzek’s 
                                                             
24 It is worth reflecting on the possibility that the unproblematic endorsement of democracy that I 
employ as a basis of its consequentialist justification is being eroded by the kind of ‘anti-politics’ 
trends that Hay, Elstub and others describe. See the concluding chapter of this thesis for a fuller 
exploration of such a possibility. 
25 Let us note immediately that not every theory of deliberative democracy is actively consensus-
seeking – though it should also be added that practically every theory of deliberative democracy 
does consider consensus, or the approximation of consensus, to be a desirable end (Fishkin, 
2005). In general, theories of deliberation have become less likely to articulate the desire for 






early articulations of what he then termed “discursive democracy” (1990)). Both Rawls 
and Habermas, and in particular their overlapping conceptions of reciprocal public reason, 
are discussed in chapter four of this thesis. Joshua Cohen’s work would also presumably fit 
within this more idealised, normative generation of deliberative scholarship, exploring the 
concept of public reason and extrapolating from it a set of abstracted principles for the 
realisation of ideal deliberative practice (Cohen, 1989; 1997). Both Dryzek and Cohen 
would eventually weaken their commitment to the approximation of consensus in their 
theories of deliberation, transitioning to accounts that more particularly prioritise an 
understanding of public reason that is responsive to the fact of value pluralism. 
The ‘second generation’ of deliberative democratic theory, in Elstub’s overview, began to 
explore the theoretical paradigms established by Rawls and Habermas alongside a 
consideration of contemporary society that was more sensitive to the extent of its 
complexity (Elstub, 2014, p. 10). James Bohman attempted to extrapolate deliberation into 
a pragmatic theory that was able to take account the plausible obstacles to be found in 
complex societies, such as widespread social biases and cultural and value pluralism 
(1997; 2000). Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson also made a series of hugely 
influential contributions to the literature, building on a broadly Rawlsian conception of 
deliberative reason in order to establish the procedural value of commonplace 
deliberative institutions, and articulating social pluralism and moral difference as 
necessary preconditions, rather than obstacles, for deliberative democracy (1996; 2004). 
As Zsuzsanna Chappell suggests, this kind of proceduralist endorsement of deliberation 
contributed to a broader epistemic argument in deliberation’s favour as well (2012, p. 56), 
and so the theoretical deliberative project appeared to be on an ever-more-secure footing.  
The current, ‘third generation’ in Elstub’s chronology marks a predictably “empirical turn” 
in the literature.26 Democratic theorists are becoming ever-more responsive to the 
burgeoning library of results from real-world deliberative experiments on various scales, 
with particularly important sources of evidence arising from James Fishkin’s trendsetting 
“deliberative polling” studies (Fishkin, 1991; 2009; Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004), and 
                                                             
26 It is important to acknowledge that Elstub’s account – and accounts of the development of 
deliberative democratic theory more generally – doesn’t attach enough importance to instances of 
quite radical deliberative politics in practice that predate the majority of scholarship on the issue. 
Participatory budgeting practices in Brazil, for example, originating with Porto Alegre in the 
1980s but since extended across the country (and exported to others as well), provide an early 
basis for evidence-based analysis of deliberative procedures (Gret & Sintomer, 2005; Chappell, 
2012). Deliberative ‘mini publics’, meanwhile, have existed in New England town hall meetings 
since the days of De Tocqueville, and form the basis for insightful works such as Frank Bryan’s 30-
year analysis of their practices – a project which predates the vast majority of self-defined 






incorporating attempts to reflect the full institutional diversity of possible deliberative 
forums. A cluster of researchers at the University of Bern’s centre for Interdisciplinary 
Deliberation Studies, including Jürg Steiner and André Bächtiger, have achieved 
considerable influence with their comparative analyses of deliberative practices in 
different national contexts (Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen, 2003; 2004).  
An important feature of deliberative theories, as they have turned to these more practical 
considerations, is their tendency to prefer avoidance of aggregative procedures (i.e. 
voting) in ideal terms, but pragmatically embrace aggregative components in practice. The 
posited epistemic and procedural benefits of consensus-seeking deliberative democracy 
are therefore tempered by logistical considerations and the unlikelihood of achieving 
outright consensus: a source of contradiction, or at least of tension, that this chapter will 
turn to below. 
An almost-inevitable dependence on voting, of course, is not the only reason to question 
the claims of deliberative democrats. As with all ideal theory, earlier entries in this 
literature may be critiqued for being startlingly unrealistic. When Joshua Cohen writes 
that “[i]n ideal deliberation, parties are both formally and substantively equal. … Everyone 
with the deliberative capacities [of reason-giving discussion] has equal standing … [a]nd 
each has an equal voice in the decision. … [T]he existing distribution of power and 
resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation” (1997, p. 74), he 
neglects the influence, or perhaps even the possibility, of factors that could obstruct such 
innate deliberative equality: such effects as rhetorical training or natural skill, charisma, or 
the advantage of representing a viewpoint close to normative expectation. It seems naïve 
to imagine that even a rigorously, procedurally 'equal' deliberative format (achieved 
through heavy moderation and specific rules) could rule out differing degrees of influence 
between deliberators themselves. These effects may necessitate an understanding of 
deliberative capacity as a resource in itself. The only plausible moment of genuine equality 
in deliberation (if equality is one of the goods for which deliberation strives, as Cohen 
argues) could be the necessary vote that would follow it. 
Deliberation therefore does not necessarily produce epistemically more nuanced 
outcomes, simply because it will tend to be followed by the relatively ‘blunt instrument’ of 
voting (Saward, 2000). Voting is reductive, in that it must offer a reduced list of 
alternatives among which to choose, rather than affording each individual a vote for their 
own particular, and arguably unique, constellation of preferences. Ideally, in fact, voting 






of avoiding the vast majority of Arrovian, Impossibility Theorem concerns (see Chapter 
Five)).  
What, then, might be the value of public deliberative processes?  There are two initial 
answers to this question: 
1. We might, when deliberating, be exposed to a bit of heretofore unknown or under-
considered information that causes us to change our minds – and, in so far as 
better arguments are more persuasive, improve our preferences. This, for a whole 
host of reasons, may prove to be unlikely; but more importantly, it is difficult to 
distinguish between willing, genuine preference change and hegemonic 
domination, preference-laundering, brainwashing or something else. For these 
reasons, the literature on ‘power’ is potentially very important to a discussion of 
deliberative democracy. 
2. We might, as a part of the deliberative process, generate a new alternative option 
to those heretofore imagined, or establish a range of alternatives to better reflect 
the preferences of the voting public. This is more plausible than 1., though 
dependent upon a specifically-tasked and formalised deliberative process, which 
cannot realistically be wholly inclusive of all citizens (as I explain in chapter 6). 
However, the final voting alternatives cannot be wholly representative of the 
inputs of all parties - in this sense, voting will always 'waste' information, first at 
the establishment of alternative subjects for the vote, and second at the point of 
majoritarian supremacy, where all but the winning option are relegated away.
27
  
We may now be in a position to approach deliberative democracy from a slightly different 
perspective. Deliberative democracy, in its consensus-seeking mode, can be said to 
constitute an attempt to establish the preferential norms of a citizenry as a set of real 
interests, and to persuade the adoption of these real interests as preferences, thus creating 
the basis for the endorsement of certain outcomes on instrumentalist grounds. This 
understanding of deliberative democracy incorporates the assumption that collectives – or 
entire publics – are able to seize upon such ‘real’ interests, are more likely to do so in 
deliberative settings, and, in so far as under ideal circumstances our real interests would 
always be self-evident, make the approximation of consensus, and even of unanimity, the 
lodestar of deliberative politics. This emphasis on consensus is apparent, as indicated in 
the brief introductory survey above, in the earliest ‘waves’ of deliberative democratic 
                                                             






theory, before waning in favour of versions of deliberative theory that are more 
responsive to the challenges of complex, pluralistic contemporary societies.  
As previously indicated, one complicating factor for the justificatory typology set out in 
Chapter One is that to accept the possible desirability of a procedure on some basis other 
than its ability to satisfy our preferences requires the existence of interests that transcend 
our own understanding of them in at least some cases. This, at root, is also the perspective 
adopted by Marxist theory when it offers arguments from ‘false consciousness’, an idea 
which has formed the basis for a powerful critique of liberal notions of political power-
wielding and which may also offer an unexpected basis for scepticism over the claims of 
deliberative democrats. 
Stephen Lukes (1974 [2005]) made use of an analysis along these lines in his influential 
critique of liberal, pluralised conceptions of power relations in modern states, such as 
those expressed by Robert Dahl (1957). Dahl evinced an understanding of democracy 
which was itself designed to contradict the elitist view that structures that are commonly 
understood to be pluralist and democratic in nature actually disguise a crypto-elitist 
reality, where a revolving hierarchy of elites actually hold the vast majority of real power 
in any given political context. Dahl’s observations of American society (particularly his 
famous case study of New Haven) revealed a complicated network of interacting interest 
groups, all of which wield at least some degree of influence over the others around them 
(Dahl, 1974). Certainly some of these agents can be said to wield more influence than 
others, but it would be a nonsense to suggest that there was any agent without any 
influence at all, in the sense of not having a minimal degree of control over some resource 
or basis of political capital. Such a ‘polyarchy’ is reasonably reflected in, but not limited to, 
the dispersion of sovereignty to be found in electoral democratic process. Other 
dimensions of influence are important to Dahl as well: as an ordinary citizen I might lack 
power in the economic sense, but wield a fair amount in political terms when I cooperate 
with like-minded people to form a pressure-group. If I were to accumulate a significant 
amount of financial influence through wealth and control of resources, but my formal 
political influence would be ‘capped’ by the norms of a democratic context.  
According to Lukes, the main limitation to Dahl’s pluralist account of power in a 
democracy is methodological in nature. From Dahl’s perspective,  power relations could be 
defined in terms of necessary, relational conditionality – A having power over B to the 
extent that A is able to make B do something that they would not have otherwise done. But 






arguably overlooked some of the most important dimensions of power-wielding. Bachrach 
and Baratz critiqued his approach along such lines, pointing out his failure to understand 
the importance of agenda-control (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). If an agent can create the 
conditions where a certain conflict never arises, then they are wielding power at a point 
prior to where Dahl’s relational model would be unable to observe it. This is a potentially 
very important source of social coercion in itself.  
Stephen Lukes’ own critique is more fundamental, arguing that Dahl’s approach is 
incapable of telling us anything about the capacity that the powerful may have to shape 
the preferences, and thereby manufacture the consent, of the less-powerful. This view, if 
accurate, depicts the possibility of coercion occurring at a point prior to direct and 
observable conflict, which was necessarily the focus of the social science methodologies 
employed by Dahl, and prior, even, to attempts to reserve some issues and alternatives 
from being included on the social agenda (Bachrach and Baratz). By ensuring the adoption 
of a certain set of preferences – preferences that serve the interests of the powerful more 
than the interests of the powerless - a powerful agent is essentially imposing a false 
consciousness on wider society and creating structural biases intended to sustain the kind 
of crypto-hierarchy evinced by elite theorists.28 
There are complications with this view. How, for example, are we to distinguish between 
‘legitimate’ preference-shaping (through persuasive argumentation, the use of new 
evidence, or deliberative discourse) and the ‘coercive’ preference-shaping that Lukes 
describes? And, as with our typology of justifications, how are we to distinguish between 
the ‘real’ interests of citizens and their mere preferences in each case, when interests and 
preferences are both subjectively understood? 
Joshua Cohen expresses the tensions that exist between already-present inequalities of 
power and the deliberative ideal as an issue of public naiveté (2009, p. 255). Powerful 
actors may be able to structure their arguments or the preferences of those who might 
oppose them, finding a way to make iniquitous proposals seem publicly reasonable. James 
Bohman suggests wider cause for concern, explaining very plausibly that, among other 
factors, deeply entrenched inequalities of power could lead to the exclusion (and self-
                                                             
28 Lukes’ assertion that the narrowness of Dahl’s political analysis of US society was predicated on 
his methodological biases, and thus on his simple definition of power itself, is not universally 
accepted. Indeed, instances of power-wielding under the second and third ‘faces’ or ‘dimensions’ 
may still be captured by Dahl’s equation (presented here as “A has power over B to the extent that 
A is able to make B do something that they would not have otherwise done”), depending on how 
we interpret “would not have otherwise done” (Blau, 2011). See Keith Dowding’s Power (1996) 






exclusion) of some groups from deliberative process. To have one’s reasons ignored (or 
mocked) would cause citizens to “have no reason to expect to be able to influence future 
deliberation, and thus have no reason to continue to cooperate” (Bohman, 2000, p. 148). 
Just as importantly, the possession of power could confer the ability to simply ignore the 
outcome of a deliberative decision.  
The deliberative democrat, at this point, could object that these objections are at least as 
true for aggregative democracies as they are for deliberative democracies. In an ordinary 
Dahlian ‘polyarchy’, a particularly moneyed or well-connected agent can easily subvert or 
purchase influence over the narrower group with decision-making authority, as powerful 
lobbying groups do in Washington and Westminster on a routine basis. These same 
resources could enable the very rich or very powerful to ‘exit’ a polity rather than obey a 
certain law or pay a certain tax, and the scale of their potential contribution to that polity’s 
economy creates influence of a different kind, so that the mere threat of departure 
becomes a powerful political lever.
29
 Deliberative democracies would not be especially 
vulnerable to the influence of the powerful, merely as vulnerable as every other form of 
polity.  
This counter-argument discounts the possibility that, to put it starkly, if all participation is 
essentially time-wasting then deliberation simply entails the wastage of more time than 
other forms of participation. Deliberation, unlike simple voting, is a time-consuming and 
epistemically burdensome activity. In the face of plausible ‘elite capture’, concerned 
citizens could do better than engage in a deliberative process where the odds are stacked 
against them in any case – for example, they might mount some more impactful form of 
collective action (Cohen, 2009, p. 256). Cohen’s response to this line of critique is that it 
betrays a misunderstanding of what is entailed in deliberative proposals, which are 
intrinsically other-regarding in nature. This strikes me as a weak response, and one that 
seems to imply that deliberation requires some external means of assessing the 
reasonableness of arguments – that public reason is not a self-regulating requirement.  
As we shall see in Chapter Six, the psychological complexity underlying any process of 
preference reformation and persuasion makes it impossible to argue that any regulatory 
or epistemic framework is capable of ensuring that all the preference-shaping within a 
deliberative democracy will be benign. Without the means to establish the nature of a 
                                                             
29 Consider, for example, the commonplace argument that corporate and top-level income taxes are 







public’s ‘real interests’, or to plausibly argue that a pluralistic public is capable of having a 
politically unitary ‘real interest’, deliberative democrats are proposing an alternative way 
to do what democracies do already – identify and promulgate the most popular 
consciously-held preferences within a given polity.  
Those with less-popular preferences (minorities of various kinds) will tend to 
misrepresent their views, or fail to participate in deliberation at all by self-excluding: 
phenomena that might best be understood as instances of power-wielding as agenda-
control or preference-shaping. But are these concerns more than theoretical? Is it possible 
to speak concretely about real-world instances of deliberative exclusion being produced 
by a politics aimed at radical consensus? 
The Occupy Movement: Consensus-Seeking Deliberation  
It is one of the contentions of this thesis that popular deliberative democracy will tend to 
be less inclusive and less cognitively diverse than liberal, aggregative democracies. This is 
partly because of the expectations associated with the foundational notion of ‘public 
reason’, and partly due to the more undesirable side-effects of any non-anonymous politics. 
This chapter sets about situating deliberative democracy – which was introduced in 
Chapter One among other theoretical bases for the justification of democracy – within the 
wider idea of collective rationality. Yet the epistemic limitations and differences between 
individuals make the prospect of collective rationality and a truly inclusive deliberative 
politics very distant.  
The Occupy movement represents an opportunity to analyse the mechanisms and efficacy 
of consensus-driven collective decision-making: in its pursuit of unanimity, it in many ways 
constituted an attempt to institute a real-world deliberative democracy (Cornell, 2014). It 
embodies a critique not only of financial institutions, but of the perceived failings of 
democratic policymaking as well (Dorf, 2012; Porta, 2013, p. 83; Boyte, 2014, p. 1).  
As a case study, an understanding of the decision-making practices of Occupy may thus tell 
us much about the ideals at the core of publicly-reasoning deliberation – and the exclusive 
political circumstances demanded by even its partial realisation. The implications of this 
recent, widespread attempt to employ the politics of deliberation and public reason within 
an often diverse (and sometimes fractious) inter-cultural social movement may be cause 
for both the comfort and concern of the theorists of deliberative democracy. Comfortingly, 






have had at least some success as a set of sustainable democratic procedures. More 
worrying, however, is the reality that these strategies were themselves necessarily founded 
upon the effective restriction of deliberation to a cognoscenti of ideologically and 
epistemically similar individuals. Occupy’s pursuit of consensus may also, in itself, be a 
telling indicator of the reality of practical deliberative projects, which are not as much 
founded on an ideal of ‘facing the other’ or emphasising the benefits of ‘cognitive diversity’ 
but instead are a systematic way for agreement-prone sets of individuals to underscore the 
coherency of their in-group.  
By October 2011, the ‘Occupy Movement’, as it had by then become known, had grown 
from a series of little-reported protests and sit-ins to a global media sensation. Its most 
literal ‘occupations’ – camps of activists setting up semi-permanent dwellings in parks and 
public spaces – started to spring up in major cities across the world. Though the specific 
demands of these protestors remained (and remain) somewhat unclear (and many have 
claimed that the lack of particulars in this regard was a conscious decision for Occupy), it 
is safe to say that they were generally discontent with the established norms of their 
socio-economic context; they objected to capitalism’s seeming infiltration into politics, to 
the reckless behaviours that had led to the banking and financial crises of recent years, 
and, in the most generally-drawn ways, to politics, consumerism, and war.30 More than any 
other recent popular movement, and despite this vagueness, ‘Occupy’ was concerned with 
the collision of politics with capitalism. Very tellingly, the movement seems also to have 
tended towards a heterodox form of internal democracy. 
With a foundational opposition to the trappings of hierarchies in general, decision-making 
within the occupations came to be based upon a radical version of deliberative democracy. 
David Graeber, one of a very few generally-accepted ‘architects’ in a movement dedicated 
to egalitarianism,31 related his experience of this deliberative process: Mark Mazower’s 
                                                             
30 Several attempts have been made to set out the objectives of the Occupy protesters, though these 
are often undone by the numbers of people involved, the variety of their contexts, and the 
diaphanous nature of their discontentments. Naomi Wolf invited contributions from within the 
movement in order to reach a tripartite explanation of their demands – campaign finance reform, 
financial institutional reform (so as to make impossible a repeat of the 2008 crisis), and the 
severing of the connections between politicians and business interests (Wolf, 2011). Wolf’s article 
was quite controversial; nevertheless, it remains one of the clearest and most categorical 
attempts to explain the motivations and objectives of the ‘occupy movement’. These categories 
are also rather particular to the American political context, providing perhaps only a flavour of 
the concerns that motivated the international movement. 
31 This is essentially the claim of an investigative piece in Rolling Stone magazine from November 






review of Graeber’s book on the subject offers the clearest summary, noting that Occupy's 
assemblies revolved around  
a kind of deliberative democracy ... that aimed not at vote-taking but 
rather the creation of consensus among people[.] ... Someone talks, 
pausing between sentences which are repeated loudly by others around 
him or her, and then further transmitted onwards, before the next 
sentence emerges. Consensus itself is the ultimate goal. What happened 
when consensus proved impossible is not discussed [in Graeber's book]; 
maybe it never did. There are brief references to the presence of 
undesirables, people who either cannot behave as thoughtfully and 
decently as the rest or whose political views put them outside the pale, 
and who are summarily asked to leave. But the prevailing assumption is 
that freed from the tyranny of misinformation and repressive 
institutions, most people will embrace this way of doing things and be 
willing to make it work. A fog of false consciousness suffocates ordinary 
Americans, but once lifted the ideal of consensual unity is achievable, 
and Occupy Wall Street showed it. (Mazower, 2013, p. 28) 
This account provides us with a very recent example of consensus-driven deliberative 
democracy in action, and reveals a set of features that closely resemble the predictions of 
some deliberation theorists. A direct quotation from Graeber’s The Democracy Project is 
illustrative of how these systems were used: 
When operating by consensus, a group does not vote, it works to create a 
compromise, or even better, a creative synthesis, that everyone can 
accept. … The pivotal point was when Mike, the anarchist veteran from 
Baltimore, made the following proposal. “There seem to be two 
positions,” he said. “There seem to be two positions,” the crowd answered. 
“Either we stay in the park, or march on Wall Street.” “Either we stay in 
the park, or march on Wall Street.” … After about an hour of swirling 
discussion, clarifications, and suggestions, we called for consensus 
around a proposal based on Mike’s suggestion, and the group decided to 
do exactly that. (Graeber, 2013, pp. 52-53)  
The intention of achieving (or at least approximating) consensus is itself significant, as not 






noting here that Graeber does establish in his book the use of two-thirds supermajority 
voting in cases where consensus proves impossible (Ibid., p. 33).  
More pertinently for this chapter, Graeber describes the specific exclusion of some 
individuals: those whose views (or whose mode of communicating those views) were, in 
Mazower’s words, “undesirable” or “outside the pale” (Mazower, 2013, p. 28). However, 
such views are the product not of a legitimate difference that is admissible to the 
consideration of the forum, but of a “false consciousness”. This seems to contradict the 
argument made in Graeber’s brief history of consensus-driven democratic systems, where 
they are venerated as a problem-solving tool “among those who respect the fact they will 
always have, like all humans, somewhat incommensurable points of view” (Graeber, 2013, 
p. 203). 
A key tension for this conception of democracy thus emerges: how far can the pursuit of a 
variety of perspectives – what some other thinkers refer to as ‘cognitive diversity’ – be 
taken before even the targeting of consensus moves beyond plausible reach? As Graeber 
writes, “if one just assembled a random group of people off the street … probably they 
would be unable to find much common ground … [b]ut no one comes to a meeting of their 
own free will unless they want to get something out of it, a common goal everyone is there 
to achieve” (p. 224). In other words, such deliberative meetings have a chance at success 
because they are not composed of random participants, or even of representative 
elements of a wider public – they work because they are built around groups of people 
who already share a great many cognitive similarities, and tend to exclude those who 
would disagree with the group’s ambitions at any meaningful level.  
Graeber goes on: “There are people who are, for whatever reasons, too damaged or 
disturbed to take part in the democratic assembly. There are others … who are so 
disruptive and difficult, who demand such constant attention, that indulging them would 
mean devoting so much more time to their thoughts and feelings … that it undermines the 
principle that everyone’s thoughts and feelings should have equal weight” (pp. 224-5). 
Such people are asked to leave, or studiously ignored by the rest of the assembly. 
Elsewhere, Graeber argues that a democracy of representatives selected by lot would still 
need some way of excluding “obsessives, cranks, and hollow-earthers” (p. 298). 
At this point, we may be justified in asking why Graeber does not view the deliberative 
democracy put into practice by Occupy as a failure. Despite the fact that the movement’s 
decision-making meetings were attended on a wholly voluntary basis, by individuals who 






sample of a population would have been, and despite Occupy’s explicit commitment to the 
use of a radically inclusive and participatory democracy, and general stance of considering 
state actors with a democratic underpinning to be far more legitimate than any 
alternative, this is an attempt to realise deliberative ideals that was not able to 
accommodate every participant into its process. Graeber tells us that those excluded from 
deliberation were “damaged”, “disturbed”, “disruptive”, “difficult”, or otherwise irrational 
or misguided. But can we be dealing with a system of democracy when some sectors of a 
reasonably pluralistic group are simply beyond the pale? After all, citizens with more 
mainstream political views might be tempted to describe Occupy as disruptive, and itself 
populated by “obsessives and cranks”. If these subjective assessments, which may be 
founded upon little more than reasonable disagreement, can become a basis for political 
exclusion, then deliberative and participatory democracy may themselves have 
incommensurable objectives.  
The existence of at least some tension between the objectives of epistemic virtue and 
inclusiveness is itself intuitive, and in so far as public deliberative democracy entails a 
number of procedural changes or efforts to magnify the depth and quality of democratic 
participation, it seems reasonable to expect this to come at the cost of inclusivity. Indeed it 
may be the case that we most closely approximate the ideals of deliberative politics when 
our discussions are informal, and unattached to the requirements of public reason or the 
stakes associated with real decision-making (Mutz, 2006), making broadly participatory 
deliberative procedures anathematic to desirable outcomes. However, an effective 
reduction in inclusivity also threatens to undermine several bases for the justification of 
democracy, such as cognitive diversity, or the kind of wide-ranging stability that may be 
obtained by non-experimental pragmatism (as outlined in Chapter One).   
Deliberation without Aggregation? 
The Occupy movement is a practical example of a deliberative procedure failing to 
accommodate all would-be participants. Theories of deliberative democracy also seem to 
stop short, in many cases, from fully extrapolating their normative arguments into 
prescriptions for the adoption of entirely deliberative processes by democratic 
institutions. Partially, this is motivated by the epistemic dilemma that is clearly present in 
the case of Occupy, above (and discussed in greater detail below). One way of preserving 
the advantages of deliberation is to abandon any objective of approximating consensus, 






deliberation will produce improved outcomes once the votes have been cast and 
aggregated.  
The notion that outright consensus can be achieved by deliberative democracy is naive 
even in the realm of ideal theory. Many theorists argue that, in ideal terms, in the presence 
perfectly rational participants and with no limitations on the time or resources that could 
be expended upon deliberation, consensus around a single course of action, candidate or 
option would be the ultimate outcome (Cohen, 1989; Mansbridge, 1983). This is, perhaps 
unfortunately, not true. Even perfectly rational deliberators, engaged in limitless 
deliberation under ideal circumstances, would fail to find consensus on at least some 
substantive questions, simply because some questions lack answers that are evidently 
‘true’ or ‘best’. Unless the existence of better or best answers is one of the preconditions 
for the ideal situation described in such theories, then the existence of some such 'better' 
outcome - or at least of an outcome whose superiority is universally recognisable under 
ideal circumstances - remains an article of faith rather than a matter of fact or an intrinsic 
component in all substantive issues. A theoretical framework so ideal as to argue that all 
potential issues scrutinised by deliberative forums have potential best outcomes is likely 
to be so abstract as to have little bearing or utility in any other academic or practical 
context – and so a few critics of deliberative democracy have opposed the pursuit of 
substantive consensus even at the ideal level (Manin, 1987, pp. 359-361). The mainstream 
of deliberative democratic theory, as discussed in the brief survey at the start of this 
chapter, soon shifted focus from substantive consensus to the achievement of some kind of 
meta-consensus, and the results of this step-change will form the central preoccupations 
for Chapters Four and Five of this thesis. 
Given these shifts in the busy field of deliberative democratic theory, it is important to 
note the possibility that one may long labour under the misapprehension that many of the 
strongest proponents of deliberation are prescribing the adoption of public, deliberative 
processes not as supplemental to the structures of voting and representation that are 
present in contemporary liberal democracies, but as wholesale replacements for them. This 
misapprehension – that pro-deliberation theorists prefer the end of deliberative 
democracies in a complete sense, without recourse to voting at all – is certainly not 
unreasonable, and deserves defence. Gerald Gaus (2008) is among those to have pointed 
out how strange it is that so many theories of deliberative democracy should, having 
understood the impossibility of outright consensus, be comfortable in then reverting to 
simple majoritarian voting. Yet the idea of two spheres of democratic participation – a 






by the formal establishment of a representative sphere, underpinned by elections – has 
been present since some of the earliest recognisable contributions to the contemporary 
deliberative democratic literature (Chambers, 2003, p. 311). A counterpart to this, the 
decision-making deliberative public that proceeds to a vote once the discussion has 
concluded, should seem similarly plausible.  
Where some theorists of deliberation impose limitations on the scope of their theories, 
explicitly advocating deliberation as a procedural preliminary to voting, others sidestep or 
ignore the role of voting altogether. Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin recommend the 
institution of 'Deliberation Day' only as a prelude to elections and as a means of improving 
the preference-formation of citizens – in other words, promoting deliberation only as a 
means to increased rationality and legitimacy in the subsequent traditional vote and 
legislative cycle (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004). John Rawls (1993; 1997), in many ways the 
originator of contemporary deliberative democratic theory, limits his advocacy of a 
deliberative politics to questions of fundamental and constitutive importance to a wider 
social order, as we shall see in Chapter Four of this thesis; otherwise, the exercise of 
‘public reason’ is best reserved for a powerful judicial body such as the US Supreme Court. 
Joshua Cohen, one of the most-cited and most influential of deliberation theorists, bases 
his advocacy around the desirability of the pursuit of political consensus, but adds that in 
many cases a majoritarian principle will be necessary: “Even under ideal conditions there 
is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then 
deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule. … [T]he results 
of voting among those who are committed to finding reasons that are persuasive to all are 
likely to differ from the results of an aggregation that proceeds in the absence of this 
commitment” (Cohen, 1997, p. 75). This 1997 version of his famous Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy was a reworking intended, in part, to account for the main line of 
criticism against its original 1989 incarnation, which espoused outright consensus rather 
than any such grudging dependence on voting or “reasonable pluralism”.  
Michael Saward establishes how common it is for deliberative democrats to neglect to 
point out the eventual dependence of an inclusive deliberative forum on voting, or some 
other preference-aggregating procedure, in order to reach decisions (Saward, 2000). The 
result, he argues, is that the distinction between aggregative and deliberative democratic 
systems is often overdrawn, even as many theorists consciously situate their advocacy of 






At times the necessity of resorting to votes is strongly implied, but never made explicit. 
For example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson underpin their democratic theory with 
the understanding that reasonable moral disagreement is almost always completely 
unavoidable, as explained in their Democracy and Disagreement (1996, p. 16), and 
compellingly argue against the liberal approach of fostering meta-agreement on “higher-
order principles” that preclude the need for the approximation of consensus in instances 
of outright differences in moral outlook in Why Deliberative Democracy? (2004, p. 64). Yet, 
despite this awareness of the intractability of such disagreements, Gutmann and 
Thompson almost completely sidestep the question of the necessity of voting, apart from  
implicitly pre-supposing the necessity of representatives as the basis for their procedural 
principle of accountability (1996, ch. 4), or openly accepting that “most democratic 
decisions are made by representatives” (2004, p. 29).  
The idea that certain deliberation theorists would actually prefer the wholesale 
replacement of existing democratic mechanisms is reasonable. That so many of these 
thinkers – who describe the effects of broadly-seized public deliberation so positively – do 
not, at the last, promote such a view is perhaps, from the perspective of the ideal political 
theorist, disappointing. The idea of universalised deliberation replacing votes and taking a 
leading role in policy formation is hugely problematic in practical terms; it is 
untranslatable into the language of policy, logistics and institutional implementation. Yet 
the role of the ideal theorist is, or should be, unconstrained by such concerns. If they 
believe their own arguments, why do deliberation theorists not baldly state that the best 
of all possible worlds would see the town hall meeting altogether replace the ballot box 
and the parliament – or at least state outright that such an arrangement would be more 
faithful to a consensus-seeking democratic ideal? 
John Dryzek has come closer to arguing explicitly for the instrumental and epistemic 
benefits of deliberative structures as opposed to aggregative systems, and some of his 
contributions to this literature serve as an excellent case study of the gap between rhetoric 
and prescription in deliberation. He tells us that “the essence of democracy itself is now 
widely taken to be deliberation” as part of a new emphasis on the “authenticity of 
democracy” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 1). He notes that deliberative democrats of various hues 
share the key ambition of the outright “rejection of aggregative models of democracy” (p. 
3). The view that places elections as the key influential connection between public opinion 
and the legislative process is described as “old-fashioned” (p. 26). The purely deliberative 
alternative is, perhaps, the 'beyond' from the title of Dryzek's book Deliberative Democracy 






originally highly imaginative and radical, has been subsumed, like so many other 
approaches, into tolerant liberal constitutionalism (p. 28). 
Dryzek eventually explains that he favours a relatively narrow (or highly selectively 
inclusive) state – in other words, he seems to prefer a smaller, elected group of executors 
to implement and administrate the decisions rendered by the public. This is important for 
Dryzek's argument because of the emphasis he places on 'insurgency' by a reforming 
element as opposed to co-option into the establishment. A massively empowered and 
deliberative civil society permits perpetual insurgency and challenge without ever 
declining into half-hearted liberal consolidation. This position is reconciled with Dryzek's 
commitment to direct and deliberative democracy by virtue of its being based on carefully 
constructed definitions of both 'state' and 'civil society'. Yet the nature of the participatory 
and legislatively empowered 'civil society' described is perhaps indistinguishable from 
any conventional definition of the state.  
Dryzek himself offers a concise baseline definition for state - “the set of individuals and 
organisations legally authorised to make binding decisions for a society” (p.82) - and, 
though he later states that different, nuanced definitions may be more useful, the above 
appears to be intuitively accurate and compelling (and, I would also suggest, quite 
minimal: most people would understand the 'state' to incorporate both a society's 
decision-makers (government) and its bureaucracy and service provision). By this basic 
definition, the deliberating citizenry is essentially a component of the state – that is, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the state has grown to encompass civil society, or perhaps 
vice-versa. Does this not constitute the de-facto replacement of liberal democratic process 
by popularised deliberation?32 The answer, Dryzek believes, is no: there are many 
examples of a developed civil society influencing the power of the state (his examples 
include the impact of the political vision of Martin Luther King, alongside various other 
civil rights movements and protests) without being categorisable as components of the 
state.  
Yet if Dryzek's vision of a deliberatively empowered public sphere only extends as far as a 
greater propensity to protest, to interactively recommend policy to the state, or to stand 
up for certain rights, then the idea of deliberation as a source of power or as the bedrock of 
democracy itself appears to evaporate. Arguably, even in the time of Martin Luther King, 
                                                             
32 Moreover, by such an understanding, do all binding referenda actually involve the brief explosion 
of the boundaries of the state to encompass society as a whole? Do revolutions or occasions 
where popular action has directly influenced political outcomes also constitute momentary 






the most important direct political influence available to the wider public lay in voting. It 
may be worth remembering that President Kennedy influenced the objectives and content 
of Dr King's March on Washington in 1963. Moreover, and to explore a counterfactual, it is 
difficult to envision the successful passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 under 
a notional early Nixon administration, rather than those led by Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. From this perspective, the most important basis for political change was not the 
influence of a burgeoning public sphere but the electoral decisions of American voters in 
the presidential elections of 1960: the civil rights movement as a triumph for aggregative, 
as well as insurgent, democratic process. 
Dryzek constructs arguments that come very close to the attempted legitimisation of the 
prescription of a deliberatively expanded state. He appears to leave this option open, 
mentioning the possibility of public deliberation producing “workable agreements” (as 
opposed to outright unanimous consensus) which could, presumably, be thought of as 
legally binding (Dryzek, 2000, p. 170). Yet the greatest explicit commitment is to a kind of 
deliberatively activated civil society, attempting only to influence the state, communicating 
its conclusions through elections and possibly some other means of transmission. Is this 
not the kind of simple accommodation with the structures of conventional liberal 
democracy that Dryzek aims to avoid?  
Cognitive Diversity vs. Epistemic Compatibility 
The above analysis of Dryzek’s theory serves to illustrate the point that, even if 
deliberative democracy aims to inculcate a politics of consensus that renders aggregative 
procedures redundant, the fact of value pluralism will require some kind of 
accommodation with the norms of liberal democracy in a complex contemporary society. 
This mirrors the example of the Occupy movement. The attempt by these activists and 
radical democrats to enshrine a version of consensus-driven deliberative democracy at the 
core of its decision-making procedures is exemplative of  a potential ceiling on 
deliberative ambitions more broadly, one which may explain deliberative democracy’s 
dependence on voting as a fall-back position. Simply put, reasonable pluralism – the 
plausibility of a wide range of perhaps-incommensurable perspectives, belonging to 
cognitively diverse citizens – may be inescapable within modern, complex societies, and 
the original objectives of deliberative democracy may not be entirely achievable given this 
fact. In order to incorporate those citizens who are epistemically compatible with each 






find itself being forced to exclude would-be participants who prove to be obstacles to the 
achievement of consensus. Under such conditions, deliberative processes will become 
opportunities for already pre-selected individuals to ‘preach to the choir’, and the 
achievement of consensus on some proposal or outcome will be a question of having 
avoided the true democratic challenge of engagement with and incorporation of ‘the 
other’.  
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the very cognitive diversity that may effectively 
limit the participatory reach of deliberative democracy is often used as the basis for an 
instrumentalist justification of democratic processes (Landemore, 2012). If deliberative 
compatibility does indeed come only at the expense of inclusivity, deliberation may in fact 
reduce whatever benefits that cognitive diversity actually produces, making the 
deliberative trade-off – which involves using deliberative procedures to procure a higher 
chance for unanimity and a better basis for epistemically high-quality participation in 
exchange for breadth of participation and cognitive diversity – a difficult basis for 
institutional reform. This trade-off is articulated, in part, by Gutmann and Thompson in 
their discussion of the internal debate among deliberation theorists as to the ideal scope 
for such participation in society (2004, pp. 31-2).  
Joshua Cohen takes account of this kind of scepticism, describing it as a tension between 
participation and deliberation: “Expanding participation … may diminish the quality of 
deliberation. ... [T]ime and resource constraints make it undesirable for any particular 
area of public governance to be both fully deliberative and inclusively participatory" 
(Cohen, 2009, p. 257). Alternatively, this tension may be understood as something of a 
dilemma for deliberative democrats: between, on the one hand, the prioritisation of 
cognitive diversity, which would arguably be best served by maximised breadth of 
participation, and, on the other, epistemic compatibility (used here as a term that 
encompasses the entire range of epistemic similarities – in terms of knowledge, 
reasonableness, and pre-existing meta-agreement – that would be needed to maximise the 
efficacy of deliberation), which would be best served by narrowing the range of 
participants to those who meet the established requirements of some specific conception 
of acceptable public reason.  
There may be solutions to this dilemma. Deliberative democrats could argue that 
deliberative procedures are themselves the most plausible mechanism for finding an 
acceptable compromise, and so ensure cognitively diverse participation between citizens 






Along these lines, Cohen suggests a fostering of what Habermas referred to as the 
“informal public sphere” (Ibid.), which would serve to more closely align the views of the 
wider citizenry. What this neglects, however, is that this dilemma has been produced by 
what may be a zero-sum-game: by increasing epistemic compatibility, one would be 
reducing the extent of cognitive diversity. Cohen’s alternative solution – the abandonment 
of broad participation as a deliberative goal, and the use instead of an approach requiring 
focused, specific deliberative forums for the generation of ideas on particular issues – may 
be more plausible (p. 258). The most obvious escape route from this dilemma, after all, is 
to reduce the reach of deliberation so that the potential for epistemic compatibility is 
maximised. Nevertheless, this would necessarily rule out the possibility of democratic 
justifications based upon the benefits of cognitive diversity.  
In Chapter Four, the deliberative response to value pluralism – an emphasis on public 
reason rather than consensus – will come under discussion. And as we shall see in Chapter 
Six, any formal, systematic procedure of deliberative democracy may necessarily impact 
upon the range of cognitive diversity (and participation in general), simply as a result of 
the psychological effects of non-anonymous group dynamics. Yet the theorists of this 
‘strand’ of democratic theory appear to usually value both inclusively participatory and 
publicly deliberative approaches to democracy. In the following sections, this source of 
internal tension is attributed to the principled objective of an entire public attaining 
legitimacy by contributing to central planning, and to the assumption of plausible 
collective rationality that underpins it.  
Can Entire Publics Design Social Orders? 
An entire family of political theories rests upon the idea that an entire public is capable of 
overcoming the epistemic dilemma set out above (and so clearly encountered by the well-
meaning democrats of the Occupy movement). In this family we may include not only 
many deliberative democrats, but also some classic contractualists, who believe that the 
legitimacy of social contracts lies in the ability for entire publics to not only consent and 
accede to the terms of some newly-established collective order, but to conceive of and 
design that social order as well (from where else, after all, could a social contract arise 
within the state of nature?).  
Thinkers such as Hobbes and Rousseau constructed various models of political 






contractualism must lie the idea that groups of individuals at some point choose to be 
governed. This act of choosing is itself a democratic moment, and creates the basis for any 
other democratic tendencies that follow. For Hobbes, such democratic origins can 
legitimise the ongoing dominance of non-democratic governments; for Rousseau, the 
formative democratic choice may be repeated, and can itself become the bearer of public 
truths that are harnessable as a system of legitimised unfreedom-as-freedom. 
Both of these contractualisms form an intellectual foundation for a wider theoretical 
approach that believes that ends-based social and economic design – or at least 
legitimation – can be a collectivised enterprise. The discussion of Rousseau will introduces 
many of the central dichotomies of democratic theory – such as the possible zero-sum 
game of scale versus depth of participation, and the emergence of distinctively republican 
and liberal flavours of democracy. The basis of these thinkers’ faith in the potentials of 
human reason is the entrenchment of what may best be understood as an ‘Enlightenment 
view’ on the subject, one that imagined that reason could be “conscious, universal, 
disembodied, logical, unemotional, value-neutral, interest-based, and literal” (Lakoff, 
2009, p. 7). The implications of this Enlightenment mentality may be felt not only in the 
following discussion, but in the ‘folk theory of democracy’ and notion of ‘common sense’ 
described in Chapter Three and part of the hybrid notion of ‘public reason’ analysed in 
Chapter Four.  
Hobbesian Contractualism 
The scholarship of Thomas Hobbes may constitute the clearest starting-point in the 
articulation of this particular family of political theories. The original condition for the 
start of the contract-forming process that culminates in the state-leviathan is, according to 
Hobbes, a kind of consummate democratic moment: universal consensus and consent to the 
formation of the earliest and most primitive type of polity, which he, like many of the 
thinkers to follow him, describes as a 'democracy', literally understood as the direct rule of 
a majority of the people in a polity. Later and recognisably modern ‘democratic’ or 
‘aristocratic’ (that is, representative or elite rule) mechanisms – such as majoritarian 
decision rules – are necessarily built upon the mandate of a founding moment of absolute 
consent (Elements of Law, part 2, chap. 2, para. 6 (Hobbes, 1640)). So, where later the 
principle that a losing minority group may still 'own' a particular democratic decision (and 
cannot obstruct such a majority's decision) holds true (Ibid., para. 1), for Hobbes there is a 






basis may all subsequent forms of polity – democracies, aristocracies or tyrannies – be 
considered at all legitimate.  
There is little question that what we today call representative liberal democracy would be 
defined by Hobbes as some kind of aristocracy, and that he would think our polities all the 
better for this. Democracy, according to Hobbes, too closely approximated the destructive 
circumstances of the state of nature, rendering us vulnerable to corrupt or overweening 
politicians (De Cive, chap. 10, para. 6 (Hobbes, De Cive, 1651a), Leviathan, chap. 19 
(Hobbes, 1651b)). Hobbes repeatedly argued that monarchies are reliably less susceptible 
to such manipulation, and indeed that a monarch’s interests more closely coincided with 
that of the public than in democracy (or aristocracy) (De Cive, chap. 10, para. 13).  
These beliefs – that monarchy would be preferable to democracy or aristocracy (which we 
might call representative democracy today) – would seem to position Hobbes as a sceptic 
as to the capacity for entire publics to rationally design social orders.33 However, there is a 
presupposition of the possibility of such ‘rational crowds’ present, in embryonic form, 
throughout Hobbes' work. It is the simple yet historically unlikely assertion of the 
establishment of polities on the basis of absolute consent – predicated upon a universal 
agreement among individuals – that is reflected by later populist thinkers, such as 
Rousseau, who will be discussed below. The central Hobbesian paradigm – that 
centralised power is not necessarily to be feared – is legitimated by the principle of a 
preliminary requirement for universal consent. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau reached further than Hobbes, arguing that the aggregated views of 
the public are not only able to create the consensual, contractual basis for a social order, 
but can also be the basis for a polity’s decision-making by approximating the ‘General 
Will’. Both Rousseau’s General Will and Hobbes’ original moment of consummate 
democratic consent are founded upon the assumption of real collective interest.  
                                                             
33  Hobbes argued – in much the same way as many of the theorists which come under 
consideration in Chapter 3 of this thesis – that democracies were ill-equipped for the discussion of 
important issues. Nevertheless, if a democratic polity were to effectively emulate an aristocracy 
by concentrating “deliberations about war and peace and legislation in the hands of just one man 
or of a very small number of men, and … appoint magistrates and public ministers, i.e. to have 
authority without executive power”, then democracy could compare favourably to monarchy (De 






The General Will  
Rousseau's general will legitimises majoritarian decision-making – as in his preferred 
format of plebiscitarianism34 – by defining the true or real interests of individuals, even 
where said individuals, for whatever reason, are not aware of such interests. The very idea 
of the plausibility of an instant of universal and uncoerced agreement – for the first 
formation of a polity, for example – demands the existence of a public interest that is 
absolutely intelligible and, like Locke’s natural law, undeniable upon revelation, for every 
original constituent of a polity must have approved the polity's creation (presumably, 
those who did not consent remain “foreigners” or outlaws). For Hobbes, the untenability 
of the human situation in the state of nature demands the solution of a collectively 
legitimated sovereign authority. Although Rousseau’s concept of the state of nature was 
rather different to Hobbes’, he similarly accepted that its collapse left little choice but the 
constitution of political authority. He then extended this idea so that, in every decision, 
and at every point, there is a similarly 'best outcome' for the whole polity and every citizen 
(Rousseau, 1762 [1987], p. 205). This 'best outcome' or correct choice is best understood 
as the publicly-motivated preferences of each individual citizen: the fact of public 
motivation is, according to Rousseau, the only factor necessary to homogenise all 
preferences, and he famously argues that preferences contrary to the retrospectively-
recognised 'best outcome' are simply errors, or inspired by selfish sentiment: “When …  
the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error, and that what 
I took to be the general will was not so. If my private opinion had prevailed, I would have 
done something other than what I had wanted. In that case I would not have been free” 
(Ibid., Book IV, Chapter 2).35  Rousseau calls this infallible generator of preferable 
outcomes the General Will, and it is the role of the institutions of a polity to reflect it as 
closely as possible. 
Rousseau distinguishes early in The Social Contract between 'aggregation' and 
'association'. Aggregation is understood as the functional process of despotism, where 
individuals are “enslaved”. Association, on the other hand, denotes something greater, 
something incorporating a “public good” and a “body politic”, and not merely the “private 
interest” of the “private individual” (Ibid., p. 147). The general will, as the aggregated 
                                                             
34 As adduced by his explicit admiration for the political processes in Switzerland, and Geneva in 
particular, though there is evidence that Rousseau was also often critical of that hotbed of 
democracy – see, for example, Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse 
to the Social Contract, 1749-1762 (1997)  
35 Note also that Rousseau has some concept of concealed, internal preferences that are potentially 
misrepresented publicly or during votes. Further than public choice theorists, however, Rousseau 






choices of all citizens who are choosing to align themselves with what they believe to be 
the public’s best interest, transcends private interests and attains a possible truth value: it 
is possible to be objectively wrong when answering the question: ‘what will the public say 
is in its best interest?’, while the truth-value of responses to a question such as ‘what is the 
best choice?’ is likely subject to essential contestation.  
On this basis, Rousseau expresses doubt about the legitimacy of any government that does 
not enjoy the absolute consent of its citizenry: “where do one hundred who want a master 
get the right to vote for ten who do not? The law of majority rule is itself an established 
convention, and presupposes unanimity on at least one occasion” (Ibid., emphasis added). 
This mirrors Hobbes' apparent belief in an initial and absolute mandate for the 
foundations of the polity, though the conclusion is different: for Rousseau, merely 
majoritarian principles are unnatural if only because they are based upon a convention, 
and conventions are intrinsically artificial.  
The original convention is the social contract, where, as in Hobbes, “[e]ach member of the 
community gives himself to it at the instant of its constitution, just as he actually is”  (Ibid., 
p. 151). Rousseau envisions this formalised relationship between individual and state as 
reducible to a single clause: “the total alienation of each associate, together with all of his 
rights, to the entire community” (Ibid., p. 148). In Rousseau's eyes this may not be as 
extreme a sacrifice of personal liberty as it first appears: “in giving himself to all, each 
person gives himself to no one. And since there is no associate over whom he does not 
acquire the same right … he gains the equivalent of everything he loses, along with a 
greater amount of force to preserve what he has.” 
Thus the original “social compact” renders individuals subservient to “the supreme 
direction of the general will” – but this does not matter, as each individual personally 
generates and subscribes to the general will: “[S]ince the sovereign is formed entirely 
from the private individuals who make it up, it neither has nor could have an interest 
contrary to theirs. Hence, the sovereign power has no need to offer a guarantee to its 
subjects, since it is impossible for a body to want to harm all of its members … [t]he 
sovereign, by the mere fact that it exists, is always all that it should be” (Ibid., p.150). 
Rousseau does not accept that even within his notionally totally consensual polity, the 
interests and approaches of private individuals will sometimes legitimately differ on 
various elements of the public interest – what Rawls or Rawlsians might refer to as 
‘reasonable pluralism’, or this chapter (and the previous) have labelled ‘cognitive 






obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that he 
will be forced to be free.” 
Individuals are therefore both sovereign and associate (Ibid., p.149). Rousseau's original 
contract is based upon the same basic understanding of a self-evidently correct course of 
action as Hobbes’ contractualism, founded as it is upon a single, consummate democratic 
moment. The movement to whatever governmental forms might follow are where their 
accounts diverge. For Rousseau, such additional steps would, in the best of all possible 
worlds, be ultimately undesirable; for Hobbes, the further 'development' towards the 
Leviathan requires only a majoritarian framework, authorised by the original moment of 
consent - and such progress is desirable.  
Gerald Gaus points out that, from any simple analysis of the general will (such as the one 
set out above), there are at least four different ways to plausibly interpret Rousseau’s 
more particular claims. The first, popular will theory, is a mainstream understanding, held 
by rational-choice liberals (such as, for example, William H. Riker, whose work is 
discussed in Chapter Five) (Gaus, 1997, p. 143). By aggregating everyone's individual 
votes, we are able to discern a general will. If there are several wills of the people, that is, 
we aren't left with a single unique popular will at the end of the aggregation process, Gaus 
suggests that "the will of the people seems far too close to a schizophrenic personality to 
support a plausible theory of democracy" (Ibid., p. 145). Indeed, Riker (arguing from the 
basis of Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem) suggests that it is plausible that different 
vote aggregation methods will produce differing outcomes from identical individual 
preferences; ‘schizophrenic’ indeed (Riker, 1982). For Rousseau, however, the potential 
problem of multiple general wills is a categorical impossibility: one such will must be the 
product of a widespread distortion or mistake. 
An alternative escape route for Rousseau, according to Gaus, may be a more "sophisticated 
populism", one that views votes as "evidence of what constitutes the general will, but not ... 
itself constitutive of the general will" (Gaus, 1997, p. 146). Thus voting becomes a 
"reasonably reliable way to discover what is the popular will ... an imperfect procedure for 
identifying the general will" (p. 147). The important point is that the general will is itself 
never ambiguous; rather, we have some difficulty in perfectly capturing it. Gaus indicates 
that he finds this response to be unsatisfying, and that it seems incoherent to believe in the 







Another ‘version’ of the general will thesis could be labelled epistemic populism. This view 
equates the 'voice of the people' with the 'common good'. In other words, the aggregation 
of everyone's views will result in an answer that matches not a universal general will, but 
an outcome that is favourable to the polity at large. This is not to say that the general will 
tracks absolute truths, but rather that it does produce a true answer to the question: 
which option advances the common good? (p. 148). This plainly sidesteps some of the 
problems of the popular will theory, but one potential weakness is that the assumption 
that collective decisions will track the common good is dependent on something like the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, where each voter is at least more-than-half likely to be accurate 
in their reportage of the common good. Conversely, if we only expect voters to reflect their 
own private interests then we accept that the likelihood of their understanding their own 
interests is going to be greater than their likelihood of their understanding the common 
good. The Epistemic Populism thesis will still work if the aggregation of everyone's 
individual interests results in the public interest - but how likely is this?. Gaus calls this an 
"invisible hand theory of democracy, according to which each person votes his individual 
interest and the outcome is the public interest" and  concludes that it is "very difficult 
indeed to show that ... [voting] is a reliable way to discover the right answer" (pp. 150-
151). 
Alternatively, the real will theory version of Rousseau’s general will argument moves the 
onus of his claims from the 'common good' to the 'common judgement', a thesis which 
states that individual judgements on some questions will aggregate into a general 
judgement (Gaus, 1997, p. 153). Here, it is best to quote Joshua Cohen's definition of the 
General Will (which appears to be exemplative of the real will theory interpretation): "A 
group of people has a general will if (1) the members of the group share a conception of 
the common good ; (2) the members regard the fact that an institution or policy advances 
the conception as a common reason for supporting it; (3) it is fully common or shared; and 
(4) the conception is consistent with the members of the society regarding themselves as 
free and equal" (Cohen, 1986). 
This appears problematic, because an individual's reasons can point in opposite directions 
- for example, their private judgement may differ from their public - and their final vote 
may reflect a very complex settlement between these competing priorities. So Susie may 
share Calvin’s reasons to support a given policy, but her will may differ, and thus her 
eventual vote may not necessarily reflect her ‘real’ will, if she can even possess such a 
thing. To put this another way: "voting for policy X does not entail the opportunity cost of 






government that opposes air pollution laws, but I rather like the idea of casting an 
environmentalist vote. Because my vote is insignificant in determining the outcome, I can 
indulge my preference to vote environmentalist because I know that this single vote will 
not impact on what actually happens" (Gaus, 1997, p. 154). 
The public constructivist interpretation of Rousseau appears to defuse such issues, but 
carries with it issues of falsifiability: from this perspective, "plausible populism can be 
based on a notion of shared reason rather than a common will". If we reason in a 
specifically public way, the public good is generated by the act of reasoning itself: “a kind 
of constructivism insofar as what is politically justified is constructed out of the belief 
systems of the citizenry" (p. 155) – in some ways, then, a Kantian understanding of the 
general will.  
All of these interpretations naturally entail a certain idealisation of the democratic public 
in question. It is interesting to note, then, that Rousseau explicitly endorses a system of 
government which would, in modern terms, be recognisable as a 'representative 
democracy' – an 'elected aristocracy' – but only in grudging terms. The more obvious 
legitimising argument for the primacy of the 'elective aristocracy' in Rousseau's work is 
his suggestion that such elected officials are chosen not to represent  their constituents, 
but to administer the implementation of the general will, which is presumably expressed 
through regular referenda. Thus perhaps Rousseau's representatives are not the 
democratic and deliberatively authorised parliamentarians and senators which we may 
imagine, but a voted class of implementers – an elected civil service. Overall, his support 
for the 'elected aristocracy' is founded more upon logistical concerns than philosophical. 
He makes much of the difficulty at the heart of any polity that is literally democratic (one 
working definition of a 'democratic society' in Rousseau's terms would be any polity 
composed of at least as many 'magistrates' as citizens) in relation to increasing numbers of 
citizens (Rousseau, 1762 [1987], p. 174). 
At the heart of Rousseau's theories there remains the core belief that the state of nature 
entailed an innocent and functional human condition which also, by necessity or 
misfortune, was destined to be replaced by various contracted systems of government.36 
                                                             
36 Rousseau retained a romantic conception of simple, rural communities and their customs: 
“Upright and simple men are difficult to deceive on account of their simplicity. Traps and clever 
pretexts do not fool them. They are not even clever enough to be duped. When, among the 
happiest people in the world, bands of peasants are seen regulating their affairs of state under an 
oak tree, and always acting wisely, can one help scorning the refinements of other nations, which 







All systems of government and all associations were considered by Rousseau to be 
“unnatural”, and “everything that is not in nature has its drawbacks, and civil society more 
so than all the rest” (p. 199). He was left with the problem of attempting to approximate 
'original' innocence via the unnatural structure of a polity - and the theory of the general 
will is his solution. Rousseau's preference in practical terms would always be for any 
system that could better encourage or manufacture consensus between citizens, for “the 
closer opinions come to unanimity, the more dominant too is the general will” (p. 205).  
The concept of the general will, competing with other understandings, survives to the 
present day. If it is not the direct inspiration and bedrock for the contemporary 
‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory, then it at least shares considerable 
epistemological and philosophical ground with it. As Joshua Cohen suggests, deliberative 
participation may be able to generate at least the sense that democratic decisions are 
owned by all citizens, in that “members can - despite disagreement - all regard their 
conduct as guided, in general terms, by their own reason ... [and this] may be as close as 
we can get to the Rousseauean ideal of giving the law to ourselves" (Cohen, 2009, p. 253).  
This allows us to be clear as to the origins of consensus-seeking deliberative democratic 
theory: it is the inheritor of a Rousseauian emphasis on the possibility of a collective telos. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of the 'General Will' encapsulates the intellectual basis for 
a great deal of work in deliberative democracy (though perhaps Rousseau himself would 
deny any such thing, in that he viewed public deliberation as a distortion of the General 
Will). Many contemporary deliberative democrats implicitly view deliberation as a 
potential source of affirmation for something like the 'general will' - a venue for the 
unseating of self-interested or narrowly-considered preferences, an arena for the creation 
of unanimous or near-unanimous democratic legitimacy. Indeed, unanimity-of-choice may 
symbolise a kind of ideal, consummate deliberative moment.  
The Scope of Deliberation 
'Deliberative Democracy', as we have seen, is the term conventionally used to describe any 
democratic theory which prioritises procedures founded upon discursive reason-giving – 
that is,  'other-regarding' debate between citizens – above other procedures, such as 
simple vote-aggregation. Some of these theories may go so far as to recommend the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
wisdom of natural behaviour, and the self-evident solutions to problems, strongly prefigures the 






replacement of voting and political representation by deliberation as the primary mode of 
decision-making, while others, perhaps due to the reasons suggested in this chapter, do 
not.  
Generally speaking, evidence of the effects of deliberative participation is derived from 
experiments organised by social scientists or governments/civic institutions. However, 
this limits the scope of evidence to deliberative forums that have been formalised and 
systematised by organisers that are external to the process of deliberation itself. Yet this is 
not the only venue for deliberative activity. Such interactions also occur spontaneously (if 
not often under ideal conditions) as an ordinary component of living and co-existing with 
others within any relatively healthy public sphere.  
Voluntary engagement in civil society, arguments about television news packages, pub 
conversations on political figures and newspaper columns, or the sharing of an opinion 
with the next-door neighbour are all deliberative moments, in so far as they may plausibly 
contribute to the preference-formation of the individuals involved. Such interactions could 
be categorised as informally or spontaneously deliberative, in that they represent an 
ordinary discursive or persuasive interaction between citizens even if there is no effective 
way to measure the influence or effect of the reasons and arguments that might be given, 
or of ensuring the ‘fairness’ of the exchange.  
Unmeasurable, spontaneous, informal deliberation – if we are to accept such an ordinary 
phenomenon as a type of ‘deliberation’ at all – surely represents the vast majority of any 
such activity taking place in ‘real politics’. If we are tempted to exclude it from our 
consideration, then we must be certain that we do so out of something more than 
exasperation that such interactions necessarily occur outside the observational range of 
social science, and are thus almost impossible to compare to the idealised versions of 
deliberation and public reason that have often been the product of our theories on the 
subject (Lascher, 1996, pp. 508-509).  
From all this, it is clearly necessary to consistently articulate the scope of deliberative 
democracy, as well as to distinguish outright deliberative radicals from constitutional 
'assimilators'. Many deliberation theorists have rendered distinctions or implicit 
taxonomies of their own (and some, like James Fishkin, have offered complete category 
systems). Many of these definitional assumptions are to do with the boundaries of 
deliberative consideration as opposed to distinctions within the concept. This thesis is 
partially structured around a distinction between the ‘general will’ deliberative democrats 






consensus around the self-evident public interest should be the primary objective for 
deliberative processes – and the ‘public reason’ deliberative democrats who accept the 
inescapability of value pluralism and seek reasonable consensus on meta-agreed rules of 
discourse instead (see Chapter Four). This is not a perfect distinction within the literature: 
almost all deliberative democrats at least tend to understand substantive consensus as a 
desirable end, and even the earliest and most idealised versions of deliberative democratic 
theory use the concept of ‘public reason’ as one of deliberation’s central means, if not 
always as a productive end in its own right. 
Other theorists in this sub-field offer different distinctions. A difference between 
‘deliberation’ (consensus seeking) and ‘debate’ (difference seeking) is often underscored; 
considered ‘judgements’ tend to be ranked differently (and more highly) than mere 
‘preferences’ (which anyone can have). Finally, there is the commonly assumed watershed 
of deliberation itself, which is not usually thought to encompass the broader milieu of 
preference-formative interactions among people generally.  
Perhaps it is best to take account of the projects of those who, like Simon Jackman and 
Paul M. Sniderman in their paper on everyday political arguments, and perhaps also the 
later Habermas, understand deliberation in broader terms than the theoretically prevalent 
notion of some variation on an 'ideal speech situation' (Sniderman & Jackman, 2006; 
Habermas, 2006). Deliberation – interpersonal discussion as a contributing factor to 
preference-formation – takes place irregularly, emergently, throughout society. Given 
these very wide conceptual boundaries, the main distinctions within ‘deliberation’ are to 
do with the imposition of rules and spheres of operation, allowing critical scrutiny of 
deliberation theory which may be dismissive of the preference-formation processes of 
everyday, spontaneous interaction, or attempts to formalise and ‘improve’ the same.  
One important distinction is between the promotion of deliberation in the legislative 
sphere, by elected or otherwise selected representatives, and that targeted at the public 
sphere, with the intention of the deliberative process encompassing the wider public and 
extending beyond the scope of professional politics – can be read as a recapitulation of the 
central questions raised by Dryzek, as discussed above. As Habermas came to argue, “a 
discursively structured public sphere” ought to be only one political tier, informing and 






2006, p. 182). It can also be seen as invoking an alternative approach to older questions of 
democratic representation, specifically the trustee/delegate debate.37  
If deliberation (or, indeed, the authority to deliberate in a meaningful and binding way) is 
seen as the driving force of democratic politics, then the concentration of deliberative 
entitlement – i.e., the issue of who is able to deliberate in an influential or binding way – 
leads to a simple re-voicing of the dispute over the concentration of agency in democracy 
itself. To emphasise deliberative processes in a legislative setting (on the basis that they, 
for example, improve policy-making) is relatively uncontroversial; to theorise the basis of 
the conscious development of a deliberative citizenry is not only controversial but raises 
serious questions of practicability. 
Another source of distinction within theories of deliberative democracy could lie between, 
on the one hand, emergent deliberation (spontaneous property of interacting individuals 
and groups, particularly those with a modicum of knowledge relevant to issues under 
scrutiny), and rationally structured, formal approaches.  
The informal type of deliberation is impossible to legislate for, though it may be promoted 
by public education programmes or certain requirements of expertise before passage into 
the legislative sphere. Very few theorists have considered emergent deliberation to be 
outright undesirable, and indeed it would seem strange to 'oppose' such a natural 
component of human life. Intriguingly, as briefly noted above, Jean-Jacques Rousseau is 
one thinker who appears to oppose informal deliberation in principle. His binding concept 
of the General Will may be “always right and always tend toward the public utility”, but it 
could nevertheless be distorted by the “deliberations of the people”, leading to 
disagreements between the (naturally infallible) General Will and what he referred to as 
the “will of all”, or the generally expressed preference of the majority which is 
nevertheless fallible. Rousseau explained: “We always want what is good for us, but we do 
not always see what it is.” In other words, informal deliberation takes the blame for the 
visible fallibility of collective human decision-making within Rousseau's theory – humans 
are capable of self-deception and of the unwitting deception of others. Only as non-
                                                             
37 The distinction between trustees and delegates is an important one in democratic politics that 
places the onus upon representatives rather than publics themselves (as is the case in almost all 
contemporary liberal democracies). Edmund Burke famously made the case for representatives-
as-trustees, preferring the idea of autonomous and well-qualified elected politicians making 
decisions in line with their understanding of the wider interests of a whole polity rather than the 
specific interests of their constituency, which he viewed as narrower and more sectional (Burke, 
1774). The distinction has been made more nuanced, and more granular, by various contributors 






deliberative monads can this distorting effect be minimised, or the public may be “tricked” 
(Rousseau, 1762 [1987], p. 155). 
Generally, however, it is the idea of a systematised or formalised deliberative process – or 
deliberation that is bound by certain rules – that may be considered controversial. 
Deliberation among representatives is already usually considered to be rules-bound. 
However, the imposition of specific rules (and objectives) over the otherwise naturally-
occurring deliberative processes of the public sphere is the specific ambition of many. It is 
implicit in the 'reasonable actor' conditions imposed by Habermas – that a deliberator 
must be other-regarding and reason-giving – for this would be to rule out a whole swathe 
of possible deliberative interactions, or to categorise such interactions as something other 
than deliberation. Meanwhile, the deliberative experiments conducted by James Fishkin 
and others use professional systematising structures to keep deliberation in order, and on-
topic: moderators are employed, time-limits imposed on speakers and issues, and more. 
The vast majority of scholarship on deliberative democracy is primarily interested in 
either legislative deliberation, or the implications of expanding deliberative democracy so 
as to be more literally demotic, and so incorporate non-representatives and the general 
public into formalised deliberative procedures. As this chapter has argued, the objective of 
outright consensus may be unattainable, and this issue pertains in both 
legislative/representative settings and public forums. However, both of these deliberative 
venues exclude the possibility that the most significant types of deliberation take place in 
informal settings, without the expectation of rendering binding decisions or of the 
approximation of consensus or publicly reasonable agreement on the terms of the 
discussion at hand. To understand this informal, emergent realm of public sphere 
preference-shaping as a type of deliberation throws a different light upon the formalised 
theories promoted by some democratic theorists.  
Such deliberation, divorced of epistemic requirements, could be said to be currently in 
operation throughout any contemporary 'public sphere', and any preference-forming 
discussion of political questions. As a result of its spontaneity, informal deliberation of this 
sort can operate on the basis of unchallenged mistakes, errors and biases, and perpetuate 
these epistemically undesirable features of discussion (the likelihood of such features may 
become more clear over the course of the discussion of public ignorance in Chapter 
Three).  
Yet the product of unregulated and informal deliberation may have value with respect to 






crowds', under this view he is in fact describing an aggregative reading of the products of 
such deliberation. The median of a large number of guesses as to the number of beans in a 
jar (to adapt one of Sunstein's examples) is likely to be more accurate than the formally 
deliberated judgements of one jar expert and one bean expert. This effect may apply up to 
the point that genuine expertise is called for – a crowd would likely be incapable of judging 
the number of atoms in one bean, for example (Sunstein, 2006, p. 36). Simply aggregated 
public responses to questions therefore carry an intrinsic utility, and this utility tends to 
increase given both a) the simplicity of the question under consideration and b) higher 
numbers of respondents.  
The interactions between the 'chattering classes' or 'intelligentsia' – newspaper 
columnists, magazine editorials, well-read blogs, correspondence societies, petitions and 
pressure groups – are generally considered to be components of a 'healthy democracy', 
and arguably contribute to this posited type of informal deliberation, as well as any 
discussion with political preference-forming implications, whatever its setting and no 
matter the contextual or personal biases of the interlocutors. Individuals will likely tend to 
discuss their voting intentions, for example, with other individuals who are 
geographically, demographically and intellectually close to them, which would probably 
have implications for the strength of justifications of democracy that are based upon the 
desirable properties of cognitive diversity. 
From the perspective of the orthodox deliberative democrat, of course, these kinds of 
preference-shaping and preference-forming activities cannot be understood in terms of 
deliberation. A vibrant and well-educated public sphere may produce some of the benefits 
of deliberation, but cannot possibly embody the most important of them: the public sphere 
and civil society constitute a starting point, from which deliberative practices can only be 
improved. Ironically, as this chapter has shown, the recent history of deliberative 
democratic theory shows the decline of idealism, and very often the effective or implicit 
endorsement of marginally improved versions of contemporary public spheres.  
Rules systems are an ordinary part of the kind of deliberation that takes place between 
representatives or legislators in liberal democracies, within governments, administrations 
and legislatures. Deliberative processes here are formalised: discussions have chairs or 
moderators, take place within time-limits, are malleable by specific rhetorical rights or 
techniques, and are always ends-oriented (a legislature debates a specific idea or measure, 
but does not tend to engage in preference-forming discussion without theme). There is a 






government, where there are external considerations such as public scrutiny, systemic 
efficiency and equality of engagement to take into consideration. However, the rules of 
legislative deliberation do not often reflect the expectations of deliberative democratic 
theorists, with no particular requirement for the framing of reasons that might reasonably 
be expected to be accepted by others, no particular interest in the achievement of 
consensus, and, arguably, a strong emphasis on serving as a venue for public position-
taking so as to serve the political interests of legislators (Mayhew, 1974). There is cause 
for real doubt over the efficacy of most legislative deliberation in inducing reasoned 
preference change in participants. To take just one example, Judith Bara et al.'s exhaustive 
analysis of several decades of the UK Parliament's deliberations on abortion rights 
appears to reveal that only one representative changed their mind over time (Bara, Weale, 
& Bicquelet, 2007, p. 588). 
Deliberative democracy of the popular, formal sort, meanwhile, entails the exportation of 
the formalised deliberative processes common in legislative settings to the public sphere. 
In addition, such deliberation is intended to incorporate stringent epistemic requirments 
on the part of participants, usually framed in terms of a particular notion of ‘public reason’, 
and is at least theoretically intended to rule out the need for aggregative procedures 
altogether by attaining consensus around the self-evident best interests of the public. Such 
deliberation could include an attempt to moderate otherwise-spontaneous public debate, 
limit, expand or proportionalise the domain of its participants, or to articulate consensus-
seeking as a public good. Any experiment involving formalised public debate, such as those 
carried out by James Fishkin, falls into this category, as does the society-wide 'deliberation 
day' concept that he espouses.  
The formalisation of spontaneous public debate is often viewed in terms of the harnessing 
or activation of a usually dormant source of political legitimisation and societal problem-
solving, just as Dryzek or Habermas view the essential desirability of a proactive public 
sphere and, at least by implication, leave open the possibility of mechanisms that may 
render the results of public deliberation legally binding. A formalised process of public 
deliberation can only represent a centralisation and institutionalisation of the everyday, 
organic processes of deliberative interaction which constitute a part of the public sphere 
and preference-formation within any democratic context.  
Thus characterised, the project of formal public deliberation can also be understood as 
fulfilling some ambition of 'regulating' such automatic discursive behaviours. Rousseau 






individual votes where voters are isolated from one another in their decision-making. This 
is, in effect, the statement that the broader citizenry cannot formulate its own decisions as 
to the public good when potentially influenced by the misguided distortions of others with 
'private interests'.  
Conclusion: Design vs. Emergence 
This chapter has established the existence of an epistemic dilemma for democrats, and for 
deliberative democrats in particular. For democracy to work well, it makes sense to 
impose some epistemic requirements on participants, but in so doing, democratic 
procedures are less likely to benefit from the advantages of cognitive diversity. This was 
exemplified by the necessity, even in a small and homogeneous ‘public’ such as that which 
comprised the Occupy movement, of excluding some would-be participants in order to 
attain deliberative consensus. In the face of this dilemma, deliberative democrats and 
classic contractualists implicitly argue that whole publics are nevertheless able to 
rationally design social orders. Hobbes at least thought that collective rationality of this 
sort was possible at the legitimating moment of universal consent that initiated the 
establishment of the state; Rousseau argued that collective rationality was routinely 
plausible, as the basis for the ‘general will’, a concept which in turn informed the 
development of deliberative democracy. This paved the way for a more detailed 
consideration of the various types of deliberative democracy, calling into question the 
tendency of the current literature to treat deliberation as a unitary phenomenon.  
The difficulties of justification and epistemology set out in the first two chapters of this 
thesis call for the introduction of a new, clarificatory typology of democratic theories. The 
core dimension by which democratic theories are distinguished should be epistemological, 
and based on their differing responses to the question of the plausibility of collective 
rationality. All theories of democracy must necessarily incorporate, either explicitly or 
implicitly, their own particular perspective on the origins of social order and the 
plausibility and efficacy of rationalistic central planning by individuals or whole societies. 
These differences can provide the key distinctions between various theories of 
deliberative democracy (and democracy more generally). Following from two chapters 
which have chiefly been concerned with setting the scene of contemporary democratic 
theory in two key regards (the justification of democracy and the possibility of collective 
rationality), the following typology established the ground for all of the remaining 






Taking as our basis the importance of presuppositions about the epistemic reach of 
individuals and groups leads to the following three-part typology of democratic theories: 
 Type 1: Collectively Rational Social Design is Possible (Rousseauians) – a perspective 
that is oriented around the basic belief that collectives and groups are capable of 
rationally structuring and designing social orders – and, indeed, that such publics, 
under the right circumstances, will produce preferable social arrangements and 
outcomes than elitist approaches. This tendency would inform a preference for 
more direct and participatory forms of democracy, for deliberation and republican 
standards of public reason, and for whatever social arrangements might best 
maximise both the cognitive diversity of a given society and the probability that an 
eventual decision would be unanimously acceptable to a collective (thus 
necessarily incorporating the epistemic dilemma described in the first half of this 
chapter).  
 Type 2: Social Design by Epistemic Elites is Possible (Platonists) – where the basic 
premise of designed institutionalism is accepted, but the idea that such 
rationalisation can be the product of a larger group than a certain narrow elite or 
epistemically advantaged group is thought to be impossible. This tendency will 
emphasise social arrangements that are representative or liberal-democratic at 
most, whenever democratic mechanisms have proven to be productive of a 
meritous system of government, but could also conceivably lend itself to wholly 
non-democratic institutional arrangements such as meritocratic oligarchies or 
epistocracies. 
 Type 3: Rational Social Design is Impossible (let us call these Hayekians)  – the belief 
that ends-driven rationalism is undermined by various human epistemic 
inadequacies, and attendant coordination problems, on both an elite and popular 
level. Rather, societies should be defined only by institutions and whatever limited 
set of laws have been instituted for long enough to have failed, if they were likely 
to do so, and to specialise so as to fit well with the specific requirements of a 
certain cultural and political context. Reforms should be piecemeal, and individual 
freedom would be best realised through participation in various ungoverned 
venues for spontaneous order rather than through self-expression and citizenship 
in a developed public sphere. 
While I do not propose to particularly endorse any of these strands of democratic thought, 






produced by ‘type 1’ (Rousseauian) thinkers are often productive of unreasonable 
expectations of would-be participants, whether they result in a naïve view that prioritises 
the achievement of rationalistic consensus in order to capture the ‘general will’, or 
whether they accept the inalienability of value pluralism and specify procedural epistemic 
qualifications in line with a concept of public reason (see Chapter Four). Similarly, ‘type 2’ 
(Platonist) theories will tend to have a realistic (or even pessimistic) perspective on the 
epistemic capacities of the average citizen, and use this as a basis to argue that they cannot 
meet a certain set of epistemic expectations (see Chapter Three). The upshot of both 
Rousseauian and Platonist perspectives is a necessary narrowing of the participatory 
franchise, and this could have undesirable, unforeseen consequences for the larger social 
order. 
This is not to say that this project will proceed to embrace ‘type 3’ (Hayekian) theories in 
an uncomplicated way. This line of reasoning is also problematic, not least in that it may 
not implicitly recommend democracy as the primary mechanism of social organisation at 
all. Additionally, the alternative mechanisms of institutional ordering offered by Hayekians 
– of emergent and spontaneously-ordered complex systems – require their own 
justificatory standards. Yet, to approach again the final arguments of the previous chapter 
(and somewhat pre-empt the arguments that will be offered in the conclusion of this 
thesis), the fact that confidence in democracy produces grounds for such confidence to be 
justifiable is not a designed but a spontaneous product of a particular folk theory of 
democracy: the same folk theory that underpins and informs the concepts of the general 
will and possibility of a rationally constructivist general public. Though this folk theory, 
and the confidence it produces, is arguably the product of suboptimal levels of knowledge 
and rationality in democratic citizens, the order that it generates is valuable and should 
not necessarily be subject to deliberative or Platonist efforts at reform. Just as Hayek and 
Oakeshott cautioned that certain irrational-seeming customs, institutions, or rules may 
actually embody evolved wisdom and therefore should not simply be uprooted by 
‘rationalists’ whose comprehension of the functioning of the social order is necessarily less 
complete than they imagine, so this thesis argues that, even if the usually-cited advantages 
of democracy are myths, they may yet be productive myths. 
By exploring Rousseauian, Platonist and Hayekian theories of democracy in the following 
chapters, this thesis will further clarify the argument set out in the previous chapter that 
aggregative democracies with broad-but-shallow participation carry with them some 
important consequentially (and not necessarily instrumentally) valuable advantages. In 






critically considered; in Chapters Four, Five and Six, we will return to the Rousseauian 








Chapter Three: The Problem of 
Ignorance  
 
There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there  
always has been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been  
a constant thread winding its way through our political and  
cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means 
that "my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge." 
-- Isaac Asimov, Article in Newsweek, 21 January 1980 
 
Summary 
This chapter engages with the growing body of literature providing evidence for, and 
drawing normative and policy prescriptions from, the ignorance of voters. Having 
established the empirical fact of widespread public ignorance, the chapter moves on to 
consider its ethical implications, specifically whether such ignorance, when widespread, 
constitutes an argument either against democracy itself, or in favour of some revised 
version of representative democracy. I will outline a ‘folk theory’ of politics, based on two 
overlapping and popular assumptions: that voting is an ethically important activity, and 
that political problems can have simple solutions. I argue that this intuitive understanding 
of democracy gives rise also to a certain understanding of what the epistemological 
capacities of voters ought to be: a folk theory of participation. The chapter proceeds to a 
sustained analysis of several responses to the problem of ignorance which may, broadly, 
be categorised as ‘Platonist’. I dispute these arguments and argue instead for a 
representative system based upon a universal voting franchise, thus vindicating the 










The Folk Theory of Democracy 
Two overlapping questions – of whether it is important to vote, and whether most citizens 
are fit to be voters – carry a longstanding significance for democratic theory. Intuitively, 
most people tend to think of voting as being rather important. Evidence from political 
science has tended to contradict this view; individual votes are only rarely significant, and 
in fact it is something of a mystery why voting remains relatively widespread among the 
citizens of representative democracies (Downs, 1957), and it is not at all surprising, given 
the lack of efficacy in voting, that citizens should choose not to educate themselves. 
Nevertheless, the value of democracy plausibly survives the fact of ‘rational ignorance’. As 
Russell Hardin has put it, "[t]he argument from rational voter ignorance does not show 
that all things considered, democracy is a bad political system that should not be 
established or sustained. One expects democracy to work poorly and to be a poor tool for 
generating just laws and social policies, but perhaps all feasible alternatives to democracy 
would expectably perform even worse" (Hardin, 2009, p. 202).38  
In addition to the common assumption that voting is important and therefore a matter of 
duty, there is a widespread belief – highlighted by Jeffrey Friedman, among others – that 
political questions, even if they appear complicated, are actually reducible to very simple 
principles; that there is a common sense solution to many of the problems that politics and 
politicians are meant to address, even if evidence from social science would suggest 
otherwise (Friedman, 2007; Friedman, 2014). Karl Popper described this as a tendency 
toward “rationalist optimism”, a doctrine that can be found within Enlightenment 
philosophy as well as the presuppositions of the general public:  
[T]hough error is something that needs to be explained (by lack of good 
will or by bias or prejudice), truth will always make itself known, as long as 
it is not suppressed. Thus arises the belief that liberty, by sweeping away 
oppression and other obstacles, must of necessity lead to a Reign of Truth 
and Goodness … [an] important myth which also may be formulated: 
‘Nobody, if presented with the truth, can fail to recognise it’ (Popper, 1954 
[2008], p. 468)  
A number of questions arise here: What is necessary in voters? Beyond this, what is 
desirable? Should the voting public be expected to have a fairly sophisticated 
                                                             
38 Indeed, Russell Hardin argues in his essay on ‘Ignorant Democracy’ (2006) that voter ignorance is 
not only rational, but moral. By expending their time and potential expertise elsewhere, instead of 
preparing as best they can to improve the quality of their votes, citizens are able to do other 







understanding of the way their political institutions work? Should voters be able to tell the 
policies of one political party from those of another? Be informed enough to have come to 
some opinion on the bigger policy questions of the day? Should we expect voters to be 
minimally rational – to be relied upon not to contradict themselves – or minimally publicly 
reasonable, capable of convincingly justifying their preferences to one another?  
One spectre that can be laid to rest immediately is that of wholly self-interested 
democratic participation. In fact, a large body of evidence suggests that voters tend to 
formulate their preferences sociotropically – that is, targeting their own interest as a part 
of the wider public good, rather than in contradiction of it (Kinder & Kewiet, 1981; Sears & 
Funk, 1990; Lau & Heldman, 2009). What generally comes under scrutiny over the course 
of the literature discussed in this chapter is not whether citizens attempt to vote in line 
with the wider public interest, but whether they are epistemically limited to the extent 
that they are unable to approximate the public good even when they try to. 
The two intuitive views outlined above – that voting is important and that political 
problems can be easily solved, or have gatherable answers – seem to circumvent questions 
of epistemic capability or motivation. The intuitive view is worthy of more detailed 
consideration, particularly in terms of the resulting understanding of what voting is, and 
what attributes good voters ought to embody. Together these understandings form a ‘folk 
theory of democracy’, which one might compare to Jason Brennan’s ‘folk theory of voting 
ethics’ (Brennan J. , 2012, p. 3). 
The folk theory of democracy incorporates the view that democracies work best with 
large-scale participation. This is because the problems that could be addressed by 
politicians often have self-evident solutions, and voters are imagined to be well-positioned 
to choose politicians that are likely to resolve their problems in a desirable way. This kind 
of view, as Friedman (2005) points out, may be derived from the conflation of ideological 
perspectives and ‘facts’, and may result in the strange situation of two voters, with very 
different ideas of the ‘right’ thing to do about a given problem, and voting for two 
completely different political parties, both agreeing on the desirability of a more engaged, 
more frequently voting electorate and a political class more responsive to the opinions of 
the demos. This is a phenomenon recognised within social psychological literature as a 
false-consensus effect, wherein each person imagines that their opinion is so obviously 







In the folk theory of democracy, the validity of democracy is weakened by lower voter 
turnout on election days, and the primary indication of a citizen’s incapacity for voting is 
that citizen’s failure (or refusal) to vote. The presumption is that, with a little more 
education or a touch more political engagement, citizens will grasp upon the ‘facts’ of a 
given political circumstance and vote – naturally, for the ‘right’ party. This is redolent of 
the Rousseauian perspective introduced in the previous chapter. After all, if all citizens are 
capable of understanding political truths and approximating them with their votes, then 
all citizens would also, in the best circumstances, vote unanimously for a single party, or 
coalesce independently around the same alternative. There is little space for a concept of 
reasonable pluralism within the folk theory of democracy. 
The folk theory of democracy is not limited to actors in the informal public sphere. 
Journalists, politicians, and academics also often deploy such arguments. Many 
endorsements of contemporary liberal democracy incorporate something very like the 
folk theory of democracy. George Soros, for example, while setting out the potential for 
corruption in democracy, seems to operate from the stance that politicians’ attempts to be 
appealing to voters can only ever be manipulative, and that voters, under ideal 
circumstances, would be able and motivated to select candidates and options in line with 
some concept of the public good (Soros, 1998, p. 200). Michael Sandel’s promotion of a 
“politics of the common good” operates from the basis of similar presuppositions. Because 
all political judgements and conceptions of justice require moral commitedness beyond 
simple liberal neutrality (Sandel, 2009, pp. 246-260), Sandel argues that contemporary 
politics should move to actively reflect moral stances that he thinks are self-evidently 
preferable to their alternatives: limitations on the scope of market influence, active 
economic intervention to reduce inequalities, and so on (pp. 261-269). 
These accounts highlight some of the attributes which, intuitively, the folk theory indicates 
we might wish to find in a voting public. Principally, it carries the following assumptions: 
that in order to elect a representative that serves their interests, voters should at least 
have a notion of what their best interests are, and how they might best be promoted (or, 
perhaps more importantly in a representative democracy, who they think would be best 
positioned to promote these interests). The folk theory of democracy takes little account 
of the scope or scale of interest: it is assumed that the personal interest will coincide with 
the public or the national interest, and – perhaps most importantly of all – that there is a 
possible vote that can at least approximate the support of this general good. This is to say 






political ends, and that there is no desirable end that falls outside the range of 
candidates/alternatives/choices as presented to the voter. 
The general premise that every citizen is able to reason to an extent that is sufficient for 
understanding political issues, and to act virtuously and in the public interest on the basis 
of such understanding, may also be understood in terms of an appeal to common sense. 
This concept has formed an important component in political scholarship since the 
Enlightenment, based on the idea that some ideas and beliefs are self-evidently ‘right’. 
Thomas Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense is only the most famous example of such an 
appeal to self-evident truths and popular reason (Paine, 1775 [1995]). Hannah Arendt also 
believed that some notion of common sense was a central basis for democracy: the set of 
beliefs that could be justified as common sense would also necessarily be communicable 
and publicly reasonable (and thus highly relevant to the discussion of public reason in 
Chapter Four) (Arendt, 1982, p. 75). Arendt offers common sense as a basis for shared 
understanding and political action: “Common sense … discloses to us the nature of the 
world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly private and 
‘subjective’ five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a non-subjective 
and ‘objective’ world which we have in common and share with others” (Arendt, 1968, p. 
221). Sophia Rosenfeld establishes common sense as a powerful rhetorical construct, an 
appeal to obvious realities that are often actually radical claims in themselves (Rosenfeld, 
2011). Without some underpinning belief that the common sense of ordinary citizens is 
equal to any potential public problem, democracy would be hard to justify.  
The overlapping presuppositions that form the basis of the folk theory of democracy might 
also be understood by social psychologists as elements of “naïve realism”, which amounts 
to the generic belief that intuitively ascertainable truths exist, and are simply reflected by 
one’s own ideas: that external truths are unproblematically mapped by whatever we 
happen to believe about them (Ross & Ward, 1996). The failure of others to concur with 
the beliefs of an individual who is naïve in this way can only be explained by some 
combination of the following: differences in knowledge (so that the pooling of information 
would improve the probability of agreement), differences in rationality (i.e. that ‘those 
who differ with me are less rational than myself’), or differences in bias (i.e. that ‘those 
who differ with me are influenced to disregard truths by self-interest or ideology’) (Ross & 
Ward, p. 111). These “tenets” give rise, on one hand, to a “false consensus effect”, which 
biases individuals to assume that their choices are more normative and popular than is 






to explain the instances of disagreement and moral pluralism that they do encounter (p. 
117). 
The folk theory of democracy therefore inherits some evidential weight from 
psychological theories about naïve realism, and extrapolates these findings into a 
widespread, normative understanding about the ethics and value of democratic 
participation (and, in particular, voting).  
To summarise this folk theory of democracy in brief: 
1. Voting is ethically important, and there exists an ethical obligation for citizens to 
vote. 
2. Voting well is preferable to voting badly, and voting badly is preferable to not 
voting at all.  
3. There is always an objective ranking between democratic alternatives, and this 
ranking is self-evident to human reason. 
4. Voting well therefore involves an understanding of the ‘facts’ of the political 
situation, such that the voter can determine the best vote: that which best serves 
their own and the public interest. 
5. The best possible candidate or choice may plausibly not be represented in a given 
ballot, but there is always a candidate or choice that allows the good voter to make 
the most desirable, ‘better’ vote, and so at least approximate the real public 
interest. 
Perhaps understandably, the popular understanding of the value of democratic processes 
which I have reduced to a ‘folk theory of democracy’ is often criticised by academics, and 
very often on the basis of a critique of statement four, above. A consensus has emerged 
around a large (and growing) body of evidence that the average voter in a representative 
democracy is extremely ignorant of the ‘facts’ of their political circumstances. If the value 
of votes is contingent on the voters’ knowledge and understanding, then should we not re-
assess our esteem of democracy in the face of self-evident, general, and often radical 
public ignorance? It is worth substantiating this claim of widespread and profound 






Evidence of Public Ignorance 
The issue of literal individual ignorance – and its implications for public deliberation – has 
been explored academically in some depth. Much of this literature simply compares the 
stated ideological stances of citizens with their actual political behaviour or beliefs, and 
finds a significant gap: for example, as Hardin reports, "since polling began in the 1930s, 
about a fifth of U.S. voters call themselves conservatives and vote accordingly but take 
liberal stands on major issues" (Hardin, 2009, p. 231). 
It may be instructive to engage with evidence of public ignorance from beyond the usual 
scope of political science, however. A great deal of existing research deals with the extent 
of public understanding of science – for example, to what extent the average person 
commands a broad understanding of scientific terminology, scientific procedure, or 
generally-accepted scientific 'facts' (Mooney & Kirshenbaum, 2009). This kind of 
knowledge may be considered a good indicator of public ignorance more generally, and of 
political ignorance in particular. Any policy area that is informed by scientific evidence 
will necessarily require some understanding of that evidence of citizen engagement with 
the policy is to be desirable; moreover, a general ignorance of science may be indicative of 
non-engagement with technical information of whatever sort. The evidence implies a 
significant level of public ignorance of scientific information and processes. Scientific 
terminology represents a central area of concern: to take one example, more than 70% of 
British people “do not understand” what  'UV' (ultra-violet, as a description for a certain 
spectrum of radiation) stands for – whether it should be avoided, why it is sometimes 
included in weather forecasts, or the general concept of a 'UV index'  (Ungar, 2008). This is 
particularly troubling considering that public ignorance seems to persist even when 
considering the question in what should be a familiar context, and regarding information 
that has relatively high levels of importance and salience to personal welfare. More 
broadly, surveys from the 1990s indicate an extraordinarily large scale of scientific 
ignorance: in one case, the British public was found to be “scientifically illiterate” in 85% -
95% of cases (Shamos, 1995).   
In the related set of policy areas with a strong scientific evidence-base, recent research 
sheds some light: nearly half of US citizens (46%) think that 'cap and trade' is something to 
do with health-care or financial regulatory reform (when it is in fact a significant policy 
response – allowing businesses to 'trade' carbon – output allowances – to industrial 







Many surveys focus on the state of political or citizenship education, and question the 
extent to which our educational systems 'prepare' young people for civic engagement in 
adulthood. A great many empirical findings in this area are thus focused on school leavers 
and young adults - for example, findings that 77% of British 18-year-olds cannot reliably 
differentiate between the policy platforms of mainstream political parties. When the 
survey is limited to those who have completed A-levels in politics, this figure only 
improves to 50% (Denver & Hands, 1990).  
Some of the most startling indications of political ignorance among democratic citizens 
originate from the USA. Sometimes these are illustrative of a fundamental lack of 
engagement with ideological difference or the contents of important political documents 
(for example, 35% of the American public thinks that “from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs” is a line from the US constitution, while another 34% think 
that it might be (Somin, 2010, p. 258), to simple errors in highly-charged contemporary 
politics (as when 52% of US citizens think that federal taxes have increased during the 
Obama administration, when in fact they had, at the time of survey, been significantly 
reduced (Przybyla & McCormick, 2010). Strange public beliefs about the Obama 
administration – and about Obama himself – go further: quite apart from the ongoing 
belief among large swathes of the US public that Obama is a Muslim, or not eligible to be 
President due to his place of birth, as many as 8% of Americans report that they believe 
that Barack Obama is the Antichrist, a figure which becomes more shocking when one 
notes that it is inclusive of 5% of self-identified Democratic Party voters who think that 
Obama is Satan (Brennan J. , 2012, p. 10). 
Other evidence suggests that the general public is far more interested in trivia and 
personality than actual questions of policy. For example, in 1992, 86% of voters knew the 
name of President Bush's family's dog, while only 15% of the same respondents knew that 
both Bush and Clinton supported the death penalty (Bovard, 2005, p. 14). 
89% of voters cannot identify the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and 91% don't know 
who the senate majority leader is (Somin, 2000). 50% of Americans “think the Democratic 
party is more conservative politically than the GOP, or don't feel they know enough to 
offer a guess”, while “almost half of Americans” believe that the President has the power to 
suspend the Constitution (Bovard, 2005, p. 13). And there is little evidence to suggest that 
this is a recent or emerging issue – in fact, evidence of political ignorance has been 






the Cold War, 62% of US citizens thought that the Soviet Union was a member of NATO 
(Somin, 1998).  
A 1999 Gallup poll designed to measure the state of ‘general knowledge’ in the USA also 
yielded startling results, some of which are more pertinent to the question of political 
understanding than others. For example, just under a quarter of US citizens were unable to 
identify Great Britain as the country with which America fought for its independence. 
Knowledge of basic science was once again shown to be questionable, with 18% of those 
surveyed believing that the sun orbits the Earth, rather than vice-versa (the picture in the 
UK was reportedly worse, with 33% of people either giving the wrong answer or claiming 
to have “no opinion” on whether the Earth revolves around the sun or not) (Crabtree, 
1999).  
More recently, a survey of the British public for the Royal Statistical Society shed light on 
some common political misconceptions, most of which indicate a kind of pessimistic bias – 
an assumption that things are much ‘worse’ than they really are – among the general 
public. For example, the 1,015 people polled believed that 24% of benefits payments are 
claimed fraudulently – when the reality is that less than 1% are. Similarly, 15% of girls 
under the age of 16 were thought to become pregnant every year, when the actual figure is 
around 0.6%. 29% of those surveyed thought that ‘Jobseekers’ Allowance’ – a welfare 
benefit provided to people who are in the process of trying to find employment – is more 
expensive to taxpayers than funding state pensions, when the latter costs about 15 times 
more.  
58% of respondents did not believe that crime rates were falling, and 51% stated that 
violent crime was becoming more commonplace, despite the fact that rates of both violent 
and non-violent crime have been falling quite steadily for decades. There was also 
evidence of a significant shortfall of knowledge regarding immigration and national 
demographics. Around 31% of the British population is imagined to consist of “recent 
immigrants”, when the figure actually lies between 13% and 15%. Those surveyed also 
thought that Britain was more ethnically diverse than it is in reality, stating that black and 
Asian people constitute “up to 30%” of the population while the real figure is 11% (Duffy, 
2013).39 
                                                             
39 Ilya Somin (2010) and Richard Posner (2003) have used some of these empirical findings 
showing the extent of public ignorance as an argument against the possibility of a deliberative 
democracy. In other words, people tend not to be able to meet the knowledge-requirements 







It should be noted that evidence of widespread and significant voter ignorance does not 
appear to directly contradict the folk theory of democracy. Certainly the folk theory would 
seem to suggest that there are self-evident responses to complex-seeming political 
problems, and that these are gatherable by citizens – yet this may even coincide with the 
views of the academics and others who point out the ignorance of voting publics. The 
rather similar implication of a project that highlights the ignorance of voters would seem 
to agree with the folk theory: that voter ignorance is avoidable, and that less ignorant 
voters would be preferable. Yet a critic of the folk theory of democracy need not focus on 
voter ignorance; they could also question the value of voting in itself. Without this, the folk 
theorist can still claim that mass participation in democracy is valuable, even in the face of 
ignorance.  
Thus it is in the interpretation of the evidence of public ignorance that we might find a 
contradiction to the folk theory. What exactly are supposed to be the risks of public 
ignorance? 
The Dangers of Ignorance: Bovard, Lecky and Caplan 
At least intuitively, it seems right that voters should have some minimal standard of 
awareness or intelligence about political and/or economic questions. Concerns raised by 
the apparent lack of awareness and intelligence among voters would then likely lead to an 
argument in favour of a good minimal standard of political education. This chapter will 
later consider whether there is an educational or exclusion-based ‘solution’ to the problem 
of voter ignorance. Yet to justify the (very common) search for solutions, we must first 
establish not only that ignorance exists in voting publics, but also determine why the 
existence of ignorance could constitute a problem. 
What problems could be generated by the established fact of public political ignorance? Is 
it possible to assert that ignorance is only perceivable relative to some unreasonable pre-
existing ideal standard, and that democracies are regardless robust in the face of non-
expertise – capable of generating non-arbitrary and consequentially valuable outcomes as 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
standards we would expect to put in place as the basis for sound policy-making and political 
judgement. Robert Talisse rejects these claims in his article Does Public Ignorance Defeat 
Deliberative Democracy?, arguing that ignorance in these terms does not equate with an 
individual's incapacity to accrue relevant knowledge or a command of politically valid 







they aggregate whatever kind of preferences are presented to them by a public? Or is 
ignorance undesirable on something more than an intrinsic level? Could ignorance 
underpin the domination of minority groups and elite capture, or foster intolerance or 
extremist opinions in wider populations (Olson Jr., 1971; Issacharoff, 2008)? Perhaps we 
ought to be concerned as much with the ethics as the consequences of ignorant voters, as 
Jason Brennan suggests in a recent contribution to the literature (Brennan J. , 2012). Yet 
the ethical significance of bad voting must to some extent be founded on the extent to 
which ‘bad’ votes are able to negatively impact on a wider polity.  
From the outset it is important to distinguish between arguments about the dangers of 
voter ignorance, and arguments that appear to be targeted against democracy (or state 
actions that are supposed to be legitimised by democratic processes) in principle. James 
Bovard, for example, appears to cross this line at several points in his discussion of 
democracy, for example when he writes that, because of the apparent mandate generated 
by elections, “[p]eople are taught that, thanks to democracy, coercion is no longer 
dangerous” (Bovard, 2005, p. 255). This risk seems to be associated with the existence of a 
democratic process rather than any specific argument about the epistemic quality of the 
votes that are cast within the system. For Bovard, state coercion would presumably still be 
‘dangerous’, even if that state were structured around an epistocracy or all voters were 
educated to the point of expertise in matters political and economic. Bovard’s principled 
complaint is not concerned with ignorant voters so much as the strength (or existence) of 
the state itself. This perspective may consonantly result in an argument against the idea of 
government in general, rather than an argument about the boundaries and epistemic 
requirements of democratic processes. 
None of this excludes the validity of Bovard’s other arguments. He encapsulates the view 
that public opinion may be more easily manipulated, bought, or cowed into submission 
when it is relatively uninformed. For Bovard, the primary resultant risks appear to be 
those of intrusive ‘big government’ or costly and unnecessary foreign intervention and 
war. These undesirable outcomes (which, according to Bovard, are self-evident) are made 
more likely because the politicians' rhetoric is simply more persuasive to the ignorant 
voter (Bovard, 2005, pp. 28-29); politicians have freer rein for the use of the politics of 
fear, as, for example, George W. Bush did in 2004 by casting his main presidential rival as a 
poor protector and overstating the threat of international terrorism (p. 34). In general, 
Bovard says, politicians are finding it far too easy to lie (p. 77); if voters are ignorant and 
they do not understand facts, then how are they to distinguish between facts and 






emerge from an ignorant voting public even if we remain sceptical about the formal 
influence that any voter can wield over their political class. The positive version of this 
claim is, of course, that a more reliably educated voting public would demand better 
politicians, punish bad policies, and discourage the use of dishonest politicking. Yet 
Bovard’s overriding pessimism over the role of the state (as raised in the preceding 
paragraph) would seem to imply that he suspects that a generally better-informed public 
is unlikely to come about, and would probably not make a significant difference to 
government even if it did. Most significantly, Bovard is implicitly adhering to some version 
of the folk theory of democracy outlined at the beginning of this Chapter – in his belief in 
self-evident, common-sense ‘right’ answers to key policy questions he is making use of an 
Enlightenment concept of reason. His only disagreement with the folk theory is on the 
question of public competence – and in order to explain an incompetent public even in the 
face of self-evidently correct answers, he must refer to both the presence of unacceptable 
levels of ignorance and the wilful manipulation of such ignorance by malevolent authority 
figures. 
Historically, similar claims about the ignorance of the general population would often be 
the basis for elitist or anti-democratic arguments against the institution of an extended or 
universal franchise. To extend the vote to include those without the capacity or experience 
for a critical consideration of politics was considered extremely dangerous in, for example, 
19th and early 20th Century Britain, and such arguments were put forward by both Tories 
and their more ‘progressive’ political counterparts, members of the Whig and Liberal 
parties. William E.H. Lecky serves as a fine example of such anti-democratic sentiment, 
and his claims about the possibility for widespread manipulation of votes in the event of 
an extended franchise seem like a pre-emption of Bovard’s contributions:  
There are multitudes in every nation who contribute nothing to its 
public opinion; who never give a serious thought to public affairs, 
who have no spontaneous wish to take part in them; who, if they are 
induced to do so, will act under the complete direction of individuals 
or organisations of another class. The landlord, the clergyman or 
Dissenting minister or priest, the local agitator, or the public-house 
keeper, will direct their votes, and in a pure democracy the art of 
winning and accumulating these votes will become one of the chief 






Lecky goes on to set out, in some detail, his worst fears about an extended franchise – that 
politics would become more simplistic, petty and rivalrous, and that elections could turn 
on unreasoned whims (like a basic notion of fairness dictating that one political party 
ought to be given power after a while under the government of another, rather than basing 
a vote on a rational assessment of the national good) (p. 19). He continues (and it is worth 
again quoting at length): 
The men who vote through such motives … within the narrow circle 
of their own ideas, surroundings, and immediate interests, exhibit no 
small shrewdness of judgment; but they are as ignorant as children of 
the great questions of foreign, or Indian, or Irish, or colonial policy, of 
the complicated and far-reaching consequences of the constitutional 
changes, or the great questions relating to commercial or financial 
policy, on which a general election frequently turns. If they are asked 
to vote on these issues, all that can be safely predicted is that their 
decision will not represent either settled conviction or real 
knowledge (pp. 19-20).  
The tone and quality of politics is not the only basis for Lecky’s opposition to an extensive 
voting franchise. He also argues that popular sentiment is often inimical to progress, 
desirable policies and even technological advancement. He quotes Henry Maine’s Popular 
Government to this effect:  
Universal suffrage, which to-day excludes free trade from the United 
States, would certainly have prohibited the spinning-jenny and the 
power-loom. It would have certainly forbidden the threshing-
machine. It would have prevented the adoption of the Gregorian 
Calendar; and it would have restored the Stuarts. It would have 
proscribed the Roman Catholics, with the mob which burned Lord 
Mansfield's house and library in 1780; and it would have proscribed 
the Dissenters, with the mob that burned Dr. Priestley's house and 
library in 1791 (pp. 22-23).  
This argument appears to form an interesting counterpoint to Lecky’s earlier claims, 
which are founded upon the assumption that the wider public cares little for politics and 
has no inclination for educated or rational consideration of political questions. Lecky does 
allow that such people can be “shrewd” about their immediate interests – exhibiting a kind 






this immediate, contextual rationality would lead to opposition to industrial advancement, 
but also implies that a contrary rationality exists at a larger scale of consideration. Lecky’s 
argument does not seem simply to rest on a claim of outright voter irrationality, but on a 
considered distinction between a more global rationality – which is desirable for 
governance – and a localised rational response to personal conditions and welfare.  
Many of Lecky’s concerns about the implications of democracy can also be found in earlier 
works – as in, for example, the letters of the historian Jacob Burckhardt, who wrote in 
1845 that, while “[t]he word freedom sounds rich and beautiful”, freedom could not itself 
be realised by the enfranchisement of the wider public:  
No one should talk about it [freedom] who has not seen and experienced 
slavery under the loud-mouthed masses ... I know too much history to 
expect anything from the despotism of the masses but a future tyranny, 
which will mean the end of history. ... Believe me, 'the political people' to 
whom certain ones boastfully appeal do not yet exist ... instead, there are 
only masses, and among them a number of splendid still undeveloped 
characters, ripe to fall into the hands of the first swine who comes along, 
and to behave like beasts (Burckhardt, 2001, p. 93)  
This is a view that plainly places the notions of civic freedom and political rights at 
loggerheads, and evinces not only a distinct scepticism as to the epistemic capacities of 
the general public, but a deep-running suspicion that the ‘masses’ will be prone to 
manipulation, and willing to support a charismatic yet destructive tyrant. From such a 
perspective, the electoral successes enjoyed by some totalitarian political parties in the 
20th Century would appear simply to corroborate the assumption that a popular 
democracy will inevitably tend toward undesirable outcomes.  
The centuries-old arguments of Burckhardt and Lecky make for an interesting 
comparison with Bryan Caplan’s contribution to the ‘ignorant voters’ literature. Like 
Lecky, Caplan’s claims about the risks of significant voter ignorance stem from the worry 
that the ignorant will actually use their votes - and that their votes are capable of 
producing self-evidently undesirable policy outcomes, thanks to the election of politicians 
that are either as economically illiterate as their constituents, or willing to act as populist 
opportunists. Democracy is undesirable, according to Caplan, "because it does what 
voters want" - and most voters are both ignorant and irrational (Caplan, 2008, p. 3).  
Caplan describes a kind of total unreasonableness in voters: they are “worse than ignorant 






persistently delivers bad policies” (p.2). Where Lecky seemed comfortable enough trusting 
the individual citizens with local concerns that directly affect them, Caplan seems to think 
that individuals are often unable to rationally grapple with any issue of complexity. This 
also carries the implication that, as Lecky argues for national interest decisions, there 
exists a version of self-interest that is (or would be) more desirable for the individual than 
that which a broadly ignorant citizen is capable of capturing. This establishes the grounds 
for an important feature of Caplan’s contribution to the Platonist literature: the idea of 
“rational irrationality”. Caplan argues that not only do voters appear to have stronger 
incentives to remain ignorant than to educate themselves (as established by the ‘rational 
ignorance’ mentioned above), but they are incentivised to approach whatever knowledge 
they do have in biased and unwise ways. Attempts to assert the psychological plausibility 
of this understanding of human error lead Caplan to compare it to the Orwellian notion of 
“doublethink” (p. 125). In fact, most psychologists would likely think of a tendency to pivot 
between seeming rationality and irrationality over identical information as something like 
‘cognitive dissonance’: a situation where an individual believes two contradictory things at 
the same time. Psychological studies suggest that such dissonance, once conscious, is an 
uncomfortable situation for the human mind, and this discomfort serves as a strong 
incentive to resolve the apparent internal disagreement one way or another (Festinger, A 
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1957). Caplan, then, must be primarily thinking of 
something like an unconscious or undiscovered cognitive dissonance, so that the same 
individual is capable of acting both rationally and irrationally at once without feeling the 
need to put an end to their internal conflict (say by, to adapt one of Caplan’s examples, 
asserting both the importance of protectionist attitudes such as ‘buying British’ and  the 
rational purchasing of the most cost-effective product when actually in a supermarket).  
The central idea of “rational irrationality” is that “if one vote cannot change policy 
outcomes, the price of irrationality is zero” (Caplan, 2008, p. 132). This leads voters to 
reason badly in the service of other commitments or pre-existing biases, rather than in the 
pursuit of a rational vote. Since irrationality costs nothing in this very economistic 
understanding of preference-formation, and since the pursuit of rationality always costs 
something, rationality will be trumped by the need to service even weakly-held 
assumptions or prejudices. Caplan implies that recognitions of this phenomenon promises 
significant analytical power: it may help to explain, for example, the electoral success of 
totalitarian parties in the mid-20th Century (p. 142). For when trends occur in the 






rationality are not random, and so probabilistically cancelling each other out – then there 
can be serious implications for the health of the wider social order.  
The concept of ‘rational irrationality’ is not unproblematic, not least because it necessarily 
presupposes that we have some reliable basis for distinguishing rational preferences from 
irrational ones (in Caplan’s case, that would often simply be the extent of an individual’s 
acceptance of the core principles of economics). But from an even slightly more relativistic 
standpoint, this position seems untenable. After all, there is a huge plurality of 
perspectives to be found in the writings of professional economists, let alone ordinary 
voters. Is Caplan really arguing that there is only one way to be ‘rational’ in response to a 
certain set of evidence? Am I demonstrating rational irrationality by believing in the 
importance of purchasing locally-produced foodstuffs for environmental reasons but then 
nevertheless buying cheaper imported food for economic ones? Or are the contextual 
constraints on my rationality leading me to oscillate between two perfectly reasonable 
perspectives? As Jason Brennan has explained, many of the facts established by economic 
theory are deeply counter-intuitive (Brennan J. , 2012, pp. 172-3), and Gerald Gaus has 
similarly criticised Caplan for overstating the extent to which some economic facts have 
been decontested, and, moreover, that it is not clear that knowledge of economics 
necessarily translates into better policy (Gaus, 2009, p. 294). Deliberative democrats are 
also a reliable source of arguments as to the normative limits of expertise, which cannot 
necessarily offer answers to fundamental moral quandaries (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 
p. 226; Brown, 2014, p. 53). By arguing for the existence of self-evidently rational 
perspectives, Caplan’s Platonist/Hayekian argument shares epistemic ground with the 
Rousseauian perspective, which argues that, if only we could all be exposed to the same 
information and consider it in a reasonable way, disagreement might not exist in politics. 
In the event, Caplan does go so far as to accept that the policies and institutions of 
universal franchise representative democracies tend to be “better than you would expect 
given pure public opinion” (Caplan, 2008, p. 1).40 This phenomenon – of democratic 
outcomes exceeding, in terms of quality, the citizens whose participation underpins 
democracy – is explained by Caplan as being a result of the fact that votes tend not to be 
influential. The same phenomenon that creates the incentives for voter irrationality 
therefore also creates the conditions where such irrationality is less able to be problematic 
for an entire social order.  
                                                             
40 This is not to say, it must be pointed out, that Caplan is at all content with the greater body of 
policies enacted within democracies – simply that voter ignorance offers sufficient grounds to 






The wider implication is of an institutional trend: governments produce more desirable 
outcomes when they are resistant to the influence of voters than when they are strongly 
subject or accountable to them. This outstanding implication invites an endorsement of 
epistocracy: what is it about governments that makes them capable of producing better 
results than the voting public that underpins them, if not the expertise of politicians and 
officials relative to a wider public? This perspective, which seems to be implied by 
Caplan’s contribution, would surely not meet with his own approval. 
Regardless, arguments as to the negative implications of an epistemically limited voting 
public either demand or imply policy prescriptions: normative arguments about how best 
to minimise the impact, or alternatively improve the contributions of, ignorant voters. 
These arguments are the subject of the next section.  
Responding to the Dangers of Ignorance 
If the efficacy and desirability of democracy is negatively affected by an ignorant 
electorate, then there two obvious responses available: citizens should either become 
more competent, or the powers of democratic institutions should be curtailed so as to 
limit their potential for damaging the wellbeing of the wider social order. A third, less 
obvious alternative is to ensure that the structure of democratic institutions is robust in 
the face of an ignorant electorate, and capable of procedurally producing desirable 
outcomes and resisting the influence of even a majority of ignorant voters where 
necessary. The first two types of response can be termed ‘epistemic’ and ‘minarchist’ 
respectively; the third type of response may best be understood as a kind of 
constitutionalism (wherein the basic contents of an underlying constitution are 
considered to be firmly agreed and are very resistant to alteration in line with political 
whims – see, for example, the institutionalised inefficiencies, such as separated powers or 
staggered ‘shifts’ of elections of representatives – that ensure that many democracies are 
not to a great degree responsive to the preferences of the electorate. This section will 
focus on the first two types of response. 
The first, epistemic type of response to public ignorance can itself take a variety of forms: 
for example, epistemic improvement of an electorate can be achieved by the narrowing of 
the franchise to only include participants with a certain minimum level of demonstrated 
competence, but also by attempting to systematically improve the knowledge-levels and 






frequently represented or justified as an educative and information-pooling procedure. In 
reality, as Chapters Two, Four and Six of this thesis argue, deliberative democracy is likely, 
in practice, to collapse into exclusivist (rather than educative) solutions to epistemic 
problems; partly because increased knowledge will not always be a reliable solution to 
epistemic difference, and partly because the very act of deliberation necessitates the de-
emphasis of participation.  
Although some contemporary research suggests that most citizens are able to assemble 
enough expertise to crystallise an understanding of their own interests in a situation of 
particular controversy or contextual salience (Bauer, 2008), most posited educative 
solutions to public ignorance revolve around culture-change and centrally mandated 
information-dissemination. A classic iteration of such an educative argument can be found 
in Deweyan democratic theory, though democratic education is also a preoccupation for 
Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill (2004 [1861]). Recognising that the public often 
seemed “lost … [or] certainly bewildered”, Dewey argued that it could be made more 
capable through the introduction of “a more radical and committed democracy” (Dewey, 
1927, p. 325). For Dewey, education was synonymous with democracy, and the only 
possible means of sustaining social order between generations. A thorough-going 
democratic culture was itself cast as the bedrock of an educational approach, in so far as it 
could inculcate a tendency to think rationally about pushing back the boundaries of 
ignorance: "[T]here are cases when a man literally does not know what he likes or what is 
good to him, or what to take as a good. As a non-rational creature, he may resort to mere 
trial and error. As a rational one, he tries to regulate his trial by judgement, that is, to make 
it an experiment such as will throw light upon the case by bringing into existence new data 
making possible a more adequate judgement" (Dewey, 1922, p. 277). The attainment of 
the capacity for such rational judgement is concurrent with the capacity for personality – 
the term Dewey used to express a sense of individual responsibility and an ability to 
contribute to the public good. Democracy is simply a set of conditions where every citizen 
is afforded the opportunity to develop personality (Bernstein, 2010, p. 292). 
A thorough-going civic education – as a core element of a suite of democratic cultural 
values promoting social intelligence – could create the conditions for increased awareness 
and expertise in a voting public. However, such an educational ‘silver bullet’ has not yet 
been put into practice, perhaps because education of sufficient value (and culture-change 
along the lines that Dewey specified) poses insurmountable logistical problems. Moreover, 
if, as Ilya Somin suggests, the arguments about rational ignorance are to be believed, then 






for it” (Somin, 2013, p. 15) – a claim supported by the fact that, though information is now 
more readily available than at any previous point in human history, and though general 
levels of educational attainment have steadily increased for decades, political awareness 
and knowledge have remained consistently low (Somin, 2013, p. 171; Galston, 2001; Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1989).   
Somin, like Mill, is also wary of the potential for political and economic education to simply 
serve the purpose of governmental indoctrination (Somin, 2013, p.173; Mill, On Liberty, 
1975, p. 98) – and, even if we are not convinced that this is a concern serious enough to 
cause us to rethink educational policies, it does serve as a reminder that educative 
processes will often necessarily involve the importation and emphasis of pre-existing 
social and institutional biases.  
If educational solutions are politically and logistically impracticable (at least to the extent 
that they are unlikely to reduce ignorance to the point that they will satisfy the Platonist 
arguments-from-ignorance set out in the previous section) then alternative responses 
should be considered. Ilya Somin gives serious consideration to a range of such solutions, 
including ‘information shortcuts’, increased deferral to experts and media reforms, and 
creating financial incentives for epistemic performance (i.e. paying voters to learn), before 
eventually concluding that none of these are able to fully allay Platonist fears as to the 
negative consequences of public ignorance, and indeed that many of these ‘solutions’ to 
the public’s lack of economic and political knowledge could make democratic politics more 
vulnerable to manipulative or coercive influence and bad outcomes more generally  
(Somin, 2013, chaps. 4 and 7).  
Somin’s engagement with these responses is perhaps too granular. All such solutions are 
reducible to exercises in education or franchise-limitation. Delegation to expert 
representatives or officials, if contingent on a democratic selection procedure, will likely 
import the same epistemically questionable public judgements as a direct democratic 
process; moreover, the selection of experts requires a clear a conception both of what is 
entailed in expertise and of the best means of measuring expertise in potential officials: a 
problematic task, as Shapiro has argued (Shapiro, 1996, p. 128). Given the evidence of 
public ignorance discussed earlier in this chapter, it seems unlikely that democratic 
publics will be able to reliably select good experts: one of many examples of public 






193).41 And of course experts and officials must contend with their own knowledge 
problems, as Tetlock (2006) has explained. 
Somin eventually endorses a weaker version of the minarchism set out by other Platonists, 
arguing that, while political and economic ignorance do not “justify absolute 
libertarianism” – after all, he writes near the beginning of his book, democracies tend to be 
“more prosperous and peaceful … [and] also more likely to avoid major policy disasters” 
than alternative forms of social order (p. 9) – it is nevertheless true that “[d]emocratic 
control of government works better when there is less government to control” (pp. 193, 
199).  
Other Platonists are rather less circumspect. Bovard writes that there are, in effect, only 
two options available to contemporary politics: “We can either embrace paternalism and 
openly admit that the government must protect people from themselves (and from their 
foolish political opinions), or we can reduce the size and scope of government to 
something that the average citizen can better understand" (Bovard, 2005, p. 244). 
Bovard, of course, prefers the latter option: if politics and economics is too vast and 
complex for the average citizen to approximate rational voting, then surely a minimal 
government, representatives with exceptionally clear responsibilities and mandates, and a 
reduced potential for public ignorance to be harmful, are the best course of action.  Caplan 
concurs: people are far more incentivised to come to rational conclusions about things 
that have a direct and immediate impact on their lives, such as purchasing decisions (a 
mode of choice-making that Somin refers to as “foot-voting”). Since public ignorance and 
irrationality are seemingly very widespread, and since it seem reasonable that voters 
nevertheless think they are voting in line with the public interest and that their 
representatives are generally keen to be seen to be highly responsive to public 
preferences, democracy is inherently problematic: the “threefold combination – irrational 
cognition, selfless motivation, and modest slack – is as bad as it gets” (Caplan, 2008, p. 
195). If only, Caplan goes on to reason, our elected representatives were less responsive, 
or our electorate were more self-consciously self-interested, then the “threat” of public 
ignorance and irrationality could be mitigated. 
If increasing the emphasis on markets is politically unlikely, and democracy is indeed non-
negotiable, then Caplan suggests precisely the kind of franchise-limitation or vote-
                                                             
41 Retrospective electoral judgement of the performance of representatives may be an exception – 






weighting that Somin depicts as politically impracticable in his own book. A test of 
economic literacy, or perhaps the limitation of the franchise to (or increased value of votes 
made by) those with college degrees, are both put forward (p. 197). Failing this, it would 
certainly be sensible to stop trying to increase voter turnout (p. 198).  
Caplan’s failure to allow for the reasonable pluralism of views – and tendency to dismiss 
preferences that are not reasoned in line with what he takes to be absolute economic 
truths – counts against the plausibility of both his critiques and prescriptions for 
democracy. Yet this is not the only line of argument employed by the group of democratic 
theorists I describe as Platonists. Recent contributions to this literature – the best example 
of which is Jason Brennan’s The Ethics of Voting - shift focus to criticising the universal 
franchise on ethical grounds, re-framing these familiar arguments-from-ignorance in more 
philosophical terms. The following section will engage with this sub-type of 
argumentation, and Brennan’s contribution in particular.   
Voting Ethics 
Jason Brennan constructs an ethical basis for his objection to ignorance in a voting public. 
He argues, echoing Bastiat,42 that, because votes within a democracy form the basis for 
outcomes with which every citizen must subsequently live, votes cannot only be informed 
by personal, temporal preferences. 'Voting well' thus entails an engagement with, and 
understanding of, the political and economic issues that are at stake, thus developing a 
"justified"  perception of where the public interest lies, and proceeding to vote in line with 
the realisation of that interest (Brennan J. , 2012, p. 4). Good votes cannot be solely based 
upon private interest, therefore, or even upon what a given voter believes the public 
interest to be. While Brennan appears to accept that all conceptions of the public interest 
are based upon perceptions, and are to some extent therefore subjective, he imposes a 
distinction between "justified" perceptions of the public interest and mere beliefs.  
Thus 'voting well' - in a knowledgeable and justifiably public-interested way - is presented 
as an ethical requirement. To do otherwise - to vote badly - would be to risk imposing an 
ill-considered and successful vote (successful, that is, in the sense that the vote contributes 
to a winning margin for its chosen outcome or candidate) on an entire polity (Brennan J., 
2012, p. 68). This possibility of imposing the negative consequences of your ignorance or 
                                                             
42 “[W]hy is incapacity a cause for exclusion? Because it is not the voter alone who must bear the 






selfishness on other people is the factor that, Brennan believes, makes voting ethically 
significant; a preoccupation that recalls John Stuart Mill's harm principle, wherein the free 
actions of an individual may be legitimately intervened-in when that individual’s actions 
are liable to cause harm to another individual. 
Yet 'voting well' in such a way is also plainly epistemically burdensome. It is much easier 
to vote badly than to vote well. Brennan is primarily concerned with the existence of a 
phenomenon of dutiful voting among individuals without the requisite knowledge or 
concept of the public interest to vote well. Yet Brennan insists that this concern does not 
lead him to call for the narrowing of the voting franchise; indeed, he is clear that he 
considers voting to be a (nearly) universal right (p. 5). Rather, it is suggested that only 
those individuals with the motivation and necessary epistemic capacities actually vote; all 
other citizens, though entitled to vote, are ethically obliged not to, and should be dissuaded 
from doing so. This is a clever argument, and seems to offer good grounds for 
distinguishing between Brennan and some of the other authors discussed in this chapter, 
as well as deliberative democrats and public reason theorists (see Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
Having set out the ethical significance of voting, and the importance of voting well, 
Brennan does not suggest public education programmes or more participation (as a 
deliberative democrat might); neither does he recommend the exclusion of ignorant 
citizens from the franchise (as, for example, Lecky would or Bovard might). Instead, those 
who are incapable of voting well are encouraged to abstain, and the preferentiality of 
abstinence in the case of some voters renders redundant the commonly assumed duty of 
voting (p. 45).  
So, to set out Brennan's argument and claims as simply as possible: 
1. Votes are ethically significant, in that they have a bearing on whether or 
not a political process produces desirable outcomes. 
2. Because votes are ethically significant, voters are ethically required to 'vote 
well'. This involves voting in line with the "justified" perception of public 
interest, and not merely with what they believe the public interest to be. 
3. Voting well is thus an epistemically burdensome activity. 
4. Citizens are not, however, ethically required to vote. 
5. Citizens who are unable (or unmotivated) to vote well are thus under no 






altogether. Bad voters are ethically obliged not to vote, but do not lose their 
right to do so.43  
This argument, and the claims and premises that compose it, are problematic in several 
ways. Let us scrutinise in order the points of argumentation set out above. 
1. The Ethical Significance of Individual Votes  
The first stage of Brennan's argument involves establishing that voting is an activity with 
ethical implications.  This claim is based on a consequentialist argument: Voting badly is 
ethically unacceptable because it produces undesirable outcomes. However it is unclear 
whether Brennan’s claim can be meaningfully applied to individual votes, which, in mass 
democracies, are usually considered to be rather irrelevant to political outcomes. It has 
become a commonplace of political science to point out the insignificance of individual 
votes, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, and this is a literature that Brennan 
explicitly acknowledges (p. 21). Most vote aggregation systems assign negligible value to 
individual votes - and it is difficult to conceive of a voting procedure that could improve 
the relevance of an individual contribution in the age of mass-membership voting 
franchises. What then is the ethical significance of a choice where the probability of a 
meaningful causal outcome – casting the ‘decisive vote’, for example, or otherwise 
influencing policy – is so minute? 
The unlikelihood of meaningful political influence through voting has led to a family of 
arguments – already referred to in this chapter – that express individual political 
ignorance as basically being rationally-motivated.  
Arneson sets out a decent explanation of how, instrumentally speaking, voters are 
'rational' to disengage politically: "Even morally disposed and conscientious citizens will 
not vote well", for such are the costs associated with meaningful political knowledge 
(Arneson, 2009, p. 201). It is not at all clear that rational ignorance can form the 
foundation of an instrumentalist case against democracy, but Arneson’s claims function 
well as a response to Brennan. Surely voting well, as Arneson argues, only becomes 
                                                             
43 At other times, Brennan has gone further and, like some of the other authors discussed in this 
chapter, explicitly argued for the removal of voting rights from those without sufficient 
competency on the basis that sensibly restricted suffrage would be more desirable in terms of 
both intrinsic and consequential justice (The Right to a Competent Electorate, 2011). He does this 
by positing a moral right to only being subject to the influence of morally reasonable actors, and 
pointing out that no plausible system of democracy could possibly guarantee such a right. Here, I 
focus on Brennan’s voting ethics argument, which is his better, more developed and more 






ethically important once a voting public is scaled-down enough to make each vote at least 
somewhat efficacious: "The moral permission to vote without becoming well informed and 
deliberating carefully holds only given certain conditions. If large numbers of voters 
abstained from exercising their right to vote, at some point the efficacy of the votes left in 
the hands of the remaining voters would be large enough to trigger requirements to use 
the vote well" (Ibid., p. 202). This raises an even more troubling possibility for Brennan’s 
theory – couldn’t the requirement for voting well create a feedback loop, where fewer 
citizens participate, raising the bar of 'voting well' ever higher?  
In any case, Brennan may still argue that the quality of individual votes is important in the 
aggregate - that the choice of the majority will result in certain outcomes, and it is 
therefore desirable for the majority of individuals to establish their preferences in a 
public-minded and informed way. This, of course, raises another question: is a bad vote 
still an ethical problem if it remains in the minority? If Susie votes in a misguided way, 
surely this is of no ethical importance unless a majority of voters vote in the same way, 
leading to the election of undesirable representatives and the enactment of bad 
policy? Brennan's ethical concerns are clearly based on a consequentialist position: voting 
is ethically significant, he argues, because good voting can result in desirable outcomes, 
and bad voting can produce undesirable ones. So to rephrase the question - can a 'bad' 
vote be ethically compromising in an intrinsic way, or does it only become so by dint of 
being both 'bad' and popular?  
The reality of majoritarian democratic principles also seems to shift the epistemic burden. 
If Susie, as a voting citizen, has no idea of whether her political preferences are popular or 
not, then it is very difficult to estimate the ethical responsibility that voting will entail. If 
her views are in the minority, it would (from a consequentialist standpoint) be pointless to 
worry too much about the quality of her thought processes or her contextual knowledge. 
If, however, her views are popular, and her vote is likely to join the mass of votes that 
support a winning candidate or option, then again her ethical responsibilities seem to be 
subsumed by the scale of the identical preferences around her. If she is making an error 
then she is certainly not alone; if the outcome is unacceptable then she certainly couldn’t 
be thought to be (in any important way) responsible for it. 
Let us set this aside, and assume that our badly-informed and misguided vote is influential 
to some extent, even given the scale of our voting public and the possibility that our 'bad' 
vote is in the minority, and will never produce or influence an undesirable outcome. 






mistaken. Brennan does not omit the possibility that 'voting well' can still result in 
undesirable outcomes. The intentions of the voter seem to take on a particular significance 
for Brennan's claims: it is important to him that the voter makes an effort to promote good 
preference-formation. This certainly seems reasonable. If, for example, Calvin makes an 
error (as the result of negligence) that reduces the profitability of the company that he 
works for, this is intuitively much more ethically significant than an identical error that is 
committed despite his best efforts to make a justifiable choice in the company's best 
interest. Yet the failing has occurred in both cases, and the negative outcomes in each case 
will be identically bad. For Brennan's idea of voting ethics to be persuasive, we must also 
be persuaded that the effort to vote well actually increases the likelihood of more 
desirable outcomes. If not, then the assignment of value to these efforts - gaining 
knowledge, trying to theorise the public interest - is erroneous. It does not seem that 
Brennan makes a comprehensive case that the attempt to 'vote well' can be correlated 
with an increased incidence of 'good votes' - even if only because it is not possible to 
determine beyond doubt what a 'good vote' will look like, so subjective may be a voter's 
perception of the political question or questions under consideration. A good voter can 
cast a bad vote, and a bad voter can cast a good one, even if only by accident.  
To summarise the above discussion: individual votes are not ethically significant because 
they are extremely unlikely to be influential within a mass-franchise, majoritarian 
democracy, and because there is no necessary connection between an effort to vote 'well' 
and the fact of more desirable outcomes. There are other avenues of criticism available 
here as well: for example, what motivation does an individual have to produce good votes 
in the face of a selection of choices that may not (indeed, probably will not) offer a 
candidate or option that precisely matches her idea of the public interest? 
It is perhaps worth noting that the above paragraphs are not intended to constitute an 
argument that participation has no significant consequential value in mass-franchise 
democracy. On the contrary, the wider objective of this thesis, as explained in its first 
chapter, is to explain the importance of the presumption of efficacy in such democratic 
systems. However, where Brennan argues that ‘bad voting’ can have a negative impact on 
other people in the same society, I am doubtful of our ability to distinguish good votes 
from bad; in the face of this ignorance, it is best to detach the epistemic basis of voting 
from ethical judgement altogether. Voting has a different set of utilities which makes its 






2. How to Vote Well  
Let us accept the first of Brennan’s claims – that voting is ethically significant – and move 
to the next, overlapping claim: that the ethical significance of voting necessitates good 
votes on the part of voters. It would be foolish to suggest that we do not desire votes to be 
‘good’; voting well is intuitively desirable. However, it is not clear that Brennan’s argument 
can legitimately conclude with the idea of an ethical obligation – that voters, if they are to 
vote, must vote well (Brennan J. , The Ethics of Voting, 2012, p. 4). 
To an extent this view has already been challenged by some of the questions raised in the 
previous section, yet the issue here is more to do with the difficulty of establishing 
definitional desirability in the act of voting.  For example, it seems implausible to establish 
a benchmark for assessing when votes are the products of 'good' or 'bad' epistemic 
processes. We cannot realistically analyse the preference formation process on the 
individual level, and thus we cannot determine whether a vote was 'good' by the content 
of the vote itself, and neither can we establish the quality of a vote based on the knowledge 
or reasoning capacity of the voter. Thus our assessment of whether or not a vote was 
‘good’ seems to fall subject to an ignorance problem. 
Brennan’s argument, which gestures towards a reasoning justificatory procedure (Ibid., p. 
68) (though not to the extent or full implications of public reason theorists who are 
discussed in the next chapter), is founded upon a simple and intuitively attractive 
assumption – that knowledge is good for votes, and ignorance is bad. This claim is 
untestable because there is no way to establish beyond contestation what a ‘good’ vote 
looks like. To justify a certain vote on the basis of the desirability of the future political 
outcomes that are expected to arise as its result is necessarily ideological. Bryan Caplan is 
more straightforward about this stance than Brennan: that some candidates and policies 
are self-evidently better than others, and only the ignorant or the unreasonable will fail to 
grasp this.  
If, however, we infer from Brennan that voting well does not necessarily result in good 
votes, then the argument for voting well seems to dissolve. Of course the desirability of the 
attempt to vote well remains. But given the problems raised against these first two of 
Brennan’s claims, then what is the ethical issue with voters simply voting in line with what 
they believe to be their own interests – or, more likely, in line with what, however 






3. The Epistemic Burdens of ‘Voting Well’ 
The costs associated with voting well have to be defined by what voting well entails; if we 
accept that we can call ‘voting well’ any procedure that results in good votes, then it is not 
a given that maximising knowledge/expertise is necessarily the primary requirement for 
‘voting well’. Brennan does not specify the threshold of knowledge that would convert a 
bad vote into a good one. An overriding issue here is that Brennan seems to be assuming 
that public-mindedness is interlinked with increased knowledge. To a limited extent this 
seems to be fair: one cannot be realistically public-minded and other-regarding unless one 
has taken the time to try to understand where the public interest may lie. But beyond this, 
there is little to suggest that we might become more selfless as a result of our increased 
knowledge.  
Nevertheless, if we accept Brennan’s premises, ‘voting well’ would be extremely 
epistemically burdensome. It would demand knowledge of what information is relevant to 
a given vote choice, as well as knowledge of how to go about gathering such information. 
There needs be some conception of the public good, of course – and formulating such this 
would demand certain knowledge as well. Finally, if voters are to assess their ability to 
vote well (i.e. in line with a reasonable conception of the public good), then they must be 
able to gather information as to the public justifiability – the reasonableness and 
acceptability – of both their own notion of the public good and their attempt to vote in line 
with it. The next step of Brennan’s argument (discussed below) makes these epistemic 
burdens relatively unproblematic. Yet the scale of Brennan’s epistemic demands suggests 
that the final set of citizens who are capable of voting well will be rather small. 
4 & 5. No Obligation to Vote, but an Obligation not to Vote Badly 
Nobody, according to Brennan, is ethically obliged to vote. This is an interesting argument. 
It serves Brennan’s position in so far as it permits him to explain that the exclusion of 
ignorant citizens from voting is as simple as establishing that they are not duty-bound to 
go to the polling station, which stands as the societal presumption at present. However, 
the ‘no obligation to vote’ claim also poses a threat to Brennan’s argument. If voting is 
ethically important, and voting well is both ethically desirable and, we may safely infer, 
quite rare, then surely individuals who are epistemically capable of voting well ought to 
vote. Brennan’s insistence that there is no ethical obligation to vote feels, therefore, 
counter-intuitive, and undermines the idea that voting is ethically significant.  
The final formulation therefore may seem to be that while bad voters are ethically obliged 






many bad voters will not recognise themselves as such, will proceed to vote anyway, and 
will need to be outweighed by good voters at the ballot box.  
Brennan writes that a citizen must “vote well or must abstain. Voting well tends to be 
difficult, but discharging one’s duties regarding voting is easy, because one may abstain 
instead". This argument, he also states, does not constitute advocacy for 
disenfranchisement of the ignorant (pp. 4-5). Is this a believable claim? 
I think not. One reason to think that it would not be ethical to encourage 'bad' voters to 
abstain, even if we accept Brennan’s claims about the ethics of voting, the detectability of 
‘voting badly’, and the rest is that the development of a civic culture where the ignorant 
self-exclude themselves from voting would, I suggest, add up to the generalised social 
norm of informal disenfranchisement rather than educative improvement. Where Caplan 
and Bovard are explicit about the need for the disenfranchisement of less-capable voters, 
Brennan allows his ethical argument to create the intellectual pre-conditions for a less 
formal kind of exclusion (though it should be noted that, as a work of philosophy, 
Brennan’s arguments do not contain much explicitly prescriptive content – as he puts it, he 
is offering “moral philosophy, not a manual for civic education” (p.172). 
 Moreover, such a culture would prioritise an unrealistic objective (that all votes should be 
'good votes') over a realistic (and currently realised) one: that everyone who wishes to 
vote does so. The consequential benefits of this second, more realistic objective that are 
suggested in chapter 1 of this thesis - social cohesiveness, a sense of citizens having a 
'stake' in their politics, the provision of grounds to endorse the political system on the 
basis of procedural fairness even when one's vote is 'wasted' (and your candidate does not 
win), epistemic benefits (even if these are limited or peripheral), and the ability for even 
'bad' voters to retrospectively punish bad representatives - are valuable enough to leave 
our culture of voting as it is. 
Conclusion: Platonist Exclusivity 
This chapter has argued, through specific discussions and rebuttals to various types of 
Platonist arguments based on the epistemic inadequacy of voting publics, that: 
1. There are few (if any) reliable standards by which to distinguish a knowledgeable 
vote from an ignorant one without establishing some pre-judgement about the 






2. It is unlikely, given the lack of importance in individual votes, that a good vote will 
ever produce a better outcome than a bad one, 
3. The benefits associated with widespread voting outweigh the costs associated with 
bad voters (this as an extrapolation from the consequentialist argument offered in 
Chapter 1), 
4. The fact of the unimportance of individual votes means that there is little incentive 
to vote knowledgably – but also effectively means that unknowledgeable votes are 
unlikely to cause any great harm.  
The requirement of knowledgeable participation in democracy, along with the franchise-
reduction that it entails, arguably incurs something along the lines of Estlund’s 
‘demographic objection’ against epistocracy (or government by ‘knowers’) (Estlund, 2003, 
p. 62). 
Desiring participation by only the ‘knowers’ entails importing whatever demographic 
‘sample bias’ comes with that group. Whatever else the most epistemically qualified subset 
of a society may be, they are unlikely to constitute a representative cross-section of a given 
citizenry. This kind of demographic bias is already plausibly an issue for aggregative 
democracy: there are biases and demographic trends among those who choose to vote in a 
contemporary liberal democracy, limiting the epistemic range of participation and 
curtailing whatever benefits may be received from cognitive diversity. But the Platonist 
arguments set out in this chapter would exacerbate the tendency toward such a sample 
bias, plausibly undermining the legitimacy of democratic politics, potentially reducing its 
potential epistemic benefits in the aggregate, and destroying the basis for the desirable 
consequences of the universal franchise (even if classical liberals may be comfortable with 
the according reduction in the legitimacy of state action). 
The ‘folk theory of democracy’ can therefore be endorsed for its prescriptive implications, 
if not for any of its premises, many of which are badly damaged by the evidence and 
arguments presented by Platonists. Yet the overriding importance of the prevalence of the 
folk theory – of a democratic mind-set that demands that value is attached to the basic 
elements of liberal democratic participation – is what lends democracy its robustness and 
value. Many, if not all, of the criticisms of democracy set out in this chapter necessarily 
entail an acceptance of the Enlightenment concept of reason, just as the folk theory does, 
and then proceed to bemoan the failure of most democratic participants to grasp the 
essential truths that would allow them to vote ‘well’ or ‘ethically’. Where a Rousseauian or 






circumstances to be descriptive of the public interest, the Platonist arguments in this 
chapter see a division between the public interest and the epistemic capacity of 
individuals or whole publics to ascertain its contents. This, however, is a similarly weak 
position, as it prejudices the set of things that seem to be obvious technical truths to each 
thinker above the subjective preferences of others.  
Regardless of how plausible, upon careful reflection, each clause of the folk theory of 
democracy appears to be, it is essential to the consequentialist justification of democratic 
norms that it is a myth that is allowed to self-perpetuate. The confidence that these 
misconceptions inspire outweighs whatever dangers they may pose to the wider social 
order. The maintenance of this myth, crucially, would involve the avoidance of anti-
participatory or disenfranchising measures.  
The next chapter will discuss another approach to the epistemic improvement of 
democratic citizens, and the possibility that the requirements of ‘public reason’ are 
essentially exclusivist, just as consensus-seeking deliberation and most of the Platonist 










Chapter Four: Public Reason  
 
Democratic theorists now take deliberation to be the 
exemplary practice or activity for democrats, and they gear 
their arguments toward its realization. Hence deliberation 
has become a standard for the accomplishment of 
democracy: it is what democratic theorists aim for, our ideal 
and our aspiration. (…)  What, then, could be wrong with 
deliberation? To begin, one might simply be suspicious of the 
near consensus among democratic theorists on its behalf. 




This chapter attempts to explicate the concept of ‘public reason’ as central to theories of 
deliberative democracy that take into account the reality of reasonable pluralism and 
value-incommensurability. Rather than prioritising the implausible goal of substantive 
consensus, this approach to deliberation requires the pursuit of meta-consensus on 
acceptable reasons instead. This analysis suggests that the concept of public reason 
hybridises the act of reason-giving and the epistemic state of ‘being reasonable’. As a 
result, public reason functions as a stringent epistemic requirement for would-be 
deliberative participants, and one that exceeds the standard requirements for effective 
political rhetoric. The chapter will take into account the approach of a range of 
contributors to the literature on public reason, including Habermas and Rawls. It will then 
turn to a criticism of ‘public reason liberalism’, a strand of post-Rawlsian theory that 
connects public reason to non-deliberative politics. The commonly-adopted distinction 
between ‘consensus’ and ‘convergence’ accounts offered by public reason liberals is shown 
to be faulty: indeed, such ‘convergence’ accounts may not be recognisable as a version of 






Public Reason: Deliberation and Liberalism 
This chapter sets out a critical reappraisal of the academic use of the term ‘public reason’ 
in order to develop a common-ground definition of the term and start to understand the 
discrete set of methodological and normative implications arising from it. Public reason is 
a more sophisticated democratic concept than that of the general will, which is closely 
identifiable with the folk theory of democracy outlined in Chapter Three. However, public 
reason is also too often misidentified or dealt with so vaguely that the analytical value of 
the term is lost. It seems likely the cultivation of true public reason is incompatible with 
most definitions of liberalism and, in practice, likely to produce undesirable outcomes 
within deliberative democracies.  
'Deliberation', of course, is a term that means different things to different people. Yet it 
would be fair to say that most democratic theorists – and perhaps most scholars of 
democracy more generally – are now deliberative democrats of one sort or another. The 
ascent of this particular strand of democratic theory well reflects the quality and power of 
its central theorists, and the persistent appeal of the intellectual traditions which preceded 
and informed it. Nevertheless, deliberative procedures are not capable of solving the 
various problems and paradoxes at the heart of any notion of enhanced state power via 
the legitimising or mandate-maximising effects of certain conceptions of democracy. 
Indeed, the underlying theory of deliberative democracy is contestable from a variety of 
academic perspectives. 
Where aggregative democracy is concerned with the outputs of individual decision-
making processes – preferences and choices themselves – deliberative democracy belongs 
to a concept of democracy which is mainly concerned with the formation, development and 
justification of these preferences and choices. This is not to say that the world of politics in 
an aggregative democratic system (to take the cardinal example of the election of 
representatives at whatever level) is not chiefly to do with the would-be-elected (or re-
elected) appealing to, bribing, coercing or otherwise persuading electors to adopt certain 
preferences (as in David Mayhew's influential 'electoral connection' model of political 
behaviour (The Electoral Connection, 1974)).44 However, the mechanism of aggregative 
democracy, which involves the collection and combination of votes according to one or 
                                                             
44 As Mayhew wrote: “[I]f a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of American 
national assemblies with the goal of serving members’ electoral needs year in and year out, they 






another majoritarian decision system, is completely unconcerned with the preliminary 
process of vote-winning, whether its effect is invisible or readily apparent. Here lies a 
fundamental distinction between deliberative and aggregative politics, because many 
models of deliberative democracy, quite unlike the aggregative embodiment of liberal 
neutrality, involve the systematisation of preference-change in line with some set of 
epistemic standards, and the insertion of such systems into democratic processes as a core 
component of the determination of democratic outcomes.  
Chapter Two established the improbability of substantive consensus, whether through 
deliberative or other democratic means. Efforts to establish consensus-seeking politics 
will always be tempered by epistemic diversity and value pluralism of contemporary 
society, making even the approximation of consensus either unreachable or the product of 
the selection of an unrepresentative in-group for participation. These facts cast into doubt 
not only the Enlightenment view of reason, but the possibility of collective rationality 
itself, and calls for a reorientation of deliberative democracy away from the unrealistic 
condition of rational consensus and toward the more “pragmatic” objective of meta-
consensus (Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007; List, 2002).  
Having rejected as overly-exclusionary the pursuit of outright consensus and unanimity, 
the epistemic standards targeted by deliberative processes are best understood in terms 
of public reason, which is the requirement that political perspectives be reasoned and 
justifiable in such a way that other citizens will find them, at least to some extent, 
acceptable as reasons.45 This chapter will establish the role of public reason in deliberative 
democratic theory, offering a conceptual analysis that shows how it necessarily 
incorporates different notions of ‘reason’ and is thus a kind of hybridised concept. 
Problems are shown to arise when public reason is used as a justificatory standard for 
normative argumentation, and in particular for deliberative democracy, which seems to 
require that legitimate decisions should be the result of (logical) reasoning and meet the 
criterion of public acceptability. For liberal democrats, an emphasis on acceptance 
through reasoning (or acceptance of a decision or position through the acceptance of 
underlying reasons) would undermine the respect for individual liberty and diversity: a 
perspective that may be discovered in the growing literature on ‘public reason liberalism’, 
which entails an attempt to understand public reason beyond deliberative politics. The 
                                                             
45 As the following discussion will show, the meaning and content of such acceptability is subject to 
contestation: under some conceptions of public reason, merely being able to recognise reasons as 
valid reasons is considered to be enough, whereas other models incorporate something more 






‘consensus view’ of public reason often used by such liberals should be rejected, but the 
alternative ‘convergence view’ is also problematic, apparently reducing reason to mere 
endorsement, and seemingly having little to do with orthodox accounts of public reason.  
Under the convergence view, public reason becomes the sum of any private reasons (or 
whims) that somehow enter the public sphere. Moreover, even this view on the place of 
reason seems to suggest overly strong requirements on legitimate law-making, because 
legitimacy here rests on acceptance.  
The approaches used by public reason liberals fail, therefore, in two important ways: 1) 
they do not constitute public reason at all, and will not have the effects imagined by 
deliberative democrats who see public reason as a way to legitimize laws; and 2) it is 
unrealistic, since, at least in a functioning society, everyone at some point is required to 
adjust their actions to some law that they do not particularly prefer.  
The emphasis on the formalisation of preference-formation in line with a requirement of 
public reasonableness never existed in classical and literal notions of democracy – this is a 
departure which, in the words of Joshua Cohen, aims for a democratic model which, 
through deliberation, embodies a “shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and power 
to the common reason of citizens – democracy’s public reason – as a guiding force in 
democratic life” (Cohen, 2009, p. 248). Though reasonable outcomes may occur 
‘accidentally’, as it were, as the result of aggregative democracy, democracy cannot be 
considered to be deliberative unless reasonableness is itself the objective of the 
democratic process (Ibid., p. 251). In other words, where normal democracies build in a 
presumption of reasonableness because their systems are thought to be procedurally fair 
and even-handed, and may be productive of outcomes that are themselves reasonable, 
deliberation entails the incorporation of reasonableness as an end, and not merely as the 
means, of democracy: a desirable outcome in itself. This connection between deliberative 
democracy and the theory of public reason is also made explicit by John Rawls (1997), 
Gerald Gaus (1997), and Gutmann and Thompson, who go so far as to write that 
“deliberative democracy’s basic requirement is for ‘reason-giving’” (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004, p. 3).  
Though the idea of consensus-seeking (and unanimity-seeking) deliberative democratic 
processes owes much to the 'general will' philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his 
followers (in the implicit understanding that the majority will is 'truth-tracking' and 
opposing wills must either be incorrect, manipulated or belong outside the polity in 






intent of diminishing political disagreement within a polity lies far beyond Rousseau's 
philosophy. Indeed, as I have noted, Rousseau is openly opposed to the idea of 
deliberation, seeing it as a potential source of trickery – a distortion of the unanimous 
general will. Indeed, public reason’s role as a core objective of deliberative democracy is 
strengthened by a growing acceptance within the literature of the inescapability of value 
pluralism.  
Various deliberative models have come to revolve around ideal notions of 'other-
regarding' and 'reason-giving' participation in debate. A great deal of deliberative 
democratic theory takes its inspiration from one or another interpretation of the theory of 
communicative rationality (or, later, the ‘unlimited communication community’) 
developed by Jürgen Habermas, and thus naturally imports much of Habermas’ 
preoccupation with the role of reasons in politics (for example, see Dryzek, 1990; 
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004; and the contents of Bohman & Rehg, 1997). The 
recognition of good reasons is entailed in the Habermasian understanding of rationality 
(Habermas, 1984, pp. 115-6; Chambers, 1996, pp. 90-1), as is an important differentiation 
between strategic and communicative action. Strategic action, which encompasses 
manipulation and coercion, is targeted at the realisation of goals, whereas communicative 
actors are interested in sharing, and finding grounds for genuine agreement on, the 
reasons that they give (Habermas, 1984, pp. 38-39). These reasons can derive their 
authority from appeals to recognised facts, expressions of personal views, and/or 
reference to extant social norms.46 These lines of argument come to their political fruition 
in Between Facts and Norms, as Habermas constructs a model of political legitimation 
which rests upon the possibility of communicatively rational discourse (Habermas, 1996, 
pp. 82-85).  
John Rawls’ approach to political public reason is similarly imbued with ideal conceptions 
of reason-giving as a desirable attribute for democratic citizenship, and will be discussed 
in more depth below. Generically speaking, an emphasis on reasonableness in the public 
sphere is difficult to disagree with in itself: if one feels one has a good reason for one’s 
                                                             
46  These three sources of reasons – empirical, personal/emotive and normative – make for an 
interesting comparison with the three types of Aristotelian rhetorical appeals mentioned later in 
this chapter: logos, ethos and pathos (best understood as appeals to rationality, credibility and 
sympathy). Similarly, the Habermasian idea of an “ideal speech situation” bears some comparison 
with the ‘ideal conditions of discourse’ as expressed by Plato, which are the basis not only for 
agreement but for rendering of such agreement into something meaningful. Individuals coming to 
agreement without mutual engagement in frank, good-willed discourse will not necessarily 







beliefs, one ought to express it, and the legitimating effect of widely-acceptable reasons 
should be relatively self-explanatory. The primary source of difficulty with concepts of 
public reason lies in the epistemic demands that they necessarily entail, and the political 
exclusivity that such demands could lead to. This chapter argues that the net effect of 
much deliberative democratic theory constitutes the establishment of reason-giving as a 
necessary condition for political engagement within a democracy, setting up mechanisms 
for exclusion and self-exclusion that may be both procedural and unintentional (see 
Chapter Six). 
Self-justification (and public justification) of existing preferences – in normatively 
acceptable ways – is thus an extraordinarily important element of any theory of 
deliberative democracy. To justify a given constellation of choices and preferences 
publicly is to take a strong stance within a deliberative forum, and to take on the role of a 
persuader. To hold views and reasons that are only internally justifiable or at odds with 
majority opinion is to operate at a relative disadvantage within any deliberative activity.  
This leads us into a maze of questions: can all reasons be reasonable? More specifically, 
can there be a non-normative basis for the assessment of the reasonableness of 
preferences? Is the fact of communicability in itself sufficient? Might a reason not be 
unspeakable, indeterminate in nature – and still be a reason? Might it disagree with the 
social norms of its intended audience to the extent that it may not be rationally uttered? 
And, given any of these, should such reasons be discounted in the political public sphere?  
What is a Public Reason? 
The concept of public reason is deployed by theorists from across the political spectrum, 
and from manifold intellectual traditions – and as a result, many divergent definitions and 
usages are applied to it. This chapter attempts to identify the roots of the concept of public 
reason, set out its most fundamental components, and critique the tendency to conflate it 
with the associated but distinct concept of ‘public justification’. As well as an exercise in 
definition and clarification, this undertaking carries significant implications for the 
relevance and meaning of any work that is dependent upon public reason arguments, and 
provides a means to better understand the tensions at the core of democratic theory to 
which such arguments are intended to respond. 
This chapter therefore moves to two new objectives: clarificatory, and critical. The first 






and (hopefully) useful conception of ‘public reason’ – one which takes into account the 
possibility that this concept must, at some level, constitute a compromise between the act 
of reason-giving (reasoning-as-explanation) and the idea of ‘reasoning’ as an engagement 
of a higher rational mind-set (reasoning-as-rationality). The second (critical) objective is 
partly implied by this clarification: that public reason arguments, as deployed by, for 
example, John Rawls, effectively establish a set of epistemic demands that delimit the 
possible range of ‘admissible’ reasons. The second part of my critical arguments is 
composed of a critical analysis of Public Reason Liberalism as it has been developed by 
scholars since Rawls, focusing in particular on whether this account is at all comparable to 
Rawls’s own apparent conception of public reason. 
In contemporary liberal democracies, citizens use votes to express their preferences as 
best they can - or they attempt to involve themselves as representatives to be voted for by 
others. As discussed in Chapter Two, most other forms of democratic engagement are 
informal: if citizens or groups have a specific interest or proposal they want given greater 
attention, they may seek to lobby representatives to institute new policies or change 
existing ones; they may attempt to structure debates en masse or introduce new options to 
the range of choices that they are presented with in the polling booth. If disgruntled or 
angry, they may strike or demonstrate to indicate their protestation of political action, or 
abstain from political processes altogether. In the formation of their preferences they may 
engage in discussions with other citizens, involve themselves in (or simply monitor) the 
debates played out within state and media, or deliberate privately on the issues at stake, 
taking account of the perspectives of others only as they choose.  
These informal democratic activities (and though it should be noted that many of these 
may take place in non-democratic contexts, most would agree that these activities 
constitute forms of democratic engagement among citizens) add up to what is often 
referred to as the public sphere of political life, where individuals or groups attempt to 
construct political solutions, wield political power, or support or undermine one or 
another party or alternative beyond the direct democratic participatory act: the act of 
voting, or of standing for election oneself.  
Many political theorists have come to view these spontaneous and informal activities as 
somewhat toothless. How can an individual or group hope to have meaningful influence in 
the face of the well-funded lobbying of 'entrenched interests', the structured regimes of 
mass-membership political parties, or the institutional inertia of the state's bureaucracies 






evidence of the weakness of the formal side of democratic participation: the improbability 
that an individual's vote might actually change a given outcome (perhaps best expressed 
in the literature that surrounds Anthony Downs’ observation of the paradox of voting 
(1957)), the self-evident lack of influence that an individual can claim as one vote in the 
multitude, and the apparent ability of representatives to set agendas and structure 
debates in such a way as to tip the scales in their own favour (see, for examples of this sort 
emanating from very different political perspectives, Riker (1986) and Lukes (1974 
[2005]), whose contributions are also discussed in Chapters Five and Two, respectively). 
The same theorists who express discontent with the modes of engagement outlined above 
tend to call for an alternative formulation of democracy: a democracy that is more 
responsive to the popular will, with more engaged and better-educated citizenries, more 
opportunities to vote directly on issues rather than deferring responsibilities to 
representatives, and systematically more prone to achieving universal consensus than 
having to resort to majoritarian principles in order to choose between competing camps; a 
formulation of democracy that is, in effect, intuitively more democratic.  
How to bring this alternative democracy about? For some, by promoting a formalisation of 
the spontaneous, informal democratic behaviours mentioned above; as John Dryzek puts 
it, fostering “a turn to deliberation that seeks reasoned agreement rather [than] the mere 
aggregation of preferences” (Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 2000, p. 36). 
Particularly close to the heart of the notion of these 'more democratic' democracies - let us 
call them deliberative democracies - lies the idea of public reason, which is the effective 
formalisation of the accounts and justifications that are made in support of a certain 
choice or perspective. Political reason-giving - and the associated idea that there exists a 
particular, preferable flavour of such reasoning that is in some sense public – provides the 
basis for a version of deliberative democracy that need not be consensus-seeking in 
anything but the general definition of what should count as an acceptable reason. Public 
reason therefore offers a possible escape-route from the value pluralism that renders 
outright consensus so improbable. 
Deliberative models of democracy do not represent the only theoretical usage of the 
concept of public reason, however. Another (relatively heterodox) perspective is based 
upon an interpretation of John Rawls’ use of public reason as a justificatory standard. This 
view, which has been the subject of extensive treatments by Gerald Gaus (2011; Gaus, 






reason by Rawls, so that it takes on the form of a generalised response to the “problem of 
conflicting private judgement”.47  
Where Gaus pursues an analysis of public reason liberalism as a critical outgrowth from 
social contract theory, and so determines its presence, effectively, in the theories of 
enlightenment contractual theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, the next section attempts 
to trace the basis of this concept in a different way, starting with an interpretation of the 
role of reason in Aristotelian rhetoric, and developing this to explore plausible intuitive 
definitions of what I conclude is a rather strange, ‘hybridised’ notion. This offers a lens 
through which to critically consider its usages by both Rawls and Habermas, and 
determine if they are essentially conflating the act of 'reason-giving' with a kind of 
classically idealised mind-set of 'reasonableness' or ‘reasoning’. This allows a re-
examination of the potential for public reason liberalism, focusing upon the recent 
explication offered by Kevin Vallier (2011b). Public reason liberalism, like the Rawlsian 
theory from which it is developed, is political thought in the ‘ideal’ mode, and is thus to 
some extent protected from simplistic critiques that would accuse it of being unrealistic. 
That said, public reason liberalism is questionable on a conceptual level as well, in so far as 
it appears to offer a vision of liberalism that satisfies few of the usual expectations 
attached to such an ideological stance, while also presenting a version of public reason 
that does not seem to be commensurable with any other widely-used version of that 
concept.  
A ‘Hybrid Concept’ 
The human capacity for reason has long been understood to be a key basis for our ability 
to form polities. Reasoned speech (logos) was identified by Aristotle as the key distinction 
between human beings (as political animals) and other living things (as set out in Book 1, 
Chapter 2 of the Rhetoric).  Aristotle also described two other forms of rhetorical 'appeal' 
alongside the reasoned argument of logos. One was ethos – the establishment of a 
speaker's credibility, as a kind of a persona (to be considered as distinct from the usually 
negatively connoted ad hominem) persuasive device; an argument from the speaker's 
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character, in essence. The third form of appeal was pathos, or the emotionally evocative 
appeal (Ramage & Bean, 1998). 
Interestingly, all of these rhetorical appeals – the logical, the emotional, and those based 
upon personal credibility (or character) – would today be intuitively recognised as forms 
of reasons, when using that word as an English noun. The noun reason indicates an excuse 
or a post-hoc explanation – we might ask, “What were your reasons for hitting the table?” 
Reasons of this sort may well be logical or causal explanations (“I saw a mosquito and 
tried to kill it”), or emotional (“Why shouldn't I hit the table? Why can't I hit whatever I 
choose? Isn't this a free country?”), or, indeed, based upon the standing and credibility of 
the speaker (“Trust me, I have my reasons for hitting the table. You know I never do 
anything without a good purpose.”) 
Yet the original logos – the classical ideal of reasoning, as an activity that elevates the 
logical human above creatures given only to passion, need or want – attaches more 
specifically to the use of the word reason as a verb. When a person is said to reason, the 
understanding is that the person is deploying logical or rational explanations, and not 
merely excuses. The act of reasoning may not, in fact, be external at all – may not be a 
rhetorical tool or a state of communication – but a form of internal deliberation and 
reflection.  
When political theorists ask us, as democratic citizens, to reason, and to reason publicly, 
what are we actually being asked to do? The most literal understanding might be to 
present externally - to make public - the rationalisations and logical, evidential basis for 
our conclusions, which previously might only have been internal, or private. This would 
appear to conflate the speech-act of reason-giving with the mental state of reasonableness 
to some extent: where the communicative reasons, if they are to count as publicly 
acceptable, must also be logically reasoned.48  
The implicit expectation in the term 'public reason' is thus that such reasoning is a 
communicative explanation that also carries some hallmarks of logic, while Aristotle might 
understand that some of our public reasons would be logical, but that a great many others 
would not be. Moreover, as Chambers has pointed out, Aristotle's stance on rhetoric was 
“that a proper use of emotion and an appeal to character need not detract from or 
undermine the claims of logos” (Chambers, 2009, p. 335). Contemporary theorists of a 
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hybridised concept of reason, then, are setting some quite new limits on the range of 
reasons that are acceptable within public discourse. Indeed, Chambers (and others) are 
beginning to become concerned with the need for a “rehabilitation of emotion and 
character as legitimate forces of persuasion” in the public sphere (Ibid., p. 334). 
Let us attempt to examine the hybrid-form of the word 'reason' more closely. The giving of 
such a reason may, intuitively, encompass a number of overlapping communicative 
activities. A reason may be a causal account for a certain decision or preference, or it may 
be some sort of a justification (perhaps moral, normative, utilitarian, or some combination 
of these).  
Perhaps the most significant necessary condition for this kind of hybrid reasoning may be 
that its content is plausibly understandable by those with whom one is attempting to reason. 
This constitutes an additional new requirement - that the logical content of a public reason 
be accessible and understandable to others (why else make the reasoning public, after 
all?). Thus the requirement is that a reason must have some recognisable meaning 
associated with the preference, decision or action in question. For example, I may eat a 
cupcake and give a whole battery of at least notionally public reasons as justification: that 
“I was hungry” (a justification based on simple utility maximisation), that “it looked nice” 
(aesthetics), that “I did not want x to eat it” (soft paternalism or simple schadenfreüde), 
that “it was about to go stale” (imposed necessity), that “I was rewarding myself for y” 
(self-reward), or that “I had a bad day” (self-consolation).  
All of these intuitively count as reasons. Some of them, of course, may be lies – factually 
untrue – yet a reason does not necessarily need to be truth-tracking. The key element is 
that with these explanations the cause or personal justification for the action in question is 
communicated. Crucially, however, different individuals will accept the legitimacy of these 
reasons to differing extents. There can be no single universally acceptable reason, even if 
there can (and this is questionable) be a universally recognised form by which to identify 
what a legitimate reason is.  
A reason in the public sense – and in the sense in which the word is used by theorists of 
deliberative democracy, among others – requires additional components. The notion of 
reason-giving is allied to the deliberative ideal of 'other-regardingness'. Ideally, a reason 
deployed in a deliberative forum would need to account for – be recognisable as a reason 
to - individuals with alternative points of view. And, in fact, reasons that are expressed in 
such a forum and fail to be publicly persuasive may not be considered to be reasonable at 






a reason is, most deliberative democrats seem to be certain about what a reason is not: 
“there is general agreement that appeals to power or expressions of private interest do not 
count as reasons” (Talisse, 2004, p. 456). 
This notion of public reason, most notably when employed by John Rawls, requires that 
reason-giving incorporates normatively accepted political values, “non-controversial” 
scientific evidence, as well as some rational content – that a given reason, quite minimally, 
makes causal sense; a component that alone seemed a sufficient condition for a definition 
of hybrid reason-giving in the intuitive or spontaneous mode described initially above 
(Rawls, 1971, pp. 416-7). Rawls is explicit about the assumptions incorporated into this 
part of his theory. Specifically, he accepts that he depends upon “a certain competence on 
the part of the person deciding: he knows the general features of his wants and ends both 
present and future, and he is able to estimate the relative intensity of his desires, and to 
decide if necessary what he really wants … he can envisage the alternatives open to him 
and establish a coherent ordering of them” – in other words, “the familiar notion of 
rationality” that Rawls employs throughout his work (Ibid., pp. 418-9).49  
The key admixture to the Rawlsian notion of public reason is what he calls the duty of 
civility, which is intended to capture the basis for other-regarding arguments. ‘Nonpublic’ 
reasoning has some obvious limitations when one is interested in establishing some 
preliminary principles of justice or constitutional bedrock, so “public reason with its duty 
of civility gives a view about voting on fundamental questions in some ways reminiscent 
of Rousseau's Social Contract” (Rawls, 1997, pp. 98-99), a comment which certainly helps 
us to understand Rawls’s conception of Rousseau’s work. 
Rawlsian public reason is thus definable as the set of reasons (ideals, moralities, principles 
and approaches) which are intuitively accepted as good (which is not necessarily to say 
right) by the public – so that a public reason is any reason which the public “may 
reasonably be expected to endorse” (Finnis, 2006, p. 3; Rawls, 1993). This is clearly a more 
stringent set of requirements for a communication to qualify as a reason than the 
spontaneously-produced instances described above, and places a far heavier burden on 
participants of a public sphere if they are to be considered to be reason-givers.  
It is also worth reminding ourselves that, while Rawls explicitly rules out the existence of 
fully private reason (Ibid., p. 220 – a comment which points to Rawls’ dependence on the 
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work of Wittgenstein), he establishes that a variety of non-public reasons must exist. 
Crucially, while “there are many nonpublic reasons”, there can only be “but one public 
reason” (Rawls, 1997, p. 99). In other words, the realm of public agreement is only such 
where it produces a unitary reason. If an agent attempts to reason publicly but falls 
outside of the mainstream in the established set of meta-agreed rules, we must presume 
(in line with Rawls) that she is either not a part of the public, or has failed to be 
reasonable. We are presented with a public reason that is amorphous along two axes, 
based upon a notion of reason that has no pre-set boundaries – everything is effectively 
contestable within the Rawlsian polity – and a notion of a polity that can only be 
composed by those who have settled upon the same set of common agreements as their 
fellows.  
One must presume from this that the set of meta-agreed principles achievable through 
reflective equilibrium is expected to be quite small. Indeed, many of the issues arising 
from the theories of deliberative democracy that followed Rawls seem to stem from the 
employment of a system of reasoning proposed by Rawls for consideration of 
fundamental, meta-agreement issues (such as first-order constitutional design and 
amendment) being exported to the broader political sphere of public decision-making. 
These requirements seem to form significant epistemological hurdles for those who would 
reason publicly along the lines that Rawls sets out. The Rawlsian public sphere tacitly 
excludes from public reason what Rawls calls unreasonable comprehensive doctrines: 
truth-testing discourses based on ontologically 'complete' philosophical or theological 
positions, which leave no room for reason-agreement with those from differing 
perspectives. Rather, the public sphere is a venue for overlapping consensus, wherein 
agents are responsive to the minimal requirements of engagement set out by others, 
capable of at least tolerating (and being tolerated by) their counterparts – or, even better, 
a greater degree of convergence in the preferences of actors (Rawls, 1971, p. 517). 
Moreover, each participant would need an understanding of “what each regards as a 
political conception of justice based on values that … others can reasonably be expected to 
endorse” and be “in good faith prepared to defend that conception so understood. This 
means that each of us must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles 
and guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be 
expected to endorse along with us” (Rawls, 1997, p. 104).  
Jonathan Quong articulates the presence of a kind of hybrid duality in his discussion of the 






concept of justice as well as a categorical stipulation of what reasoned speech should 
comprise of: “the virtues of reasonableness and civility” in addition to a complete and 
coherent position on the constitutional essentials that are to be decided (Quong, On the 
Idea of Public Reason, 2014, p. 267). Yet the respect for legitimate pluralism that 
underpins Rawls’s advocacy of liberal politics must necessarily be in some degree of 
tension with the substantive ‘half’ of his concept of public reason (the nature, in the terms 
employed here to describe public reason, of the specific mindset of reasoning that is 
considered to be publicly acceptable when employed to underpin given reasons). For 
though Rawls is clear that any notion of justice will serve this role, a notion of justice there 
must be – and it is clear that the public acceptability of different reasons will hinge upon 
their being informed by conceptions of justice that are at least somewhat comparable and 
commensurable: “values which are robust across different conceptions of the good” 
(Quong, 2011, p. 17). The existence and dependendability of such values, and their ability 
to be formulated into reasons, are a decisive factor in whether or not the politics of public 
reason is inherently exclusionary.  
Jürgen Habermas employs a similar understanding of public reason: his 'rules of 
discourse' ensure that deliberative participation is narrowed only to those who are 
competent, or equal to the epistemic burden of reason-giving (Habermas, 1984, p. 21). 
From here, Habermas distinguishes between compromise and consensus: “whereas 
parties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons, the consensus brought 
about through argument must rest on identical reasons that are able to convince parties in 
the same way” (Habermas, 1996, p. 339). Habermas also specifies that “only those statutes 
may claim legitimacy that can meet with the acceptance of all citizens”, and it is no great 
leap to suggest that greater legitimacy may lie, from the Habermasian perspective, with 
outcomes originating from consensus rather than mere compromise. Habermas thus sets 
out a notion of public reason that is built from universally acceptable reasons, and as a 
result is not only consensual by nature, but consensus-seeking in its outcomes.  
It is unclear whether Habermas’ requirement for identical reasons, like Rawls’s various 
requirements, are intended to have a delimiting effect on both the scope and the 
membership of decisions settled through a process of public reasoning. Mark Pennington 
points out that for Habermas, any “’exit’ mechanisms … [would] discourage the processes 
of public argumentation necessary to make people aware of the interests and values of 
others” (2011, p. 52). In other words, where Rawls is deploying an idealised vision of 
publicly reasoned constitutional formulation, Habermas appears to be attempting to 






contradiction lies in the difference between Habermas’ preoccupation with 
“communicative competence” (as in What is Universal Pragmatics?, 2000) and the 
principled openness of the ideal speech situation, which stipulates in part that “everyone 
is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs”, and that this cannot be prevented 
by either “internal or external coercion” (Habermas, 1990, p. 87). If we are concerned with 
the potential for a theory of public reason forming the basis for an exclusivist politics, then 
Habermas does not necessarily answer our every question: we must assume, perhaps, that 
Habermas intends that any act of exclusion on the basis of competence-to-reason occurs 
before the ideal communicative action of the public sphere can take place.50 Crucially, 
however, it becomes clear from Habermas’ later writings that his position on public 
reason is very comparable to that of Rawls, and indeed may be considered to carry similar 
implications for the participation of parties operating on the basis of comprehensive 
doctrines that are deemed to be unreasonable, prompting Habermas to offer a partial 
critique of Rawls’ approach to such questions in his Relgion in the Public Sphere 
(Habermas, 2006). 
Geoffrey M. Vaughan expands the 'public ignorance' debate with his recent discussion of 
the possible lessons derivable from the esoteric tradition for deliberative democrats 
(Vaughan, 2010). He points out that, even if deliberative democrats are correct and 
widespread public ignorance is a solvable problem, the broader issue is that Habermasian 
deliberation relies upon sweeping assumptions as to some essential components of 
human behaviour. After all, a simple (or even simplistic) understanding of a certain 
phenomenon – incomplete or abridged knowledge – should be described as 'ignorance' 
only grudgingly.  Differences in individuals' responses to an identical argument may, 
Vaughan explains, have less to do with actual ignorance and more to do with human 
individuality (Vaughan, 2010, p. 300). To further extrapolate from Vaughan's insight, it is 
on this basis, after all, that Rawls' reflective equilibrium is originally called for – to create a 
space of meta-agreement between actors from different yet legitimate positions – and to 
suggest that a deliberative forum is capable of legitimising a politics despite ignorance and 
necessary individuality is really to recall Rousseau's notion of a general will (an idea 
                                                             
50 Knight and Johnson (2012, p. 131) offer a persuasive critique of Habermas' use of a theory of 
communicative action to underpin an argument in favour of 'discursive democracy', arguing that 
there is a disconnection between "the force of the better argument" and the distinction he renders 
between speech which is intended to produce understanding - a "communicative action" - and 
speech which is intended to generate agreement. Indeed, it seems strange that communicative 
acts are considered by Habermas to be so distinct from strategic ones, given that 1. the objective 
of shared reasons is a realisable goal that one can ‘win’, and 2. communicative action can carry 






whose relevance to modern deliberative democrats will be discussed in some depth in a 
later chapter). These levels of 'ignorance' (or, at least, epistemic difference) in an 
individual, such as literal lack of knowledge or understanding of a given question under 
discussion, would lead to the individual in question being ineligible for a deliberative 
forum in Habermasian mode. Public reason, as much as the demand for rational, 
substantive consensus, is a plausible basis for the erosion of universal participation.51 
Is Public Reason Exclusionary?  
An interest in the reasons that lie behind preferences changes the emphasis of democratic 
mechanisms from actions (preference-outputs or even speech-acts) to intentions. Such an 
emphasis, it is hoped by theorists of deliberative democracy, will improve the content of 
democratic decision-making and/or strengthen the legitimacy of the results of democratic 
choices.  
Having recast, in the previous section, the ‘convergence view’ of public reason as not really 
dealing with a concept of public reason that would be recognisable to the mainstream of 
democratic theorists, we may reduce our critique to a simple claim: theorists advocating 
Public Reason as a democratic principle are proposing a radical limitation on the range of 
possible communications that citizens might use to effectively justify their perspectives 
and choices in the public realm.  
This necessarily involves a heavy epistemic burden on would-be participants. Consider the 
following three categories of requirements: Reason may be called Public Reason when the 
reasoner fulfils certain burdens of: 
1. Knowledge. Actors must have a certain minimal amount of knowledge and 
understanding of the issue under discussion in order to deliberate 
effectively (meeting the requirement for rational or logical content) 
2. Selflessness. Actors must reason in an other-regarding and unselfish way, 
in line with a notion of the public interest (meeting the requirements of a 
duty of civility) 
                                                             
51 One could plausible go much further than Vaughan and suggest that epistemic differences (in 
knowledge, or of other sorts) are intractable components of human behaviour, since the meaning 






3. Similarity. Actors must not be difference-seeking and must not use reasons 
that are not considered to be reasons by others (meeting the requirement 
that they not be so different from one another as to rule themselves out of 
the public altogether). 
This chapter focuses on the latter two categories of requirement; literal public ignorance, 
as a primary concern for advocates of forms of democratic exclusion who are not part of 
the tradition of Public Reason, is the subject of scrutiny in Chapter Three. Let us take these 
requirements in turn, briefly discussing knowledge before turning to selflessness and 
similarity.  
Knowledge 
It is clear that individuals must have a certain minimal expertise in the question under 
scrutiny in order to deliberate effectively. While this is not often emphasised by theorists 
of deliberative democracy (who prefer, like James Fishkin, to emphasise the educative 
benefits of mass public deliberation), any commitment to public reason (entailing, as this 
commitment must, a certain standard of coherence) necessitates at least a passing 
familiarity with the kind of knowledge that will facilitate the decision at hand. 
Unfortunately, as a large and growing body of evidence shows, many (if not most) 
individuals are ignorant (and often radically ignorant – ignorant as to the extent of their 
own ignorance) about political issues and ideas. A great many individuals may thus be too 
ignorant at the outset to reason in a 'public' way - although a general argument against 
democracy on the basis of human ignorance belongs elsewhere. Many theorists and 
advocates of public reasoning would argue that deliberative systems are actually a very 
powerful way of communicating political information, and of effectively educating 
participants even as they engage in the public sphere. Yet the effectiveness of systematised 
deliberation for information-exchange can only be taken as a benefit of such a system if 
individuals manage to overcome their ignorance and apathy enough to participate in a 
deliberative forum in the first place. The intuitive emphasis on literal knowledge thus at 
least raises the costs of engagement in a publicly reasoning democracy.  
Another relevant strand of this debate revolves around the possibility that ignorance may 
not be significant when set against the other benefits brought about by mass-participation 
decision making. Many of the social-psychological (or purely mathematical) phenomena 
catalogued by Cass Sunstein in Infotopia indicate that, for certain kinds of decisions, the 
wider the range of individual opinions that are aggregated together, the more closely the 






dealing with some kind of ascertainable truth-value). For example, the old fairground 
activity of guessing the weight of an animal or the number of beans in a jar often shows 
that the average of all guesses is closest to the truth. This is greatly encouraging until one 
realises that, to paraphrase The Marquis de Condorcet, if we assume that more than half of 
the participants are more than half-likely to make a decent guess, the average of all 
guesses will iron out the outliers and lie somewhere in the middle of all the decent 
overshoots and reasonable fall-shorts. In any case, deliberative procedures may not be the 
ideal means of capturing a 'wisdom-of-crowds' effect, which actually bears more 
resemblance to a market of individual value-setters than a forum of reasoning debaters 
(Sunstein, 2006).  
Let us instead turn to the idea of self-interest as a barrier to democratic participation, as 
effectively set out by the second category of epistemic requirement indicated above.  
Selflessness 
Public reasoning necessarily entails a classic set of Rawlsian, quasi-republican 'public 
virtues': other-regardingness, for example, or, to put it simply, the idea that individuals 
must attempt to reason in a selfless, publicly-interested way. This raises the 
uncomfortable possibility that many individuals may simply be too self-interested to 
reason publicly - that is, their reasons may not be 'admissable' to a process of  public 
reasoning due to their insistence on privately-reasoned motivations. As Cohen puts it, 
“[T]he interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are those that survive 
deliberation” (Cohen, 1997, p. 77). 
This may also give rise to the possibility of an emphasis on public reason which produces a 
situation where an individual who is economically rational (that is, acting upon a private 
interest that lies in what would maximise personal utility) would be effectively excluded 
on the basis that they are not being reasonable enough (at least in the public sense). Is it 
possible that all rational decisions also be reasoned about? The Public Reason response to 
this problem is to simply only consider the set of reasons that are publicly acceptable. 
Perhaps more significantly, a deliberative process based on a concept of public reason 
would reduce the likelihood of participation by rationally self-interested individuals, who 
would fear that their beliefs or choices would seem selfish to the wider majority. Where, 
then, do minority rights stand in a situation of systematised public reason? And from 
where do we derive the absolute values required to judge one set of reasons as being too 
self-interested to be democratic? It is unrealistic – and contingent upon a Rousseauian 







Public Reason – in its commitment to the importance of generally-accepted coherence in 
the reasoning of its participants, as well as its apparent emphasis on consensual political 
ends (even if the consensus lies only in the realm of meta-agreement, rather than a 
substantive, Rousseauian general will) – appears to be inimical to human difference. 
Whether a notion of public reason is compatible with a democratic commitment to 
multiculturalism is a question of some contention. Is it possible that individuals may be 
simply too different from each other to succeed in reasoning publicly? They may have 
different (and unpredictable) responses to the same sets of information, as illustrated by 
the ubiquity of 'irrational' framing effects. Is it true to say that all individuals are likely to 
(meta-) agree, even very minimally, on what counts as a reason, as (for example) Rawls 
asserts? 
The two questions raised by the requirements of similarity and selflessness most 
pertinent to the rest of this chapter run as follows:  
1. Would a system of public engagement emphasising Public Reason count as 
democratic if such a communicative failure leads to the exclusion of some 
individuals from the deliberative process?  
2. If, in fact, we cannot reliably articulate our views in a way that everyone will 
understand, then what hope is there for public reason? 
To address the first question: just as in the requirement of selflessness, it behoves us to 
study the basis and desirability for any such exclusion. What manner of preference 
orderings might be eliminated or made less likely through publicly-reasoned deliberative 
democracy? The work of David Miller proves particularly useful in answering this 
question, as it categorises the kinds of irrationalities which deliberative processes, 
founded upon the presumed advantages of public reasoning, would help to combat. First, 
there are those which are “irrational because they are based on false empirical beliefs”, an 
advantage which speaks directly to the first category of requirement (knowledge) set out 
above (Miller, 1992, p. 61). The assumption here is that a formal deliberative process will 
increase each individual's proximity to the understanding of given empirical truths 
underlying a decision. This assertion depends upon what is arguably deliberation's 
greatest and least controvertible asset: discussion is an effective means of pooling 
information; an efficient educative and information-distributing tool. Nevertheless, to 
claim that one might avoid falsehoods is also implicitly to claim that we might access 






exist, they may not always be readily recoverable in the case of complex moral questions. 
Is it likely that a deliberative process that emphasises the discursive dominance of 
majority groups will result in truer, rather than simply more popular, responses to 
divisive moral questions? I think not, and though there is no doubt that some advantages 
are attached to increased political popularity, this is rarely the explicit goal of deliberation 
and public reason theorists; moreover, enlarged democratic mandates for political action 
on the part of governments cannot always be deemed desirable. 
Miller's second example of a preference-ordering which would not survive deliberation – 
that is, a potential basis for either ‘preference laundering’ or exclusion from the 
deliberative process – is that of “preferences that are so repugnant to the moral beliefs of 
the society within which the decisions are being made that no one is willing to advance 
them in a public context”, and Miller illustrates this with “the position of racist beliefs in 
contemporary Britain” (1992, p. 61). This point accretes with what Miller describes as 
“most important”: the likelihood that people engaged in deliberative processes will be 
unable to maintain self-serving or self-interested preference arrangements; rather, in 
Robert Goodin's words, they would be required to “launder” their position in order to 
render it more publicly acceptable (Ibid.). What Miller and Goodin are describing is a 
widely understood feature of social psychological studies: the human propensity for 
conformity in group dynamics, as demonstrated by a large literature of classic 
experiments in the field.  In operative terms, preference orderings may change; in actual 
terms, the incidence of inaccurately-reported 'true' preferences seems liable to grow 
dramatically. Where this is not the case, ‘laundering’ may be demonstrative of actual 
change in deliberators as a result of processes of public reasoning.  It is therefore not clear 
that the creation of formalised venues for the orchestrated preference change of minority 
opinion-holders is desirable: as Chapter Six will show, laundering, falsification and 
exclusion are, in the end, the probable sources for increased conformity in publicly 
reasoning polities. Deliberative democracy need not be based upon an implicit or explicit 
notion of the general will and specifically seeking substantive consensus in order to 
plausibly erode the universal franchise.  
Public Reason Liberalism: Consensus vs. Convergence 
Having set out a fairly clear view of public reason – a hybridised notion, incorporating 
logical reasoning, communicative reasons and a requirement of public acceptability that 






part of citizens – it is important to discuss whether it could be understood as central to a 
form of non-deliberative politics, or whether public reason, by any reasonable definition, 
implies deliberative democracy. This section discusses ‘public reason liberalism’, and 
whether the notion of public reason employed by such liberals is in fact something else 
altogether.  
Kevin Vallier’s Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason (2011b) summarises a sizeable 
literature that represents a common critical approach to public reason, and thus will also 
serve to throw light on some of the deeper epistemological assumptions carried by many 
who employ arguments from public reason. Public reason liberalism holds that all 
coercion (and thus, in effect, any political act with implications for citizens) needs to be 
publicly justified. That is, the reasons for the coercion or political action should be 
presented to the polity, and individuals should be able to accept these reasons in order to 
also be subject to the action, rule or coercion. If there is no conclusive reasonable basis to 
endorse the coercive policy then we may safely assume that the citizen ought not to be 
subject to coercion. 
The foundational assumptions behind this view - to paraphrase the formulation so clearly 
set out by Vallier, and with emphasis added - are as follows: 
1. The Liberty Principle - no individual should be subject to unjustified coercion. 
2. The Public Justification Principle - A coercive action is justified if and only if each and 
every member of the public has conclusive reasons to endorse it (Vallier, 2011b, p. 262)  
From this basis, we can then derive two understandings of public reason. The first, held by 
thinkers such as Rawls (though Vallier rightly points out that Rawls' engagement with 
these questions was quite nuanced, and possibly changed over the course of his career), is 
consensus-based. The consensus view holds that individuals ought to agree on each 
other’s reasons - or at least agree that each other's reasons are reasonable - when 
endorsing the coercive action in question. Thus my reasoning is public reasoning, and 
contributive to a public justification of some rule, if it is endorsed by the other members of 
the public. The strength of that endorsement may vary, so the consensus view comes in 
two flavours. Strong consensus requires that individual reasons be shareable. Weak 
consensus merely requires that reasons are mutually accessible. 
Alternatively, and far more to Vallier's liking, we might take the convergence view. From 
this perspective, it matters little that the reasons behind individual endorsements may not 






definable as reasons for every member of the polity. Even if person A endorses a policy on 
the basis of a terrible line of reasoning (from the standpoint of person B), the only 
important factor is the endorsement itself. Vallier therefore essentually presents us with a 
possible typology for public reason liberalism: 
1. Convergent Public Reason Liberalism  - requiring the conclusively reasoned 
endorsement of all citizens 
2. Consensus Public Reason Liberalism, incorporating:  
a. The Weak Consensus view, where citizens' reasons are mutually intelligible 
as reasons 
b. The Strong Consensus view, where citizens' reasons are mutually accessible 
and/or sharable 
I agree with Vallier and others that the convergence view seems to be preferable to the 
consensus view. Vallier argues persuasively that the consensus view leaves us in a 
situation which does not appear to respect individual liberty and a diverse society, which 
seems strange for what is at least notionally a liberal conception of political justification.  
However, I cannot offer complete endorsement of convergent public reason liberalism, as I 
fear that some problems have crept into the formulation of the principles of public reason 
at an initial stage, and the perspectives outlined above seem to raise as many problems as 
they resolve. Let us detail the three main problems that are raised by the typology of 
public reason liberalism offered above: 
Acceptance and Falsification 
First is the perennial problem of what it means to accept a given reason. Vallier breaks 
acceptance down into two tiers: shareability and accessibility. Yet it is very difficult to find 
definitions of these that are not vaguely drawn. For example, is another individual's 
reason accessible to me if, very minimally, I recognise it to be a reason (and even if I do not 
agree or cannot imagine agreeing with it)?  
Suppose that person A endorses a set of banking regulations on the basis that they believe 
certain banking practices require regulation in the face of a recent financial crisis, and 
person B endorses the same regulations because they think that all banks are owned by a 
certain minority group, and they hate that minority group, and wish to punish them with 






If person A is presented with person B's reasons, they must on a communicative level 
understand them as reasons. B's reasons clearly identify a causal basis for endorsing the 
policy, and this explanation is at least internally consistent. Thus, under the weak 
consensus view, would person A be able to proceed? Probably not. Holders of the weak or 
strong consensus views would likely argue that there is a lack of external verifiability to 
B's claims, or that they are the product of an unreasonable comprehensive doctrine.  
(Holders of the convergence view, meanwhile, would move on, unconcerned about 
individual reasons so long as universal endorsement is achieved. Even by somewhat 
idealising the agent/reasoner, so as to exclude from our thought experiment the 
possibility of reasons that seem to fall obviously short of some extremely basic epistemic 
requirements (such as some racist conspiracy), we are still faced with an exclusivity rule 
that takes systematic issue with some sets of beliefs while tolerating others.) 
Here lies the first issue: could not person B simply frame their reasons similarly to person 
A (in the public realm, at least)? Where is the significance of the public justification 
requirement where an individual's public utterances may not be reflective of his or her 
internal reasoning - in a world, in other words, where anybody, at any point, may be lying? 
Again, since we are dealing with ideal theory, we could simply rule out the possibility of 
bargaining strategies such as deception, and model a polity composed only of sincere 
reasoners. But the realism of this claim – that an agent with extremely unpalatable reasons 
will tend to self-exclude or misrepresent their reasons in their pursuit of agreement – may 
cause us to wonder whether there is need for a perspective other than the consensus view. 
So far, this is an issue of the consensus view of public reason, and one similar to Vallier’s 
own. However, this issue would appear to be as damaging to the convergence account as it 
is to the consensus view, if only because there is little reason to theorise a view or public 
reason that is unconcerned with the acceptability or shareability of reasons when the 
reasons that are asked and offered can never reliably be said to be representative of an 
individual's preferences anyway. Perhaps some weight may be attached to the 
convergence view under these circumstances simply because it is a system that seems less 
likely to elicit falsified reasoning in the public realm, but this could only be true in so far as 
the convergence view doesn't require any reasons at all. Let us scrutinise this feature of 






Is the Convergence View 'Public Reason' at all? 
The convergence view, in Vallier's words, "rejects both shareability and accessibility" 
requirements in its definition of public reasons (p. 262). If so, then the convergence 
conception is very likely not a conception of public reason at all, but rather a kind of 
individual-mandate contractualism.  
Vallier seems (probably rightly, given the above) to have given up on the possibility of 
consistently shared reasoning. My reasons may not be comparable to yours, or even 
recognisable to you as reasons (Vallier, 2011a). Our approaches to a given problem may, 
in fact, be incommensurable. But if we both endorse a given policy, we might agree, then 
why should we care what reasons lie behind these endorsements? For example, we both 
gave our approval to that banking regulation proposal - why should it matter to me that 
your reasons (if I were ever to be exposed to them, which under the convergence view 
hardly seems necessary) would seem utterly alien to me?  
This approach, while attractive, does not seem to bear many of the hallmarks of public 
reason as it is usually understood. While Vallier, Gaus and others argue that public reason 
liberalism reflects, like most conceptions of public reason, a central set of basic liberal 
commitments, the dismissal of any substantive form of shareability or accessibility 
effectively constitutes the rejection of reasons in any communicatively meaningful sense. 
Moreover, the act of inviting the privately reasoned assent of individual citizens is not the 
same as transforming those private reasons into public reasons, which are supposed to be 
a different kind of reasoning altogether. Public reasons are not simply the set of private or 
non-public reasons which happen enter the public sphere. Intrinsic to the notion of public 
reason is a state of mind that takes into account the basic plausibility of one's reasons 
being acceptable to the wider public.  
The result is that most public reason liberals or deliberative democrats would see this 
convergence view as being too weak to produce many of the outcomes that are deemed to 
be the most useful and beneficial outcomes of a commitment to reasoning publicly. For 
example, public reason is not only supposed to require consensus, but to foster it, as it 
views consensus as a public good in itself. The very act of public reasoning (in, say, a 
deliberative forum, or in a Rawlsian original position) is designed to encourage agreement 
by narrowing the set of plausible perspectives to only those that are acceptable in the 






This thought leads us to a third challenge, and possibly the most problematic, for the 
convergence formulation of public reason liberalism, which the following section turns to 
below. 
Coercive acts cannot feasibly be constrained to those that are publicly 
justified 
An important complication is raised by the Public Justification principle, as we are left in 
some doubt over what we are to understand by ‘justification’ – specifically, whether the 
presence of “conclusive reasons to endorse” a given action is significantly different from 
endorsing said action. This is more than mere semantics. It is plausible, after all, that one 
might have reasons – ‘good’ reasons - to endorse a policy at the same time as having ‘good’ 
reasons to reject it.52 Calvin might reason that he desires increased security, and so wish to 
endorse intrusive counter-terrorism measures in airports, at the same time as strongly 
disliking the invasion of his privacy, and so wish to oppose the same measures.53 Similarly, 
if Susie hates a given policy, but respects and endorses the constitutional foundations and 
fairness of the establishment of the government that introduced said policy, is this strong 
enough to be considered to constitute Susie’s reasoned endorsement of the policy? 
It is clear that the key term here is “conclusive”, which enables us to understand that the 
Public Justification principle operates on the basis of (public) reasons that lead a member 
of the public to conclude their reasoning with an endorsement of the policy. However, this 
seems to throw out the possibility of weak, preliminary Rawlsian contractualism, where 
one is bound to accept the laws produced by governments which are established in a way 
that one finds fair – in effect, allowing us to collapse “conclusive reasons to endorse” to 
simply “endorse”. As usual, the stringency of this requirement may not be interpreted as 
handing every citizen a legislative veto54 – more likely, under this view, the citizen who 
fails to find conclusive reasons to endorse the actions of the state ceases to be a citizen.  
                                                             
52 This raises the possibility that perhaps the term ‘reason’, when discussed as a justificatory 
standard, is really addressing a ‘final’, established opinion or perspective on some topic, rather 
than the constituent reasons-to and reasons-to-not that have contributed to the internal 
deliberations over that perspective. Where this leaves the role of public reasoning as a persuasive 
process between agents is difficult to determine. 
53 Gaus uses the plausibility (or otherwise) of such ‘schizophrenic’ internal disagreements as 
grounds on which to critique some interpretations of Rousseau’s concept of the ‘general will’ (see 
Does Democracy Reveal the Voice of the People? Four Takes on Rousseau, 1997, p. 145) 
54 Perhaps the ‘unit’ of endorsement need not be a certain specific policy, considered in isolation. As 
mentioned above, the original Rawlsian perspective seems to be contractualist in the sense of 






If this analysis is correct, then according to any of the views of public reason outlined 
above, there has likely never been a legitimate law. Because the foundational principle tells 
us that coercive acts have to be justified to citizens, and that justification must take place 
on the basis of "conclusive reasons" on the part of each and every citizen, then we must 
square this with the fact that it is a commonplace for citizens to become subject to coercive 
acts which have only been legitimised to a majority (or, often, not even a majority!) of the 
public in the ways specified by public reason theorists. For similar reasons, David Estlund 
(2008, p. 4) makes an early dismissal of democratic theory that implies the need for the 
consent of all citizens on the basis that this is “not a plausible constraint.” 
The distinction to be rendered here may best be understood as between Kantian and 
Humean notions of public consent. Kant appeared to be echoing – or even extending – the 
Rouseauvian concept of the general will when he wrote in his essay on Perpetual Peace 
that “only the uniting and consenting will of all – that is, the unanimous and combined will 
of the people by which each decides the same for all and all decide the same for each – can 
legislate” (Bohman, 1997, p. 256). This would appear to implicitly contain a principle 
similar to the principle of Public Justification set out above, particularly if we understand 
“conclusive reasons to endorse” to be essentially synonymous with ‘endorse’.  
An alternative understanding of political consent was most famously framed by David 
Hume, who did not accept that citizens could maintain a right to exit – that is, that they 
could, in blunt terms, ‘vote with their feet’ – and thus, by remaining in a place, were giving 
consent to its laws and taking on the attendant obligations to obey them (Hume, 1953 
[1752], p.51). It is also clear that rejecting this tacit consent rule could not add up, in 
Hume’s opinion, to anything like the Public Justification principle. Rather, Hume seems to 
have believed that obligations and citizenship were determined by the broader utility of a 
given political context.  
So this stage of the argument is obviously subject to certain definitions of the foundational 
principles. If we merely require that citizens are likely to endorse the reasons behind a 
given coercive act in our Public Justification principle, then this may do away with a 
multitude of concerns. But such an interpretation would appear to be at odds with the 
conception of public reason offered by Vallier, where "each and every" citizen approves 
the law to which they are subject, and moves us toward a conception of democracy where 







There are several plausibly coherent positions to take with regard to these considerations. 
It may make sense to endorse a view of liberal democracy - where citizens are asked (but 
not required) to endorse the rules to which they are subject, and where simple 
endorsement of the constitutional principles at the heart of the polity is taken as a tacit 
endorsement for most of the coercive acts that are produced by a narrow legislative 
process. Such a view would appear to leave room for a Rawlsian notion of public reason, 
provided it is contained to the narrow set of reasoners and the foundational 
contractualism that his requirements would seem to be intended to address. Alternatively, 
and within this framework, it may make sense (and be coherent) to be a public reason 
liberal or deliberative democrat, arguing that more public engagement would improve law-
making, that the reasons that lie behind preferences could be improved by a consensus-
seeking or cognitively diverse public discourse, or if preferences were rendered 
inadmissible unless backed up by reasons that all can accept. 
What does not appear to be coherent by Humean standards is a democratic theory 
constructed upon a strongly contractualist version of public reason that requires universal 
consent at every level, whether or not that consent is necessarily backed up by publicly 
acceptable reasons. Indeed, one may question what the purpose of public reason would be 
in a world where individuals are only subject to the laws that they have personally had 
conclusive reason to endorse.  
Conclusion: Public Reason is not Liberal 
So far, this chapter has offered three overlapping criticisms of public reason liberalism as 
part of a wider critical perspective on the notion of ‘public reason’ itself. It has established 
a new, ‘hybrid’ conceptualisation of public reason, based on the possibility that not all 
reasons may themselves be reasonable, and attempted to highlight some of the 
implications of this conceptualisation for influential theoretical works that make 
expansive use of such a concept. 
From some perspectives, of course, this chapter will appear to have wilfully missed the 
point of public reason liberalism. As Vallier explains, either accessibility or shareability 
requirements would render public reason liberalism something more akin to public reason 
libertarianism: “legitimate state coercion will be rare … to avoid a particularly extreme 
libertarian version of public reason, [public reason liberals] must argue that the number of 






motivated by the idea that reasonable people will inevitably disagree about many of the 
most important questions in life; accordingly, public reason liberals cannot adopt a 
requirement on public reasons that ignores this fact” (2011a, pp. 387-8).  
In other words, the strictures of this interpretation of Rawlsian public reason, faced with 
the reality of widely pluralised and even incommensurable views on the part of citizens, 
will almost always fail to legitimise political action or coercion. Vallier’s solution is to 
weaken the epistemic burdens associated with public reason, to argue that they need not 
be shareable or accessible, but simply recognisable as reasons. At this point, however, 
‘public reason’ becomes a misnomer. Without a shareability or accessibility requirement, 
and without the republican-styled, consensus-seeking discourse that classic notions of 
public reason are intended to underpin and produce, we are effectively no longer dealing 
with public reason at all. Better by far to either give up on the public reasoning altogether, 
or to adopt it more whole-heartedly and inject more realism into the basic premises of 
public reason liberalism so as to accept that in a diverse society we will all, at some point, 
necessarily be subject to some law that has not been completely justified to our own 
satisfaction.  
The untenability of public reason liberalism underscores an essential relationship 
between public reason and deliberative democracy. As a response to the central political 
challenge of decision-making in a diverse polity, public reason is more sophisticated than 
general will accounts of consensual outcomes from deliberation, but is still affected by 
Platonist-style concerns with the knowledge and rationality of participants and by the 
naturally-occurring epistemic gaps that may make the reasons of citizens 
incommensurable. Adherence to the requirement of giving reasons that all can accept may 
be more plausible than the approximation of substantive consensus in democracies, but 
will nevertheless tend to produce exclusivist politics. Public reason liberalism fails to make 
the case for a publicly justificatory democracy that can be inclusive in line with liberal 
norms, as it weakens the notion of ‘public reason’ beyond recognition.  
This chapter has argued that the notion of public reason has become the dominant 
conceptual underpinning of deliberative democracy, and is, like the notion of a rationally 
designing public or general will, a potential threat to the inclusivity of democratic politics, 
and thus to the advantages of the folk theory of democracy that is associated with basic 
political equalities, and therefore also to the consequentialist justification of democracy 






and the epistemic state of reasonableness gives rise to stringent epistemic demands that 
effectively imply the exclusion of many would-be participants from deliberative processes.  
Public Reason Liberalism, as an effort to embody liberal values via a procedural 
requirement for reason-giving, attempts to weaken elements of the hybrid notion of public 
reason, but as a result effectively ceases to discuss a recognisable conception of public 
reason. This is important because it reinforces the necessity of the connection between 
public reason and deliberative democracy, and helps to delimit the definitional scope of 
the term of ‘public reason’ to the point of usefulness.  
In Chapter Six, this thesis will present some of the specific psychological effects and 
mechanisms of the self-exclusion, preference falsification and illegitimate preference-
shaping effects that may go hand-in-hand with participation in deliberative democracy. 
First, Chapter Five will consider the utility of deliberation in escaping the worst 
implications of the social choice theory critique of aggregative democracy. Central to both 
discussions of deliberation is the concept of public reason: an effort to shift the onus of 
consensus-seeking from substantive decision-making to the realm of meta-agreement. By 
converging on a certain type of reason-giving, for example, public reason would 
necessarily reduce the domains of possible consideration on a given topic, which may 
prove to be the lynchpin of establishing that democracies can escape the accusation of 






Chapter Five: Social Choice Theory 






This chapter aims to establish the nature of the Social Choice Theory critique of 
democracy – as framed by Kenneth Arrow, updating insights from Condorcet and Joseph 
Schumpeter – which ultimately asserts that almost all vote-aggregating systems are given 
to outcomes that are plausibly arbitrary in nature. William H. Riker extrapolated these 
findings into a normative liberal democratic project which has since been partly 
discredited by contemporary theorists such as Gerry Mackie, and partly answered by 
deliberative democrats who claim that the Arrovian critique cannot apply in more 
deliberative circumstances. This chapter suggests some grounds for the defence of Riker’s 
claims and subjects the deliberative ‘escape route’ to critique in turn. Rather than being 
outright anti-democrats, Riker, Arrow and the others were making an epistemically 
sceptical case for reducing the presumed mandate created by electoral processes, 










A Third Epistemology for Democratic Theory 
This thesis has so far considered the claims of two main types of democratic theorists, 
both of which entail a particular concern with the epistemic capacities of democratic 
participants. The first type, described as ‘Rousseauian’, hinges on the belief that rational 
collective design of social orders is plausible, and so tends to promote participatory and 
deliberative systems, as set out in Chapter Two. However, this Rousseauian perspective is 
also founded upon a conception of public reason that is not entirely coherent, and will 
often involve formalised processes of preference-shaping that are not necessarily ethically 
desirable, as argued in Chapter Four.   
The second type of democratic theorist, labelled here as ‘Platonist’, operates around the 
understanding that, while the rational design of social orders is possible, due to 
widespread public ignorance and/or irrationality, it must remain the purview of an 
epistemically homogenous (and, preferably, very expert) subset of a society: an argument 
that came under analysis in Chapter Three. For these theorists, democracy is valuable, if it 
is valuable at all, as a legitimating and mandate-generating system for this narrower group 
of decision-makers.  
Several of the ideas reviewed in Chapter Three also moved beyond Platonist arguments, 
arguing the desirability of democratic underlying structures for social orders (such as 
markets). This third type of theorist, termed ‘Hayekian’, comes under at least partial 
consideration in this chapter, as the thesis further scrutinises the line of distinction 
between minimal democrats and those who reject democracy altogether. The Hayekian 
approach embodies an alternative understanding of the basic questions of democratic 
theory, and operates from a different epistemic standpoint: one that is wholly sceptical as 
to the quality of public determinations on political questions, and sceptical as to the extent 
that any political processes are able to render such determinations into rational, non-
arbitrary decision-making.  
This chapter will consider the critical analysis of democracy put forward by Social Choice 
theorists through discussion of the democratic theories of William H. Riker, who 
extrapolated a more openly normative theory from the Kenneth Arrow’s ‘Impossibility’ 
Theorem, itself a carefully-designed expression of concerns established long ago by 
Condorcet, and more recently updated by Joseph Schumpeter, who crystallised a rejection 
of the idea of ‘the will of the people’. Riker’s primary and most effective critic is Gerry 
Mackie, whose Democracy Defended (2003) is widely thought to have irretrievably 






chapter will consider the extent to which such contemporary scholarship has rendered 
Riker’s arguments untenable. 
Next, this chapter will consider whether deliberative democracy can possibly offer an 
‘escape-route’ from the implications of social choice theory, as several theorists have 
argued it may. By encouraging meta-agreement upon certain structuring dimensions for 
the determination of preference-orderings, deliberative procedures could make 
subsequent votes far less likely to generate arbitrary outcomes upon aggregation. 
However, it remains to be seen if such an answer to the claims of Arrow and Riker is costly 
in other ways, reducing the potential for cognitive diversity and making a virtue of 
systematic preference ‘normalisation’. 
The Plausibility of Arbitrary Outcomes  
In two key texts (Liberalism Against Populism, 1982; The Art of Political Manipulation, 
1986), William H. Riker developed specific conceptions of democracy, 'liberalism' and 
'populism', alongside a set of explicit or implied normative prescriptions. The source and 
intellectual background for these theories is quite broad, based upon Social Choice theory 
(principally as used by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem, which purported to 
show a fundamental instability in the aggregation of preferences from democratic vote 
systems), historical examples of such instability, and a long tradition of critical, liberal 
thought as regards democracy as a system of civic organisation.55 
Quite recently, Riker's understanding of democratic theory has come under heavy 
criticism – most notably by Gerry Mackie (2003). Mackie set out to systematically disprove 
Riker's case-studies of successfully manipulative behaviour or failure in democratic 
aggregation, to undermine the theoretical basis for Riker's claims, and to associate Riker's 
work with a lineage of thinkers commonly understood as elitist or anti-democratic - most 
specifically, Vilfredo Pareto. Riker, according to Mackie, “attacks democracy in principle” 
(p. 27); he goes so far as to assert that Riker was a kind of a “nihilist with respect to the 
public good” (p. 424), that Riker believed democracy to be “impossible, arbitrary, 
irrational and meaningless” (p. 157), and that 'populism', the specifically-defined political 
trend that Riker opposed himself to in Liberalism against Populism, is what everybody else 
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calls Democracy (p. 418). The extent of Mackie’s success will come under specific 
discussion later in this chapter; often, however, he is considered to have delivered a 
powerful blow – perhaps a deadly one – to the body of Riker’s normative theory. 
The bedrock of Riker's work in democratic theory is Kenneth Arrow's 'Impossibility 
Theorem'. Arrow argued that no choice aggregation system determining a winner from 
between at least three alternatives, and which satisfies some minimal democratic 
conditions, can guarantee 'stable', unmanipulated and non-arbitrary outcomes. To ensure 
non-arbitariness, voting and aggregation systems must compromise on one or another of 
Arrow's democratic conditions – in other words, they must cease to be at least formally 
democratic (by the definitional terms of democracy established by Arrow’s premises).56 
At its simplest level, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem recalls the ‘Condorcet Cycle’, which is 
itself a way of conceptualising the very intuitive political concept of ‘vote splitting’ 
between at least three options or candidates. If, for example, a group of three voters (a tiny 
constituency indeed) holds preference orderings over the options a, b and c as in the 
following example, then a Condorcet Cycle has emerged: 
Voter 1: a > b > c 
Voter 2: b > c > a 
Voter 3: c > a > b 
It is clear that there can be no majority winner among these options: the vote is 
deadlocked, because by pairwise comparisons, each option is at some stage preferable to 
every other. Different methods of counting these ‘votes’ will therefore produce varying 
outcomes, and in any situation a majority of participants will be disappointed by the 
outcome. This arbitrariness is potentially repeatable at every level of complexity, and 
much of Riker’s work constitutes an extended series of historical examples of such cycles, 
and plausibly arbitrary outcomes, in real politics. Mackie attempts to forensically debunk 
each of these examples in turn, and of course it is difficult to historically establish the 
likely second- or third-preferences of voters when these deeper preference arrangements 
were not necessarily recorded. However, a passing familiarity with electoral history can 
furnish us with several examples of electoral outcomes that, due to vote-splitting (and 
effective Condorcet Cycles), arguably furnished a democracy with an outcome on a wholly 
arbitrary basis.  
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One such historical example may be found in the US Presidential Election of 1912, which 
the following section considers briefly below. 
The US Presidential Election of 1912: An Arbitrary Democratic Outcome? 
In the run-up to 1912, former Republican President Theodore Roosevelt forced a split 
within his old party, which was by then led by William Howard Taft. Roosevely believed 
that Taft had betrayed his legacy of progressive politics, and so formed the Progressive 
Party (also called the ‘Bull Moose’ party, so named after Roosevelt was shot by a would-be 
assassin while on his way to a rally. He declared that it would take more than a single 
bullet to kill a bull moose, and proceeded to deliver a full stump speech before finally 
going to a hospital). Woodrow Wilson, meanwhile, was eventually selected as the 
Democratic nominee, and faced an additional challenge in the form of an American 
Socialist Party, led by Eugene V. Debs, that stood to finally make a degree of an electoral 
impact.  
On election day 1912, Roosevelt mainly cannibalised the Republican vote, forcing the 
Republicans into third place and propelling Wilson’s democrats to victory: the first 
Democratic administration since the end of the Civil War. Figure 1 shows this electoral 
outcome in terms of total votes and modified vote-share.57 
 




William H. Taft 
Republican 
Votes 6,293,019 
Or ~45% of votes for 
the three main parties 
4,119,507 
Or ~30% of votes for 
the three main parties 
3,486,956 
Or ~ 25% of votes for 
the three main parties 
Figure 1: Results of the 1912 Presidential Election for three most popular candidates, with simplified 
vote shares. Source: ‘A Narrative History of America’ (Tindall & Shi, 2004, p. 801)  
 
As suggested above, the reconstruction of historic preferences and voting intentions is an 
impossible task. Yet it would not be unreasonable to assume that the majority of voters 
                                                             







who chose to support Roosevelt were more likely to prefer, in the second instance, Taft to 
Wilson. Correspondingly, this discussion also presumes that Taft supporters would 
generally have preferred voting for Roosevelt than voting for Wilson. The Progressive and 
Republican parties originated from the same source, shared much the same platform and 
appealed to very much the same sets of constituencies in the USA. We may also impute 
that Wilson voters otherwise followed the national trend (of generally preferring 
Roosevelt to Taft) and so broke slightly, in their secondary preferences, for the Bull Moose 
party. Given these (reasonable) assumptions, perhaps the fuller preferences of the voting 
population in 1912 was close to the following: 
 
30%: Wilson > Roosevelt > Taft 
15%: Wilson > Taft > Roosevelt 
25%: Roosevelt > Taft > Wilson 
5%: Roosevelt > Wilson > Taft 
20%: Taft > Roosevelt > Wilson 
5%: Taft > Wilson > Roosevelt 
 
Voters preferring Wilson to Roosevelt: 50% 
Voters preferring Roosevelt to Taft: 60% 
Voters preferring Taft to Wilson: 50% 
 
Condorcet Cycle: Wilson > Roosevelt > Taft > Wilson … 
 
By pairwise comparison, half of all voters preferred the Democrats to the Progressives, 
more than half preferred the Progressives to the Republicans, and half preferred the 
Republican option to the prospect of a Democratic president. The plausibility of this 
account may very well be debatable, but the key point is that differing assessments of the 
mindset of voters in the 1912 election can generate different overall winners, and that 






preference-sets. Indeed, when the unprecedentedly strong support for Debs is taken into 
account (which ultimately amounted to around 900,000 votes), the plausibility of an 
arbitrary outcome increases. It would be quite reasonable to suggest that the second 
preference for these socialist voters would be the second-most radically progressive 
candidate: Teddy Roosevelt, who more than any of his other rivals actually offered “a 
manifesto of the modern, positive welfare state” (Ekirch Jr., 1974, p. 157). 
Questioning the Impossibility Theorem 
Academics disagree on whether ‘unstable’ electoral situations such as the one described in 
the previous section are unusual, or whether they are surprisingly common, as Riker 
argued. Certainly, instances of ‘split votes’ in situations with more than two alternatives 
are a commonplace of polling in many different contexts. At the level of national legislative 
or executive elections, such scenarios may also occur with some frequency. The UK 
general election of 1983, which saw a great many votes going to a new third political force 
(the Liberal/Social Democratic Party Alliance) may be one such example of a Condorcet 
cycle, at least in terms of the popular vote (Studlar & McAllister, 1987). The 2007 French 
Presidential Elections may be viewed as another recent instance of an indeterminate or 
arbitrary democratic outcome, with the fairly clear indication that the Condorcet winner of 
that poll was not even present in the final run-off vote (Abramson, 2007). 
Arrow's impossibility theorem thus retains a certain degree of impact. His 
problematisation of democracy affects the relative plausibility of democratic 
meaningfulness. We can never be certain that democracies are wholly responsive to the 
complete preferences of voters. Even if instability, arbitrariness and Condorcet Cycles are 
rare, the persistent issue is of our inability to distinguish between problematic outcomes 
and solid ones. Whence, then, democratic legitimacy, or strong state mandates? Add the 
problem of potential manipulation (as Riker (1986) does) and vote-aggregation seems to 
be an inadequate model for strong democratic states. This, Riker would argue, is the whole 
point – and is why Riker continued to advocate aggregative 'liberal' democracies over 
other types. The instability and uncertainty intrinsic to such democratic systems ensures 
that they may never legitimise an over-strong state capable of threatening individual 
liberties (Riker, 1982). 
Unsurprisingly, Arrow's (and Riker's) claims about the nature of democratic 






attacked on the basis of the difficulty of reducing its definition of democracy to a set of 
simple logical conditions with which any system of vote-aggregation should correspond if 
it is to be considered to be democratic: Non-dictatorship, Pareto Efficiency, Universal 
Domain and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Arrow, 1951 [1963]).58 No 
democratic aggregation system, according to the Impossibility Theorem, can guarantee 
adherence to all of these principles simultaneously. 
At first glance these principles appear to be quite uncontroversial components of what 
most people would considered to be democratic norms. Non-dictatorship is a particularly 
intuitive benchmark for a democratic aggregation system, simply specifying that no single 
individual may determine outcomes independently. This principle has the greatest 
theoretical importance in conditions of near-deadlock. If, for example, the vote on a certain 
question is evenly split, with x voters saying ‘aye’ and x voters saying ‘nay’, then the tie-
breaker – voter x+1 – would in the terms of Arrow’s criteria be elevated to the position of 
dictatorship. 
The requirement for weak Pareto Efficiency is also undemanding in that it requires that, to 
simplify greatly, if everyone prefers a to b then the aggregating principle cannot favour b 
over a. This criterion ensures a very minimal degree of responsiveness to the preferences 
that are being aggregated.  
Universal Domain is more regularly criticised as not necessarily belonging in a list of 
democratic principles, yet still carries a certain intuitive strength. It requires that an 
aggregating principle must always allow, and be able to process, all possible arrangements 
of the preferences at hand. As shall become apparent later in this chapter, this is the 
condition which some deliberative democrats believe can be weakened in a nevertheless 
democratically legitimate way, thereby circumventing the impossibility theorem. 
Finally, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives states that a preference of one thing 
over another – a over b – should not be affected by the introduction of an additional 
alternative, c. It is possible that c may still, of course, become the first preference, but the 
overall relationship between a and b should stay the same. For example, if Calvin decides, 
all things considered, that he’d rather have an apple than a banana, and Suzie arrives and 
offers him her orange, no matter what placement the orange receives in his preference 
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arrangement, the Independence principle dictates that he should not suddenly decide that 
he prefers bananas to apples after all.  
This fourth benchmark is arguably the least intuitive of Arrow's requirements, and 
warrants a brief digression here (Mackie, Democracy Defended, 2003, p. 123). It is 
conceivable in political decision-making, for example, that a new alternative may alter the 
nature of an individual's second preference. Let us say that Susie prefers large-scale 
spending on national defence (a) to zero spending on national defence (b). A third 
alternative is introduced – moderate spending on defence (c) – and Susie adopts this as 
her first preference on the basis that it represents a reasonable compromise. There is no 
reason why this person should not then, in the face of a strong new alternative, decide that 
her second preference would now be to not spend any money at all. So her preference 
structure has changed from a > b and has now become c > b > a, and quite rationally: with 
the introduction of a heretofore impossible moderate middle option, she has decided that 
it would be better to not spend anything than to over-spend. The introduction of the third, 
independent alternative has changed the terms of our perception of the original options, 
and so shaped our notional citizen’s understanding of the landscape of possible political 
outcomes. In the first instance, the idea of over-spending effectively did not exist.   
All this said, Arrow's independence condition remains intact as a possible source of 
arbitrariness in democratic aggregation. The plausibility of arbitrariness being injected 
into conventional aggregative systems by breach of this conditionality remains intact, and 
plausibility is all that is required by the larger normative drive of the Arrow/Riker 
democratic instability thesis. Similarly, it should be accepted that breaches of the 
independence condition would be extraordinarily rare in real-world preference formation. 
These caveats, along with the complexity of their implications, are perhaps part of the 
reason that the majority of democratic theorists seek an escape-route from the 
impossibility theorem not via the problems associated with the Independence condition, 
but instead through the various issues raised by his insistence upon Universal Domain.  
Like Arrow, William H. Riker’s contributions to democratic theory start from the 
assumption that deep-set preference orderings do exist. There could be no complaint 
about democracy's failure to correctly represent aggregated individual preferences if the 
preferences themselves held no internal meaning.  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is just one way of expressing the idea that one cannot rule 
out arbitrary outcomes from systems that do not collect complete information. Riker does 






Deeper preferences exist to the extent that they plausibly scotch any claims to outright 
stability on the part of democracies, yet they are unattainable and unknowable to the 
extent that there is no hope of repair. They do not 'exist' publicly, and thus there can be no 
'general will' in the sense that Rousseau understood it. The coincidence of unexpressed 
rational choice-making itself undermines the case for democratic systems that are aimed 
at capturing the 'general will'. The next section will discuss whether this particular 
understanding of democracy is coherent by considering some of the key elements of Gerry 
Mackie’s objections to it. 
Assessing Mackie’s Critique of Riker 
Before turning to whether deliberative democracy might provide an effective answer to 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the body of normative theory that Riker extrapolated 
from it, it is first necessary to determine whether this family of democratic criticism is still 
worthy of being taken seriously. For some theorists, Riker’s insights in particular were 
categorically dismissed by Mackie’s response, leaving Arrow’s analysis as an interesting 
insight that is ultimately irrelevant to the workings of actual democracies.  This section 
will identify some important elements of Mackie’s critique of Riker, and defend Riker’s 
approach on primarily epistemological grounds.  
This section simplifies Mackie’s approach to the dismissal of Riker’s claims into a series of 
three important lines of argumentation. First, he attempts to undermine the plausibility of 
the arbitrary democratic outcomes (where different legitimate aggregation methods 
would produce different final outcomes from the same set of preference inputs) upon 
which Riker’s theories are founded by arguing that they are incredibly rare, and that 
Riker’s attempt to provide historical examples are afflicted by a serious internal 
contradiction over whether deeper individual preferences can be determined. Second, 
Mackie suggests that Condorcet cycles should only become a realistic possibility in 
circumstances where the alternatives on offer are extremely similar to each other – and so 
even a genuinely arbitrary outcome is of only trivial importance. Third, Mackie argues that 
even given a concrete example of democratic arbitrariness, there is usually an intuitively 
preferable aggregation method, preserving the meaningfulness of voting.  
1. Is Riker’s Epistemology Inconsistent? 
Riker popularised Arrow's work by presenting it within an ideological context: a conflict 






understandings of the collective will and the collective good. His suggestion that, given the 
impossibility of discerning a reasoned 'general will' from any mass of voters, the popular 
vote could be seen as “an intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular veto”, 
draws our attention to the idea that, in prospective electoral terms, it is impossible to tell a 
rascal from a saint (Riker, 1982, p. 244). Instead, the emphasis switches, in a variation of 
trustee-model representative politics, to the regulation of officials by retrospective 
assessment. Again, because of the nature of aggregation, Riker cannot guarantee that a 
rascal will always be punished, or that a saint will always meet with rewards. Yet the 
plausibility of being rejected by voters may be enough to motivate decent legislative 
behaviour and a host of constituent-favouring re-election seeking activities on the part of 
the representatives (as pointed out in David Mayhew's Electoral Connection (1974, p. 80)). 
Moreover, he develops theories of both spontaneous democratic arbitrariness of the sort 
discussed above and the conscious manipulation of these and related effects, an 'art' of 
political manipulation based upon agenda control and the engineering of voting blocs 
toward a certain end, which he labels heresthetic to stand alongside the ‘liberal art’ of 
rhetoric. The arguments in support of these theories are predominately supported by 
historical examples. Riker develops detailed interpretations of episodes from electoral and 
legislative history to demonstrate the plausibility of Condorcet cycles, cases of Arrovian 
arbitrariness, and instances of ingenious heresthetic on the part of statesmen or 
legislators. 
Riker's 'minimal, liberal', “Madisonian” or “private-instrumental” understanding of 
democracy revolves around a certain epistemological approach, which shifts from an 
emphasis on knowledge problems and Arrovian scepticism (over the possibility of 
effectively communicating deep preference arrangements through democratic politics) to 
a broader faith in a scholar’s capacity for the recovery of historical intentionality (allowing 
Riker to offer accounts of coalition-building and heresthetic that are dependent upon a 
interpretation of the deeper preferences of the agents involved) (Riker, 1982, p. 9; Elster, 
2003, p. 139). Gerry Mackie shows particularly clearly where Riker's epistemological 
understandings move from one mode to another, and tends to understand these shifts as 
indications of inconsistency or internal contradiction.  
In pointing out what he takes to be a contradiction internal to Riker's arguments, Mackie 
actually conflates two distinct means for the reconstruction of individual preferences. His 
discussion of Riker's emphasis on the unknowability of preferences is similarly affected. 






Riker also modelled his ideas on his understanding of historic politics, and proceeded to 
attempt to derive from these certain models of democratic outcomes - Social Choice 
theory, in other words, is a tool of analysis for Riker's world-view rather than its sole point 
of origin. It is used by Riker to raise much older assertions about the nature of democracy: 
not a critique of democracy developed directly from Arrow, but an attempt to adduce an 
already extant critique using Social Choice.  
Mackie states a belief early in his book that there lies at the heart of Riker's work the idea 
that it is always impossible to know other human minds, or at least that individual voting 
choices are insufficient for the reconstruction of underlying preferences (Mackie, 
Democracy Defended, 2003, p. 40). To summarise the position: “true tastes ... must be 
indirectly inferred ... [so] underlying preferences cannot be inferred from votes” (Mackie, 
1998, p. 75). 
“It is,” Mackie writes, “the peculiar misfortune of the sceptic that he is always forced to act 
as if his conclusions are false”. He then claims that Riker uses “methods of inference” 
(read: guesswork) in order to construct his historical examples of democratic instability, 
manipulation and Condorcet-cycling. If historical actors may have their underlying 
preferences and motives pieced together in such a way, why not satisfy oneself with the 
performance of democracy as a transmitter of preferences by applying the same principles 
to contemporary voters? Such sensible leaps of logic are, after all, “a normal and 
uncontroversial everyday occurrence” (Mackie, 2003, p. 42).  
The basic epistemologically sceptical position is that one can never truly know another's 
preferences on a concrete, falsifiable level. For democrats, this carries the implication that 
no individual's deeper preference-orderings (the existence of which are central to the way 
that Arrow’s impossibility theorem works) are strictly recoverable, and nobody’s votes 
can be wholly explained. Mackie does not directly object to this scepticism, but rather 
suggests that, in the aggregate, things become simpler: that, though individual preferences 
cannot be reliably indicated by voting processes, “it does not follow that it is so for all of 
our votes considered together” (Mackie, 1998, p. 77). A series of votes or a deliberative 
democratic method may begin to approximate underlying preferences (if not actively 
reformulate them).     
Moreover, Mackie asserts, Riker's position is internally contradictory, in that the 
demonstration of the principles of heresthetic requires on the part of political actors a 






a manufactured coalition or majority. How is this possible if underlying preferences are 
essentially indeterminate and, perhaps more importantly, generally incoherent? 
Mackie clearly sees this as an insurmountable difficulty for Riker: “Manipulation is not 
possible without knowledge of others' preferences. Thus, we arrive at the contradiction: 
manipulation is possible only if preferences are known; but if manipulation is possible, then 
preferences are unknown” (Mackie, 2003, p. 160). By interpreting this paradox in Riker’s 
work, Mackie comes to the crux of his argument.  
Yet Riker's main assertion is that voting is not a reliable means of projecting 'sincere' 
preferences. He offers no explicit opinion as to whether such intentions are recoverable by 
other means, but his work as a historian of what he calls ‘heresthetic’ indicates that he 
subscribes to the (epistemically orthodox) idea that historical method, with sufficiently 
thorough inter-textual analysis and a strong contextual understanding) is capable of 
reconstructing the motives or objectives of political actors to within a certain threshold of 
plausibility. It is this methodology which is employed in raising examples of manipulative 
behaviour from history, and there is not necessarily any contradiction between this part of 
his work and his overarching belief that voting is incapable of expressing a general will, or, 
indeed, complex internal preference-rankings at the individual level.  
Unlike historians or academics, members of legislatures and election officials do not have 
time, resources or training to attempt the analytical, textual reconstruction of every given 
political actor's entire preference profile on a sophisticated level. Riker moves between 
historically reconstructing preferences on the one hand, and discussion of the limits of the 
contemporaneous process of assuming preferences from the contents of votes. It is in 
these terms that his case for the prevalence of manipulative behaviour in politics resists 
being undermined by a broadly historicist world-view. 
One might at this point object that the intuitive approach – that of inductively assuming 
that individuals vote broadly in line with their deeper preferences – is also basically 
plausible, and because of this, on balance, the majority will is preserved within popular 
democracies. Indeed, Riker might not have disputed such a point. However, it would have 
had little impact on his ultimate conclusion: that “populist” conceptions of democracy 
cannot operate under the weight of the plausibility of arbitrary aggregative outcomes. 
According to Riker, only a limited, liberal model of democracy is practicable given such 
findings. 
The supposed paradox in Riker’s concept of heresthetic states that manipulation itself 






accurate? A successful manipulation – a successful case of agenda control, for example, in 
order to achieve a certain political end – is not dependent upon awareness of anyone else's 
actual preference orderings. Rather, the probabilities of certain behaviours are estimated, 
based upon past knowledge and more, to form the basis of manipulation. Riker cannot 
dismiss the existence of human theory-of-mind; neither, one imagines, would he have 
wished to. But the verifiable transmission of actual preferences via voting is still 
impossible, therefore rendering 'manipulated' outcomes indistinguishable from 'true' 
results. To point out that strategic and honest votes are indistinguishable is merely to 
reiterate Riker's point (p. 162). 
2. Are Trivial Decisions More Likely to be Arbitrary? 
Mackie seems concerned to bring to bear every possible rebuttal in his criticisms of 
Riker's interpretation of democracy. Intriguingly, many of his arguments would be 
rendered obsolete by the success of the arguments that precede or follow them. For 
example, Mackie suggests that Condorcet cycles are more probable where the alternatives 
being voted on are similar to each other. The next step in Mackie's argument sets out that, 
if the available alternatives are more similar, thus increasing the likelihood of democratic 
instability, this should not be a cause for great concern. Cases of democratic instability are 
likely where the decision itself is trivial, rendering the phenomenon of cycling more trivial 
as well (Mackie, 2003, pp. 113-4). 
This line of reasoning is not wholly persuasive. First, it is not clear that the clustering of 
alternatives will increase the likelihood of Condorcet cycles. Mackie’s claim here is built 
around the idea that fine-grained distinctions between alternatives will lead to outcomes 
which essentially confirm unanimity around a general principle, and so a more-even 
distribution between alternatives that present different implementations of that principle 
(Ibid.). To return to the defence expenditure example offered above, if the existing 
alternatives are between expenditures of 9% of GDP, 4 % of GDP, and 0% of GDP, then we 
can probably expect most voters to coalesce more readily around one of these alternatives 
(perhaps that second, moderate option). If, on the other hand, the choice is between 
tweaks to an already-established principle or norm – say, between 4.5% of GDP, 4% of 
GDP, and 3.5% of GDP, Mackie argues that preferences between these alternatives will be 
far more evenly-distributed. The incidence of Condorcet cycles may accordingly increase, 
but this won’t matter, because everyone has effectively already agreed on defence 






Two problems are immediately apparent in this account. The first is that granular 
differences are not commonly presented as such. A minuscule gap between three options 
can still be framed as a vast philosophical difference. This is quite normal in contemporary 
British politics, for example, where the three main political parties make much of their 
differences of approach in key policy areas, but in fact are effectively occupying near-
identical political platforms (Quinn, 2008). Presentational differences – contributors to the 
literature on framing effects would describe these as ‘issue’ rather than ‘valence’ 
differences (Druckman, 2004) – can have an appreciable impact on democratic outcomes. 
The wider point is that ‘granularity’ can scale infinitely. According to what set of 
constructed norms are some alternatives widely-spaced, and some closely-packed?  
Secondly, Mackie is forgetting that there are many examples of outright moral 
disagreement in contemporary societies, some of which literally bisect the voting publics 
in question. For example, 48% of US and 49% of UK citizens ascribe climate change 
primarily to human activities (Pelham, 2009). Of course, a classic Condorcet cycle is 
between three or more alternatives. Issues resulting in even three-way polarisation are 
more rare, yet the existence of even a weakly-supported third alternative can create 
cyclical results between the two remaining polarising alternatives. 
3. Do Certain Aggregation Methods Suggest Themselves? 
Elsewhere, Mackie suggests that different circumstances – that is, different apparent votes 
and constituencies – could justify the implementation of more or less complex systems of 
aggregation (Mackie, 2003, p. 121). For example, implementation of a Borda count in 
circumstances where uneven Condorcet cycles pertain with simple pairwise comparisons 
will often produce a clear winner, rather than a tie (p. 120). If all recognisably democratic 
aggregation methods fail, then why not implement some simple measure in cases of a 
voting cycle, as we might in the face of a tie between two alternatives in a small, even-
numbered group? A strategic preference-change by even one voter, or the use of a coin-flip 
or die-roll, could mean the difference between a determinate and an indeterminate 
outcome (p. 117).  
This line of argument may be rebutted without reference to Arrow’s Independence 
Condition, which it arguably violates (p. 122). Determining a winner through use of some 
expedient (if the expedient is fairly decided and consented-to), or by making use of an 
alternative aggregation method, is easy, as Mackie demonstrates. The problem is that the 
accusation of arbitrariness, under such circumstances, persists. The possibility of 






genuine doubt on the plausible legitimacy of democratic decision-making.  Simply to state 
that different types and compositions of Condorcet cycles could be resolved with different 
voting and aggregation rules is not enough; indeed, this claim merely serves to underscore 
Riker's argument. Implementing a Borda count in cases of non-balanced cycles, proves 
that no single rule can always guarantee democratic stability. The possibility of two 
equally 'true' outcomes from a single set of votes (only analysed in different ways) is itself 
a kind of instability: the meaningfulness of the outcome would always remain in question.  
A Deliberative Response?  
As the above section aimed to show, at least some part of the Arrow/Riker critique of 
democracy survives Mackie’s critique. Condorcet cycles and plausibly arbitrary outcomes 
may not be as common as Riker argues, but they may not be very rare, either. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that several theorists of deliberative democracy should treat this 
critique with considerable seriousness – particularly since the defanging of the 
impossibility theorem and its political extrapolations could provide further grounds for 
the development and implementation of deliberative theory.  
Some of the potential benefits of deliberative democracy have already been discussed in 
this thesis (see, for example, Chapters Two and Four). First, deliberation may objectively 
improve the 'quality' of decision-making, with gains in the quality of political, electoral or 
legislative outcomes. Such an improvement could arise from a number of sources, but 
most likely are the ideas of ‘cognitive diversity’ (as discussed in Chapter One) and 
consensus-building. The idea that a deliberative process can rationalise the preference 
arrangements of individuals and so render each more closely commensurable with others 
when in combination is essentially an expression of the following beliefs: a) that 
deliberation tends to produce a narrowing of the range of responses to specific questions, 
and b) that the outcome of such a confluence of preferences is desirable. In this sense, 
deliberation is potentially beneficial if the premise that it facilitates consensus-building 
proves to be true. As the next chapter shall discuss, there are good reasons to doubt the 
efficacy of deliberation as regards consensus-building and cognitive diversity.  
Even failing an objective increase in the epistemic strength of democratic decision-making, 
deliberation may nevertheless be capable of promoting acceptance of the democratic 
process in itself, allowing groups with minority views to feel less alienated. In other words, 






to an individual's preferences, because they feel that they had sufficient opportunity to 
express and argue for their personal goals. This may be described in its simplest terms as a 
mandate-maximisation effect, where the actions of a state subsequent to a deliberative 
process may be considered to be more legitimate, both because it seems more fair 
(offering grounds for consent even where one’s own preferences did not become the basis 
for enacted policy or an electoral outcome) and more conducive to consensus (and so 
furnish large margins for majority decision-making). We may therefore endorse 
deliberative democracy if we accept both that a) deliberation has a mandate-maximisation 
effect and b) larger government mandates for policy-making and political action are, on 
the whole, desirable (something that, for example, many liberals would have cause to 
doubt). 
Finally, and more pertinently for this chapter, the upshot of the preference-rationalising 
capacity of deliberation (if true) is that it offers a response to, and possible escape-route 
from, the social choice thesis of democratic instability. This thesis, as discussed above, was 
implied by Joseph Schumpeter (1943 [1965], p. 269), reconstructed as a proof by Kenneth 
Arrow in 1951 and popularised in more normative terms by William Riker and the 
political scientists he inspired in the following years, suggests that no aggregative 
democratic system is immune to accusations of arbitrariness when compared to the 
original preference arrangements of individuals. Yet if deliberative democracy can 
improve the relative 'rationality' of individuals' preferences through dimensional meta-
agreement (agreement on the nature of the issue at hand), then it may be seen as a tool for 
democratic stabilisation, making arbitrary, manipulated or random democratic outcomes 
far less likely. A deliberative requirement for reason-giving or public justification may 
offer, according to Gerald Gaus, an escape-route from Riker's critique, for "although the 
public justification function may allow citizens to hold any set of beliefs, by (for example) 
excluding some from the ideal deliberative condition, it can ensure that a 'laundered' set of 
beliefs results, which will necessarily produce a reasonable or coherent public reason" 
(Gaus, 2009, p. 157).  
The following section addresses the context and implications of the third possible benefit: 
deliberation as an escape-route from theories of democratic instability. A full explication 
of this position requires an in-depth analysis of the challenge presented by Arrow, Riker 
and others, the strength of the existing criticisms levelled against them, and the ways in 
which deliberation may offer a new means of escaping the accusations of arbitrariness 






Deliberation and ‘Single-Peakedness’ 
Academics with a certain (Riker would say 'populist') understanding of democratic 
principles have sought to either disprove Riker's theses (in the manner of Gerry Mackie) 
or to seek escape-routes from their Impossibility Theorem bedrock. The above discussion 
has shown that the overarching instability thesis is dependent only on showing the 
plausibility of arbitrariness, perhaps placing a greater emphasis on the 'escape-routes'. 
It is through the questioning of Arrow's Universal Domain condition that deliberation is 
seized upon as a democracy-stabilising tool. Dryzek expresses this as recourse to 
reasoning decisions as opposed to simply polling them, in that Arrow's challenge renders 
“a turn to deliberation that seeks reasoned agreement rather [than] the mere aggregation 
of preferences ... necessary” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 36). 
How might deliberation mitigate the problems highlighted by Schumpeter, Arrow and 
Riker? First, and most obviously, deliberative procedures could make voting – and thus the 
difficult business of aggregating votes – altogether redundant. As this thesis suggested in 
Chapters Two and Four, this outcome seems to be unlikely, and the majority of 
deliberative democrats view voting as an unfortunate but probably inescapable fact of 
democratic participation in large, complex contemporary societies.  
The more realistic alternative suggests that deliberation may offer the sought-for escape 
route from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem by legitimising the weakening of the Universal 
Domain condition – a view that has been set out by James Fishkin, Christian List, Robert C. 
Luskin, and Iain McLean (2013). Might deliberation be useful for 'meta-agreement' – the 
consensual acceptance of the exclusion of some preference orderings from a vote 
aggregation, or at least agree a single or limited number of 'organising dimensions' by 
which to assess each option before voting? Failing this, could deliberation intrinsically 
increase individuals' propensity toward 'single-peakedness', thus weakening the 
probability the occurrence of a Condorcet Cycle? After all, such a possibility – for single-
peakedness to allow for a possible escape-route from the implications of the impossibility 
theorem – was explicitly recognised by Arrow and Riker themselves (Riker, 2003; Arrow, 
1951 [1963], p. 74). 
'Single-peaked' is a term used to describe a preference arrangement where an individual's 






dimension') between her first preference and each other preference.59 For example, if we 
were to arrange the three voting options on defence expenditure on a single unifying 
dimension, it would be that of cost. A multi-peaked preference along this dimension would 
be preference for first the most expensive alternative, then the least expensive, and then 
some moderate middle option. Along some other organising dimension, however, such an 
arrangement of preferences may still appear to be single-peaked (Farrar, Fishkin, Green, 
List, Luskin, & Paluck, 2010, pp. 337-8).  Many theorists have asserted that it is possible to 
promote single-peakedness – indeed, that it may be a normal by-product of a deliberative 
process, and could help to address issues arising from public ignorance as well as both 
value-pluralism and, relatedly, the “tougher nut to crack” of outright value 
incommensurability (Fishkin, 2006; Cinalli & O'Flynn, 2014). 
Christian List recently categorised this assertion into three parts, stating that “it is often 
easier to reach agreement on what the questions are than on how to answer them”. A 
deliberative process intended for this end would involve the following steps: 1. 
Identification, through deliberation, of a common dimension of consideration (semantic 
agreement). 2. Arrangement, through deliberation, of the alternative options along the 
decided-upon dimension (geometric agreement), and (3), wherein “group deliberation 
leads each individual to determine a most preferred position (his or her 'peak') on that 
dimension” (List, Deliberation and Agreement, 2008, p. 70). 
Dryzek promotes the use of deliberated meta-agreement as potentially desirable in its 
own right, maintaining a broader emphasis on what he perceives as a qualitatively 
intuitive appeal: “Deliberation could promote awareness of the ... dimensions of collective 
choice at issue. Alternatives can then be sought on each of the dimensions, and the 
collectively preferred positions on each dimension aggregated into an overall choice.” 
Interestingly, while further extolling the virtues of the deliberative process, Dryzek 
immediately goes on to mention something that could amount to a potential problem for 
those that would put deliberation to use as a limiter of universal domain: specifically, that 
deliberative fora are excellent venues for the proliferation of alternatives, dimensions and 
                                                             
59 It should be noted that single-peakedness, in so far as it is a form of shaped preference 
arrangement that may be approximated by deliberative processes, is limited to a single issue-
dimension. Mono-dimensionality is considered here to be too narrow and restrictive for the 
reasonable consideration of complex political questions, as the chapter will go on to argue. 
However, a more persuasive version of the single-peakedness escape route could be extrapolated 
from the possibility of single-peakedness in many-dimensional issue spaces, as argued by Tullock 
(1967). However, as Tullock himself explained, the plausibility of many-dimensional single-
peakedness does not change the fact that Arrow’s condition of universal domain must still at least 






options: alternative approaches are at least as likely to multiply as they are to diminish 
(Dryzek, 2000, p.41).  
Knight and Johnson specifically cite deliberation’s potential for escaping the social choice 
critique of democracy. Domain restriction, after all, is a clear way of delimiting the range 
and variability of input to democratic aggregation – the only limitation is ethical or 
conceptual, since such restrictions will likely seem to be anathematic to fundamental 
democratic principles. Deliberation, in so far as it is a procedure that can effectively fulfil 
the same democratic principles as domain restriction seems to violate, may be a way to 
effectively ‘license’ domain restriction and so achieve more plausibly non-arbitrary 
outcomes (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 143).  
Deliberative democracy appears to be a strong basis for an ‘escape route’ from the 
implications of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. However, it is also possible to criticise an 
emphasis on single-peakedness in three main ways: (1) mono-dimensionality (meta-
agreed or not) may be overly simplistic for political questions; (2) single-peaked 
preferences will mathematically tend to increase support for centrist (or moderate) 
options; and (3) there exists only mixed evidence that deliberative processes are capable 
of increasing single-peakedness. We shall turn briefly to each of these criticisms in turn. 
1. Is One Dimension Enough? 
By finding reasonable grounds for agreement upon a single organising dimension from 
which to consider a given issue, decision or policy, deliberative democracy may be able to 
increase the incidence of ‘single-peakedness’, and thus reduce the probability of Condorcet 
cycles. An initial, intuitive objection to this possible benefit, however, is that political 
issues are highly complex, incorporating manifold moral and technical dimensions, and it 
may not always be appropriate to reduce consideration to a single dimension (even if 
deliberation is able to make such a reductive approach democratically legitimate).  
Political questions are potentially highly complex. Consider, for example, one of the 
quintessential political questions: Who will I vote for? A single political party (and its 
selected candidate) may appear in different 'places' relative to other political parties 
depending on the chosen organising dimension. Within the context of British politics, the 
Liberal Democrat party may be considered to be to the 'left' of Labour in terms of its 
policies of social liberalism, but could equally be placed to the 'right' of the Conservative 
Party in terms of its economic policies (which usually emphasise free trade, deregulation 






selection of an organising dimension – the process of 'meta-agreement' – would become 
the crucial step in overall preference formation.  
Equating 'single-peaked' preference orderings with increased decision-making rationality 
is therefore questionable. Political choices tend to be multidimensional, involving the 
interface of many concerns and various normatively established 'goods'. The decision to 
arrange preferences only in terms of a delimited set of assessment criteria – soft meta-
agreement, if you will – may not produce an epistemic improvement in individual decision-
making, even if it can be argued to be a democratically legitimate weakening of the 
Universal Domain criterion. Different organising dimensions may yield differing (and 
equally valid) assessments of choice-rationality. Similarly, a multi-peaked preference may 
also be intrinsically reasonable in specific circumstances. The voter who prefers 
maximum-spend to zero-spend to moderate-spend (a > c > b) could still express this choice 
in a rational way: “It would be best to spend the largest amount possible on defence, but if 
not, it would be better not to spend anything than to waste a moderate amount of money 
on an ineffective defence programme”. Yet on the intuitive organising dimension, this 
argument and its preference-arrangement is multi-peaked. 
The pursuit of single-peakedness is therefore necessarily reductive, and runs the risk of 
overly simplifying complex political questions in order to delimit the range of admissible 
issue-frames and thus decrease the incidence of Condorcet cycles. In this sense, it is closely 
related to the ‘public reason’ species of meta-agreement that is also targeted by, or cited as 
a virtue of, deliberative democratic theory. Where public reason requires coalescence 
around some agreed criteria for acceptable reason-giving, framing single-peakedness as a 
desirable consequence of deliberation demands meta-agreement on most-relevant issue 
frames. Even if this is a spontaneous product of formalised deliberative procedures, it is 
not clear that increased single-peakedness will always be desirable for democracies. 
2. Single-Peakedness and the Median Perspective  
The second crucial criticism of an emphasis on increased single-peakedness also raises an 
issue with deliberative process generally. Single-peaked preferences incorporating a rank 
for all possible alternatives will always tend to improve support for centrist options. This 
is a more significant effect in scenarios with lower numbers of alternative candidates or 
choices. For example, within a three-option set, complete single-peaked preference 
arrangements will always rank the central option on a given issue-dimension as at least 






Only in a multi-peaked arrangement can the ‘middle’ option in this frame be the last, or 
least-preferred, choice.  
The significance of this effect is clearly diminished by preference arrangements from 
among a wider range of alternatives – but not entirely lost. A single-peaked preference 
profile will always favour ‘centrist’ choices above one, or both, peripheral alternatives. 
Indeed, if this were not true, single-peakedness would be unlikely to reduce the incidence 
of Condorcet cycles. The encouragement or celebration of single-peakedness of choices 
along whatever organising issue dimension is meta-agreed by a deliberative public is akin 
to the encouragement or celebration of an increased propensity for ‘moderate’ politics. 
This effect is not necessarily problematic, of course. There may be very good reasons to 
prefer a general tendency toward moderate politics. However, it is worthwhile to suggest 
that such a tendency is not necessarily desirable in all circumstances, either: if the 
selection of a primary organising dimension is in any way arbitrary, or if the ‘middle’ 
option is a false or unproductive compromise, then increased support for ‘median’ 
positions will also be arbitrary or unproductive.   
3. Is Single-Peakedness Reliably Produced by Deliberation? 
Even if the issues outlined above are not significant obstacles, and single-peakedness 
along a particular issue dimension is perceived as a self-evident good, there may be cause 
to doubt the reliability of single-peakedness as a side-effect of deliberative politics. The 
implementation of formalised public deliberation is not always capable of delivering an 
increase in single-peakedness – indeed, deliberative processes have been shown to reduce 
voters' propensity toward single-peaked preference arrangements under certain 
conditions.  
Data regarding participants' preferences collected over the course of deliberative events 
run by James Fishkin suggest a declining and finally reversing tendency toward single-
peakedness in some experiments. Deliberative polls conducted on the issues of ‘Australian 
Head of State’ and ‘Changing the British Monarchy’ both resulted in noticeable movements 
away from single-peakedness among the preferences of participants (List, Luskin, Fishkin, 
& McLean, 2013, p. 88). Other deliberative events, meanwhile, seem to have resulted in 
miniscule or statistically negligible increases in single-peakedness (for example, on New 
Haven Airport Expansion).  
These findings lead List et al. to limit their argument – that deliberation increases 






Salience, in this context, really means prominence, or perceived importance (Ibid., p. 91). 
These findings indicate that the higher the public profile (or visibility, perceived 
significance, or pre-existing  awareness) of deliberated issues, the more likely that the net 
effect of deliberation will be a reduction, rather than an increase, in single-peakedness. 
This may be due, as these authors argue, to the lack of a “natural” left-right structure to the 
available alternatives, suggesting that morally or technically complex questions – the ones 
that  transcend simplified political pigeonholes – will be more likely subject to Condorcet 
cycles as the result of deliberative democracy.  
These findings, and their implications, corroborate some of the arguments offered in 
Sunstein's Infotopia, and other contributions to the literature. Deliberation can lead to the 
polarisation of views as often as movement toward moderate consensus (Sunstein, 2006, 
p. 57). Such a preference amplification effect has important implications for the efficacy of 
deliberation in general, as well as its overarching objectives (we might imagine, for 
example, an agonistic democrat quite valuing this particular deliberative side-effect) 
(McCulloch & Drake, 2011).  More pertinently, this is a feature of human psychology which 
may be able to account for a decline in single-peaked preferences over the course of 
debating particularly fraught issues, just as less desirable collective effects such as 
'information cascades' or simple peer-pressure may account for the seemingly attractive 
end of a more consensual politics (Sunstein, 2006, pp. 88-90). Chapter Six will take up a 
discussion of these and other such psychological effects in more detail. 
Conclusion: Deliberation vs. Social Choice 
If the initial promise of deliberative democracy – the realisation of the unanimously, 
substantively consensual politics promised by theories of self-evident moral and technical 
truths and their ability to be tracked by something like a ‘general will’ – was disappointed 
by the environmental obstacle of diverse societies, it only served to shift the theoretical 
focus to various venues of meta-agreement where, it is hoped, the prospects for consensus 
fare better. Meta-consensus over the nature of legitimate reasons, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, or meta-consensus over organising issue dimensions, as discussed in the latter half 
of this chapter, both promise to raise the standard of popular participation and add value 
to democracy. Where public reason aims to embody democratic robustness in the face of 
private, self-interested or manipulative participation, deliberative pursuit of mono-






aggregative democratic outcomes against the claims of arbitrariness levelled by social 
choice theorists.  
The incoherence and stringent epistemic demands of public reason have been shown to 
invite a host of potential problems. This chapter has pointed out that, in addition, the 
pursuit of single-peakedness cannot be considered to be easy, unproblematic or desirable 
in all circumstances. Efforts to promote deliberation as a means of legitimising the 
weakening of the Universal Domain condition are questionable, as shown in the second 
part of this chapter. Broader efforts to show the capacity of debate to increase the 
probability of 'rational' preference-arrangements (gauged by most theorists in terms of 
close adherence to dimensional single-peakedness) are similarly flawed, both in the 
assumption that political questions are so reducible to such a conception of rationality 
and, possibly, in the actual capacity for deliberation to produce single-peaked preferences.  
Arrovian and Rikerian critiques of democracy appear to survive both the challenge of 
democracy’s self-appointed defenders (primarily represented in this chapter by Mackie) 
and deliberative problem-solvers. The deliberative escape-route is closed: as shown in 
Chapter Two, there is no plausible model of deliberative democracy that does not 
eventually depend upon voting, and voting invokes the possibility of arbitrary or 
otherwise unstable outcomes such as Condorcet cycles. Even if deliberation takes place 
prior to a vote, there is no guarantee that, depending on the salience or profile of the 
decisions at hand, it will not exacerbate the multi-peaked preference arrangements that 
make Condorcet cycles more likely. If deliberation does reduce the probability of 
Condorcet cycles, then it can only do so by reducing complex political questions to 
simplistic organising dimensions that may not wholly capture their detail or various 
different interpretations: hardly in keeping with the original, idealised concept of an 
epistemically enhancing and educative deliberative democracy. 
Social choice theory, by showing that the inescapable norm of voting may lead to arbitrary 
outcomes and weaken the responsiveness of institutions to demotic preferences, serves to 
undermine many arguments in favour of democracy, making the need for an alternative 
source of consequentialist justification, such as the one presented in Chapter One, more 
urgent. Just as importantly, however, they undermine many of the arguments put forward 
by Platonist critics of the universal franchise, such as those explored in Chapter Three. If 
democracy is dependent upon voting, and voting is not only inefficacious but sometimes 
productive of wholly arbitrary outcomes, then it becomes very difficult to worry a great 






Chapter Six: Psychology, 





This chapter considers the potential consequences of a loss of anonymity at the most 
fundamental level of political participation. As a preliminary step, the relationship 
between the secrecy of voting and the institution of the universal franchise will be set out. 
Formalised public deliberation would necessarily reduce or, in its most radical forms, 
abolish the principle of political anonymity, essentially invoking the risks of corruption, 
intimidation and manipulation that were commonplace prior to the introduction of the 
secret ballot. However, not all such risks would be wholly overt. Studies of the human 
tendency toward conformity reveal that anonymous circumstances may allow individuals 
to operate more honestly in the face of disagreement from their peers. A review of some of 
the key literature dealing with the social psychology of group behaviour may help to 
explain this feature of anonymity, provide clues as to the possible undesirable side-effects 
of institutionalised deliberation, and explicate the desirability of anonymity to any 











The Folk Psychology of Political Scholarship 
Many of the assertions of democratic theorists, and of deliberative democrats in particular, 
are potentially testable with reference to existing or specially-created social-psychological 
experimentation. It is interesting to note, therefore, that most political theorists (with 
some notable exceptions, some of whom are discussed below) seem to have little interest 
in the findings of psychologists who conduct studies, for example, in group dynamics, 
conformity, the effects of ostracism, or the relative efficacy of various techniques of 
persuasion. In place of the folk psychology that is employed, purposefully or otherwise, by 
many deliberative democrats, this chapter recommends the adoption of a minimal degree 
of social-psychological literacy.   
When Rousseauians claim (or imply) that all people are capable of being other-regarding 
and giving coherent reasons in public forums, this is a psychological assertion. When 
Platonists suggest that humans are given to ‘rational’ ignorance and irrationality and 
extract little subjective value from the accumulation of nonessential knowledge, this is 
potentially psychologically testable. The claims and assertions included in this thesis are 
no exception: this project’s overarching justification of democracy is contingent on a 
tendency among human beings to unproblematically accept a ‘folk theory’ of democratic 
virtue and efficacy: the existence of such a tendency is, at least potentially, a matter that 
could be proven or disproven by psychological study. 
This chapter aims to establish, among other things, the value of psychological research to 
political theory, and the potential analytical improvements that political theorists can 
bring to bear when interpreting the findings of such psychological studies. It is primarily 
concerned with the possibility and implications of a non-anonymous politics. Such a loss of 
anonymity is particularly pertinent to deliberative democracy, whose beneficial features 
are usually contingent on a publicised approach to preference-shaping and the 
justification of political views. The implications of anonymity-loss, and the advantages 
associated with hard-won, anonymous forms of democratic participation, will be 
discussed with reference to various social-psychological findings. There are also various 
areas where extant psychological studies have considerable implications for democratic 
theory more widely, and some of these will also be surveyed. 
The first part of this chapter will attempt to establish the significance of anonymous 
participation in democratic politics, including its origins and problematic relationship with 
notions of ‘public reason’. It will then turn to a brief discussion of the potential for 






psychology. The second half of the chapter sets out a selective survey of psychological 
studies whose findings have particular significance for the work of democratic theorists.  
Anonymity and Public Reason 
Anonymity is, by most accounts, antithetical to public reason. Public reason, at its most 
essential level, is the idea that social acceptability should be one of the measures of the 
value of a contribution to politics. Under ideal circumstances, when a public reasons, and 
reasons well, a range of possible but publicly unreasonable perspectives or alternatives 
will be excluded from political discourse. The extent of our comfort with this idea should 
be informed by the extent to which we believe that the social concepts we arrive at 
through public reason can considered to be fallible – and, if falsifiability or plausible 
fallibility are not possible benchmarks, then our comfort with public reason must surely 
be determined by the apparent procedural and psychological value that it offers as a 
system. 
If, for example, we can conceive of a minority opinion that is both correct by some 
plausible standard,60 and at the same time unpersuasive to the wider public norms of 
reasoning, then publicly-reasoning deliberative democracy must introduce more risks 
than it does benefits. One example of such an opinion with little chance of persuasiveness 
in the face of public reason may be the minority that believed homosexuality to be neither 
illness nor criminality in 1940s Britain. Similarly, a precept that is shared and accepted to 
be true by a majority, but which is also factually incorrect or implausible, could constitute 
grounds for the dismissal of public reason. When dealing with political concepts, factual or 
empirical proof of the validity of a certain stance will often be impossible, throwing our 
reasonability criteria back upon degrees of contextual plausibility. There is no empirical 
evidence that would be wholly persuasive to both sides of, for example, the abortion 
debate in the USA, which is based on a pair of divergent yet similarly unfalsifiable ethical 
determinations. 
How, then, can public reason help us with such fraught politics? We may be forced to 
conclude that the views held by the larger group of individuals are necessarily indicative 
of the contextually ‘true’ answers for a given society. This is problematic enough, as has 
                                                             
60 Deliberation can be considered the means by which a polity may choose between a multiplicity of 
similarly plausible standards. It is difficult to assert that any deliberative process will not 







been discussed in previous chapters. However, even if we accept that public reason is 
simply a procedural approach to the just establishment of political norms, the possible 
psychological processes entailed in establishing and maintaining such dominant 
perspectives must also come under consideration. 
If shared political views can form the basis for a shared identity, and thus for psychological 
in-group/out-group dynamics – as some of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
– then public reason (and its handmaiden, public deliberative democracy) are presented 
with a problem. By removing the protections afforded by political anonymity, these more 
public forms of democratic participation create a formalised venue for a range of 
preference-forming and preference-changing psychological effects.61 The ethics and 
efficacy of these phenomena are the primary concern for this chapter. 
Having established the theoretical and normative backdrop for these concerns, I will 
present a selection of relevant evidence from various studies in social psychology, offering 
an analysis of these findings from the frame of deliberative democratic theory. The 
following three key claims will be explicated, among others: 
1. Perception of the risk of ostracism from a certain group is a very strong 
motivator, and individuals will go to great lengths to avoid being excluded. 
A public deliberative forum would therefore arguably yield fewer 'honest' 
divergent responses to a given question than an anonymous voting 
procedure.  
2. The impulse to conform to the views of a local majority is enormously 
reduced by private, anonymous conditions. Anonymity-loss in a 
deliberative forum could therefore be expected to result in increased levels 
of conformity, regardless of the ‘strength’ of various arguments. 
3. Asking citizens to deliberate upon questions of non-local, non-contextual 
significance may have the effect of triggering what is known as 'peripheral 
route' cognition, where deliberators would be more likely to embrace 
arguments that appear to be popular. 
                                                             
61 This is not to say that our eventual voting choices are not affected by the preference-informing 
influences of our contexts, our engagement with wider society, or the things we are exposed to 
quite routinely from media and partial, campaigning sources. We are political animals, by turns 
influenced and influential in our dealings with others of our species. As in previous chapters, I do 
not take issue here with the fact of preference-change, but with the inclusion of systematic 






Exclusion, Self-Exclusion and ‘Laundering’ 
The previous chapter explored the competencies and epistemological situations expected 
of citizens within a deliberative democracy. Participating in a deliberative process based 
on the requirements of public reason is intrinsically different from the act of voting, and 
incorporates different epistemic demands. Deliberative democracy is often justified on the 
basis that these different competencies are preferable to the limited set required of 
citizens who are only expected to vote, and the previous chapter discussed how this 
justification might be at odds with the wider democratic ambition of “cognitive diversity”.  
This chapter deals with one practically unavoidable side-effect of public deliberation – 
anonymity loss – as a case-study of the kinds of unintended consequences which may 
proceed from a replacement of, or modification to, voting as the primary participatory 
activity of a democracy. This chapter’s main assertion is that anonymity loss will tend to 
conflict with the objectives of both universal suffrage and cognitive diversity. A range of 
well-documented psychological effects and complexities arising from group behaviour will 
lead to self-exclusion from deliberative processes – or, failing this, the ‘laundering’ of 
unpopular preferences in the face of the disdain of other citizens. From the perspective of 
the theorists of deliberative democracy, an emphasis on structured, non-anonymous 
reason-giving is an epistemically important activity which is productive desirable 
outcomes in citizens; a set of public norms and an ownership of their own opinions that 
are intended to impose, in Joshua Cohen’s words, "some desirable constraint on the 
proposals I can advance and defend ... [or] produce desirable consequences if reason-
giving itself changes preferences ... so while I start preferring most what is best for me or 
my group, the practice of defending proposals with reasons may change my preferences, 
dampening the tension between my beliefs about what is right or politically legitimate and 
my preferences: not because that is the point of deliberation, but because that is its effect" 
(Cohen, 2009, p. 252). 
Thus, where the previous chapters were concerned with the nature, feasibility and ethics 
of public reason and the efficacy of deliberation in terms of its ability to realise its various 
objectives, this chapter questions whether publicly reasoning and deliberating citizens are 
actually preferable to those who are expected simply to vote from another perspective. As 
Knight and Johnson have argued, public deliberation could plausibly lead to “self-
censorship due to the anticipated negative reaction of other participants to one’s political 
choices”, negatively impacting upon an individual’s ability to contribute to collective 






It is important to establish from the outset that the implications of the evidence presented 
in this chapter are relevant not only to a radical deliberative democracy – one that 
prescribes that aggregative systems are, as far as possible, replaced by deliberative 
procedures – but also to any scenario where formal deliberative participation is included 
as a step prior to voting (which we might call reformist deliberative democracy). Active 
participation in deliberative democracy necessitates a phase of anonymity loss even if a 
following vote is conducted using the secret ballot. Either version of deliberative democracy 
necessarily entails a more involved, and thus more epistemically and materially costly, 
form of democratic participation.62 More pertinently for this chapter, a voter may become 
subject to what amounts to peer pressure, react to a perceived threat of ostracism, or be 
persuaded by something less than the strength of the best argument during a process of 
public deliberation – and these effects may follow that voter into a polling booth 
afterwards as well.63 This problem – that deliberation, though closely connected to a 
concept of public reason, is not in fact capable of approximating the conditions of 
something like an ideal speech situation – is a potentially serious one. This seriousness is 
compounded by the fact that to claim otherwise - and argue that individuals will be 
capable of misrepresenting their real views in a preliminary deliberation so as to avoid 
ostracism, and proceed to ‘revert’ to their original, less publicly-acceptable preferences 
while anonymously voting – would be simply to emphasise the potential for the pretence 
of changed beliefs which deliberative processes may foster; hardly an advertisement for 
this form of democracy.  
It is also important to note at this stage what this chapter is not arguing: the reader will 
not find here an argument along the lines that there is no such thing as a legitimately 
changed preference. Regardless of the plausibility of ‘laundering’, self-exclusion, and the 
undesirable side-effects of minority/majority group interactions, one must also accept 
that sometimes people change their minds, and that some manner of deliberative process 
could well be responsible for this kind of legitimate shift in preferences. Indeed, to employ 
terms such as ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ in reference to an internal psychological 
process such as preference change may itself be counter-productive, and I shall aim to 
avoid doing so too often here.  
                                                             
62 Some of the psychological findings presented in this chapter also have some significance for the 
deliberations of representative bodies, where partisan in- and out-groups are even more formally 
established and rigorously adhered to.  
63 Of course there are a multitude of other, potentially malign and undesirable, influences that will 
act upon the political preference-formation of citizens as a normal part of existing in a public 






That said, one of the core concerns in this inquiry is to determine whether conscious, 
reasoned preference-change is distinguishable from laundered, manipulated, or 
intimidated preference-change. The fact of the existence of legitimate preference change 
does not rule out the possible, or even the plausible, existence of illegitimate preference-
change. If we cannot tell the two apart, then there are grounds to prioritise anonymous, 
private conditions – where deliberative activity is purely voluntary, in a strong sense of 
that word, and where the chief act of democratic participation is a vote that is cast and 
aggregated in the strictest confidence – over creating venues for public deliberation which 
may not produce uniformly desirable changes in the electorate. 
This argument is reinforced by another important claim: that a more formal deliberative 
phase in participation – even if it is voluntary – entails an unequal distribution of political 
influence (Bohman, 2000). Those who opt to attend a deliberative forum are, in an 
important way, experiencing a deeper kind of democratic participation (indeed, one is 
moved to ask what the point of deliberative democracy would be if this were not the case). 
By the same token, those who opt out of an opportunity for deliberative engagement are 
missing out on the advantages enjoyed by those who have chosen to participate. Several 
additional factors could widen the gap between deliberators and non-deliberators in a 
voluntary system: if deliberation is used, for example, to generate new alternatives to put 
to the vote, then the increased influence enjoyed by deliberators becomes more easily 
measurable. And, significantly given the contents of this chapter, if a non-deliberator’s 
motivations for excluding themselves is not merely apathy, but membership of a minority 
group or the holding of certain unpopular views, then the ethical conundrum raised by 
voluntary deliberation plainly deepens.  
It is quite normal for political theorists to challenge the meaningfulness of formal 
freedoms held by individuals in various situations. An egalitarian theorist may question, 
for example, just how ‘free’ an unconstrained yet poverty-stricken individual is; is she as 
‘free’ as a wealthy person? Is it meaningful to claim that she is ‘free‘ to own a car when she 
cannot afford to buy or run one? On the other hand, one might very well ask: is a citizen 
‘free’ to not attend a deliberative event which may improve their level of democratic 
participation? Is a citizen with unpopular views as ‘free’ to come and reason publicly, and 
so experience a higher level of participation, as a citizen who holds normatively 
widespread, ‘common-sense’ beliefs?  
Crucially, the concerns indicated in the preceding paragraphs are also in many cases cited 






approaches (Miller, 1992; Young, 2000; Goodin, 2003). Why, such a theorist might ask, 
should we care if citizens with unpalatable beliefs are compelled to either adapt them, 
launder them, or avoid participation? Surely such effects represent an advantage of 
deliberative democracy over aggregative approaches? Indeed, we should at least consider 
the possibility that these theorists have a point. But, unless we endorse the view that 
public reason is truth-tracking (or itself definitive of truth), it is only reasonable to 
presume that not all minority opinions are necessarily incorrect (as this project’s section 
on public ignorance perhaps indicated), and that popular truths are often contingent on a 
certain temporal or geographical context: not every generally objectionable political view 
stays so for very long. While the conclusion of this thesis will return to discuss ethical 
questions such as these directly, it is important to bear them in mind as this chapter 
addresses the mechanisms of exclusion and influence which may be intrinsic to 
deliberative democracy.  
It is not unusual to offer a critique of deliberation on the basis that its consequences may 
not be universally normatively attractive (Knight & Johnson, 2011, p. 140). In particular, 
the possibility that the preference-shaping effects of deliberative democracy may have 
ethical implications or be the product of undesirable responses to normative social 
pressures has been considered, and one of the intended purposes of this chapter is to add 
the weight of psychological evidence, as well as conceptual clarity, to such claims.  
Timur Kuran is one scholar who has offered a consistent exploration of such a possibility, 
focusing more upon the falsification of preferences in the public sphere than the 
possibility of undesirable real preference-shaping (Kuran, 1990; Kuran, 1993; Kuran, 
1995; Kuran, 1998). Importantly, Kuran envisages a sustained psychological and 
informational impact being imparted by public deliberation, one which would potentially 
persist even in a subsequent anonymous vote (as in Fishkin’s deliberative polling): 
“insofar as the discussions were afflicted by insincerity, any learning that occurred will 
have been shaped by the truncated, censored, and distorted thoughts that participants 
opted to communicate” (Kuran, 1998, p. 536). While offering a limited engagement with 
classic psychological studies, Kuran prefers to offer an economistic model of behaviour in 
public politics based on the assumption that actors will pursue the reputational utility of 
agreement with majorities, and avoid the penalties that are necessarily associated with 
disagreement (the implied psychological claims of this model are, as we shall see, quite 
reasonable) (Kuran, 1995, pp. 24-40). He then uses the divergence between ‘true’, private 
preferences and their falsified public counterparts as an explanatory framework for 






Glenn Loury discusses similar questions in terms of a meta-level public debate that he 
perceives to be taking place on the role of self-censorship and political correctness (Loury, 
1994, p. 430). Yet these accounts suffer from an inadequate engagement with a social 
psychological literature that could shed much light on their preoccupations – a 
shortcoming that they share, in fact, with the deliberative democratic theories that they 
explicitly and implicitly seek to criticise. Perhaps as a result, they predominantly focus on 
the self-censorship and preference falsification, despite the fact that the psychological 
literature implies that the implications of undesirable preference assimilation – of real 
agreement generated in undesirable ways as the result of public, non-anonymous 
deliberation - is an issue of at least equivalent importance.  
Anonymity and Universal Suffrage 
Inquiry into the relationship between anonymity and political participation carries 
significant historical precedent. Traditionally, reforming movements demanding secret 
ballots and basic political privacy have gone hand-in-hand with progress towards a 
widened, and eventually a universal, franchise. As such, the opponents of democratic 
reform in the modern era have tended to directly oppose polling anonymity as a matter of 
course. 
In 19th Century Britain, the original and prevailing presumption was that elections were 
public happenings, and should be conducted frankly, and in the open. The custom in many 
places was for the few voting men to indicate their preferences by a show of hands, an 
approach that made it easy for candidates or vested interests to keep track of the politics 
of individual voters – a strategy also made viable, of course, by the relatively small 
electorate. The radical campaigner John Bright argued specifically that, following a slight 
widening of the franchise in the 1860s, and in the absence of secrecy in voting, tenants 
would have grounds to fear unfair treatment or eviction if they did not vote in line with 
the preferences of their landlords . But even among political reformers, the principle of 
anonymous voting was as controversial as the concept of drastically widened voting 
franchises. The Parliamentarian and former Prime Minister Lord John Russell, then Leader 
of the opposition, voiced the complaints of many in his arguments against the introduction 






first step – “an obvious prelude” - in the institution of universal suffrage (Mill, Thoughts on 
Parliamentary Reform, 1859, pp. 9-10; Park, 1931).64  
Nevertheless, the Ballot Act of 1872 introduced the institution of anonymous, secret 
ballots, realising the ambitions of generations of radical campaigners. In terms of 
immediate political implications, William Gladstone’s ‘Midlothian’ election campaign of 
1880 showed that direct appeals to the general public on topics of national and 
international significance could prove to be a successful electoral strategy, and this 
success is at least partly attributable to the empowerment of a widened electorate, and the 
introduction of secret voting, in the preceding decades (Brooks, 1985, pp. 65-66).  
Contemporary democracies tend to adhere to the principle of secret ballots as a matter of 
course. However, in other venues involving collective decision-making, and at the more 
granular societal level, disputes over the introduction of anonymised participatory 
practices continue. In 2003, the US Chamber of Commerce entered into a dispute with key 
union leaders over their failure to use secret ballots during internal elections and voted 
decisions (US Chamber of Commerce, 2003). Even more recently, opposition parties in 
Armenia have petitioned to institute the publication of the basic details of voters, on the 
basis that, in the absence of this information, the government is well-placed to manipulate 
voting statistics and inflate or falsify certain outcomes (Armenia Now Leading Article, 
2013). 
Reviewing classic contributions to the field of democratic theory with the question of 
political anonymity in mind can produce some surprises. Rousseau, whose notion of the 
‘general will’ is a crucial starting-point for so many of the political beliefs that underpin 
participatory and deliberative democracy (as discussed in earlier chapters), also explicitly 
abjures us to avoid deliberation of our political opinions with others. Rousseau believed 
that such discussion could only prove to be a venue for a distortion or manipulation of our 
rational and public-spirited grasp of the general will. We must presume that he considered 
the common good to be so self-evident to a reasoning citizen that surely only those who 
would deliberately seek to subvert it would have grounds to breach political anonymity 
and intrude upon the deliberations of another (Rousseau, 1762 [1987], p. 156). John 
Stuart Mill, on the other hand, was firmly opposed to the then-looming innovation of a 
secret ballot, and on grounds that may best be understood as republican in nature. So 
                                                             
64 Interestingly, Lord John Russell is usually remembered as a thoroughgoing radical, responsible 
for. It is perhaps telling that even the era’s more recognised reformers were capable of blanket 






important is the duty of voting that “like any other public duty, [it] should be performed 
under the eye and criticism of the public” (Mill, 2004 [1861], p. 100). By maintaining 
publicly visible and non-anonymous voting, a polity produces “a powerful inducement to 
adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given” – a clear 
prefiguring of contemporary deliberative democrats’ principle of publicly reasonable, and 
reason-giving, participation.   
In so far as contemporary theorists of direct or deliberative democracy discuss the 
question of anonymity at all, they tend to view it as an obstacle to the improving effects of 
open, personal democratic participation (see, for example, Geoffrey Brennan and Philip 
Pettit’s abjuration to ‘unveil the vote’ (1990). The American constitutional law scholar 
James Gardner, having observed the lack of direct academic engagement with the principle 
of anonymity among democratic theorists, notes that, from any broadly republican 
standpoint, “anonymity seems deeply contrary to the fundamental requirements of a good 
political life” (Gardner, 2011, p. 939).   
The democratic theorists who reject this general stance include Annabelle Lever, who 
situates political privacy as a central democratic principle in itself (Lever, 2011). 
Anonymous voting or the secret ballot are one of a package of important privacy rights 
described by Lever:  
Secret voting for citizens … reflects an important democratic idea: that 
citizens’ rights to vote does not depend on the approval of others, or on the 
demonstration of special virtues, attributes or possessions. While 
democratic rights to freedom of expression and association mean that 
citizens are free to consult anyone they want, the secret ballot means that 
they can share in collectively binding decisions without having to bare 
their souls to anyone who asks. (Lever, Privacy and Democracy: What the 
Secret Ballot Reveals, 2012, p. 12)65 
Anonymity Loss: An Overview 
The secret ballot is thus a measure intended, in part, to prevent external attempts to 
influence an individual's vote by coercion or bribery – a measure to reduce the incidence 
of coerced preference-falsification. This point is crucial for the purposes of the following 
argument. 
                                                             
65 See Brettschneider (Brettschneider, 2007, p. 75) for an alternative argument for secret ballots in 
contemporary theory which is more focused on the prevention of intimidation and manipulation 






Deliberation of the formal, public sort is intrinsically counter-anonymous. On this basis I 
suggest here that deliberation fails in what I highlighted in the previous chapter as the 
second tacit ambition of deliberative democracy – that is, to improve the legitimacy (or 
'authenticity') of democratic outcomes by increasing public 'ownership' of deliberated 
outcomes even where one's own preferences are not adopted. At root, this argument 
states that if people feel that they have had their say, they will be more likely to endorse 
the eventual outcome, whatever that outcome is – a vision of deliberation as a process of 
mandate-maximisation. 
Many of the arguments in favour of deliberation run along the lines that the very 
conditions which rule out anonymity are themselves productive of desirable outcomes. 
Individuals are compelled by a public deliberative process to formulate their views in 
'other-regarding' and 'reason-giving' ways. Unable to hold their political views privately, 
they must subject them to critical consideration and be held accountable for the content or 
implications of their preferences in a more complete way. Thus an important question to 
ask at this juncture is whether there is a particular tendency or bias in the types or manner 
of preference-orderings that might be eliminated or made less likely through deliberation. 
David Miller, as discussed in Chapter Four, offers a systematic understanding of 
inadmissible reasons: for example, deliberation will arguably be capable of rooting out 
beliefs and reasons that are based upon factual claims that are demonstrably wrong: an 
articulation of the Enlightenment concept of reason that is reminiscent of the Folk Theory 
of Democracy described in Chapter Three (Miller, 1992, p. 61). By deliberating, such 
irrational, untrue or mistaken beliefs will be more likely to be systematically challenged, 
and accordingly the preferences that are built upon such beliefs will be more likely to 
change in light of the facts. In questions over political or social morality, however, no self-
evident truths will be forthcoming this deliberative benefit is predicated upon the 
assumed existence of a common moral 'good' – a self-evidently correct course in all cases, 
echoing Rousseau's theoretically insuperable General Will. It is questionable whether 
simply coming to know more about a topic that is subject to essential moral contestation is 
able to produce ‘better’ outcomes in terms of preference-formation. The knowledge that is 
propagated under such circumstances will necessarily be biased by the predilections and 
existing preferences of the deliberators, and the presentation of various viewpoints will 
likely be affected by the scale and nature of the sub-groups making such contributions. 
Finally, it is questionable whether a formal deliberative procedure will be more effective 
for the purposes of information-sharing than some other, less psychologically loaded, 






includes evidence which seems to indicate that increased information is not a reliable 
source of preference change in itself (Kinder, Pape, & Walfish, 1980). 
In addition to factually incorrect claims, Miller suggests that deliberation would be an 
effect means of challenging underlying beliefs that are of particular repugnance to society 
– and should be able to do so through sheer peer-pressure, so that the holders of such 
beliefs would be unwilling to articulate their views in the midst of a deliberative venue 
where they may well be judged for them (Miller, 1992, p. 61). Miller illustrates this with 
“the position of racist beliefs in contemporary Britain”; we could just as well re-introduce 
the example employed above: the position of homosexuals in 1940s Britain. Once again, 
the procedural deliberative value that Miller observes here is contingent on the existence 
of an objectively ‘better’ perspective in all cases subject to deliberative process. While 
deliberation may be a good way of confronting participants with entrenched views with 
the existence of ‘the other’, and of  developing and articulating alternative ways of thinking 
about some issue, it is not clear that a certain standard of public reason is immune from 
simply being a mechanism for the promotion of those same entrenched social norms.  
To be more categorical, two problems arise from the anonymity-loss that intrinsically 
accompanies deliberative democratic fora. First, knowledge of the non-anonymous nature 
of deliberative proceedings could result in the self-exclusion of citizens with unpopular, 
niche or minority points of view. Such individuals would either disengage from the 
political process altogether or attempt to falsify their views over the course of 
deliberation. The impact of these possibilities depends greatly on the importance attached 
to engagement with a process of formalised deliberation in a given society. If deliberation 
is considered an important part of the democratic process and is a key means of the 
dissemination of information to an electorate, the impact would be severe enough; if 
deliberation in some way is directly linked to conventional voting (or replaces it 
wholesale) then the upshot of self-selected absenteeism from the deliberative process 
could result in the categorical and thorough-going disenfranchisement of minority 
opinion. 
The second, related problem associated with anonymity loss is that of the possibility of 
the coercion of those with minority points of view by those that belong to the majority. 
A system like that proposed by James Fishkin – a pre-election national “deliberation day”, 
featuring deliberative events for the public – could constitute a venue for the concerted 
and formalised subjection of minorities to majority points of view. The upshot of such 






legitimise views that differ from those of the majority: deliberation as populism. I argue 
that this at least resembles a process of coercion for preference-change – or, in Goodin's 
words, the implicit requirement to “launder” a given position in order to render it more 
publicly acceptable (Goodin, 2003). Psychological researchers, some of whose results are 
discussed below, go some way to demonstrating just how easily subject to manipulation a 
single individual’s preferences can be to the various pressures of group behaviour. 
The dangers associated with the loss of privately formed and reported preferences take on 
a more sinister aspect given the possibility of future cultural norms that greatly deviate 
from those prevalent now. Intolerance of a racial or cultural minority has been historically 
shown to be capable of materialising very quickly as a societal norm. How would a 
deliberative forum objectively 'improve' the predilections of a citizenry dominated by, for 
example, a racist majority? Where in traditional aggregative constitutional democracies a 
potentially persecuted minority has at least recourse to 'one person, one vote' (and the 
safeguard of declaring this preference in secret), an institutionally deliberative democracy 
could, in its drive for consensus, offer it only the opportunity to self-disenfranchise.66  
Social Psychology and Democratic Theory 
Many of the claims deployed by political theorists would seem, from the perspective of 
social psychology, to be research questions with potential empirical answers, and the 
various studies and analyses of group behaviour present in the wide social-psychological 
literature is worthy of survey and review with theoretical claims in mind. Even during the 
current “empirical turn” in deliberative democratic theory, however, little attempt is made 
to engage with existing psychological research, or to generate useful new psychological 
insights (beyond the very well-established – and rather unsurprising – fact that 
deliberation tends to improve participants’ knowledge-levels (Price & Capella, 2002; 
Barabas, 2004; Fishkin, When the People Speak, 2009). Yet increased knowledge is not a 
complete justification for deliberation in itself, as Shawn Rosenberg has argued (2014, p. 
109). 
                                                             
66 It is worth noting again that many deliberative democrats state as their objective something 
other than outright consensus. This thesis in part involves the assertion that formal deliberation 
can lead to either polarised or consensus-generating outcomes – but, more importantly, that 
individual preferences are difficult to change, and that changed preferences are not necessarily 







There is a high potential for collaborative scholarship between the fields of democratic 
theory and social psychology. For example, a psychological study could provide statistical 
weight for a theoretical claim, or attach falsifiability conditions to assertions which would 
otherwise remain only ideal or abstract in nature. Political theorists, meanwhile, could 
provide far more nuanced analytical and interpretive frameworks than social 
psychologists generally tend to use. Despite this fertile ground, however, it is striking how 
infrequently democratic theorists engage with social psychology, and vice-versa.67  
This infrequency of interdisciplinarity has exceptions, however. Cass Sunstein's books 
Infotopia and Why Societies Need Dissent provide a well-researched summary of the impact 
of several group behaviours documented in psychological research, and their 
ramifications for other social sciences (Sunstein, 2003b; Sunstein, 2006). In this chapter I 
will engage with the evidence around what is known as ‘groupthink’, and some of its 
attendant psychological side-effects, such as ‘information cascades’. Perhaps most 
pertinently for deliberative democracy, Sunstein has also set out what he calls the “law” of 
group polarisation, which states that the “members of a deliberating group predictably 
move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ 
predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein, 2003a, p. 81). This is a claim about human 
psychology, and is thus testable by psychological research, which Sunstein compares with 
the outcomes of James Fishkin’s experiments in deliberative polling, finding that these 
moderated events confirmed the psychological experiments in a “significant” number of 
cases (Ibid., p. 98).68 Sunstein also had a hand in another original study which found that 
deliberation is generally productive of reduced diversity of opinion and that the 
polarisation phenomenon persisted even when the final statements of personal opinion 
were conducted anonymously (Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2010). This finding has 
                                                             
67 To take one example, Benjamin Barber dedicates an entire 25-page chapter of his book Strong 
Democracy to consideration of “the psychological frame”, and does not reference a single 
psychological study or established idea from the field of psychology therein (Barber, 1984, pp. 67-
92). 
68 Many of the social-psychological phenomena catalogued by Cass Sunstein in Infotopia indicate 
that, for certain kinds of decisions, the wider the range of individual opinions that are aggregated 
together, the more closely the collective decision will track the truth (assuming, of course, that the 
case in question is dealing with some kind of ascertainable truth-value). For example, the old 
fairground activity of guessing the weight of an animal or the number of beans in a jar often show 
that the average of all guesses is closest to the truth. This is greatly encouraging until one realises 
that, to paraphrase The Marquis de Condorcet, if we assume that more than half of the 
participants are more than half-likely to make a decent guess, the average of all guesses will iron 
out the outliers and lie somewhere in the middle of all the decent overshoots and reasonable fall-
shorts. In any case, deliberative procedures may not be the ideal means of capturing a 'wisdom-of-
crowds' effect, which actually bears more resemblance to a market of individual value-setters 






obvious implications for this chapter, showing that a public deliberative process can have 
potentially undesirable psychological side-effects even if followed by anonymous voting 
and aggregation. 
Rosenberg (2014) offers a recent attempt to inject psychological realism into discussions 
about deliberative democracy, focusing on the limited extent to which deliberative norms 
and expectations are likely to correct for established psychological limits to analytical 
capacities (pp. 102-4), self-evaluation (pp. 105-6) and communicative competence (pp. 
107-8). Importantly, Rosenberg also explains the weakness of several attempts to measure 
changes in participants’ reasoning or coherence: Gastil and Dillard (1999) equate 
coherence with the ‘clustering’ of participants’ preferences around pre-established 
ideological stances (so that one is more coherent if one’s preferences all seem typical of 
conservatism, rather than distributed among conservatism, liberalism and socialism). This 
measure of coherence seems extremely weak, driven as it is by normative (rather than 
fundamental) conceptions of coherent political positions, and so can only measure the 
extent of an individual’s social learning and adherence to the established norms of a given 
context (Rosenberg, p. 109).  
Some of the methodological issues which are sometimes neglected by contributors to the 
literature on deliberative democracy are of particular importance. Joshua Cohen’s 
engagements with psychological research, for example, illustrate the potential advantages 
of engaging with social psychology literature, but also provide an example of the kind of 
problems and contradictions which can be introduced by reference to evidence from 
another field of study. In a simplified extrapolation from social psychology findings, he 
sets out how group behaviour tends to produce difficult circumstances for individuals who 
find themselves outside, or on the periphery of, the group in question (Cohen, 2009, p. 
255). Cohen proceeds to argue that procedural changes can be made in order to create 
space for minority views. However, this engagement with psychological literature leaves 
Cohen at risk of self-contradiction – for, in endorsing the capacity of deliberative processes 
to effect preference change in their participants he at first venerates, and then finds 
problematic for minorities, the very same set of psychological effects. 
Other theorists have engaged more directly with the problem of anonymity, and the way 
that it is explored in social psychology. James Gardner, for example, offers an excellent 
overview of the complicated interactions between anonymity and other conditions in a 
multitude of non-political circumstances, as observed by social psychologists (Gardner, 






extract further insights relevant to the problem of anonymity-loss from some other social-
psychological sources, including some classic contributions to the field, many of which did 
not set out to specifically examine the effects of anonymity. The core literature of social 
psychology carries implications for anonymity loss that, for the most part, Gardner does 
not engage with. 
It may prove helpful to establish some of the methodological and terminological norms of 
social psychology – particularly the branch of that discipline that is particularly concerned 
with the dynamics of group behaviour, exclusion and ostracism – before presenting such 
studies directly. The academic language used by social psychologists also seems to have an 
important bearing on the explanatory and theoretical frameworks they employ in order to 
interpret the results of their research.  
One central set of assumptions that many social psychologists appear to adhere to 
operates around the distinction between ‘compliance’ and ‘internalisation’, which may 
both be categorised as types of persuasion. ‘Compliance’, in general, is used to describe an 
individual acceding to or agreeing with the perspective of another individual or group 
without actually updating their internal preferences – in essence, it is the psychological 
state of ‘going along with’ something that is contrary to internal beliefs, of ‘faking’ 
agreement. This contrasts with the state of ‘internalisation’, which indicates real 
preference change as a result of the influence or information brought to bear by another 
person or group. Herbert Kelman describes an additional, third type of attitude change, 
‘identification’, which more specifically describes a shift in stated preferences due not to 
an internalisation of persuasive new information or arguments, but specifically so as to 
associate oneself more closely with a given group or person (Kelman, 1958, p. 53). 
‘Identification’ is arguably distinct from ‘compliance’ because it is a positively-motivated 
cause of preference change, resulting in induced behaviours that an individual actually 
believes, rather than a falsehood that is maintained in order to avoid censure. For the 
purposes of our discussion, we shall follow a great deal of the psychological literature 
(emulating, for example, Clark McCauley in his discussion of the relationship between 
social influence and ‘groupthink’ (1989)) in allowing ‘identification’, as Kelman describes 
the phenomenon, to be categorised as a subset of ‘compliance’.  
One appropriate question may arise here for the democratic theorist: how, and on what 
basis, do we distinguish between ‘compliance’ and ‘internalisation’? If there is no clear 
answer to this question – and we should perhaps bear in mind the burgeoning explanatory 






the differences between these two mental states at some future point – then perhaps this 
is a distinction which ought to be set aside altogether. There are other, similarly 
problematic questions – over, for example, the normative implications of internalisation. 
Are we to understand this as evidence of a human’s susceptibility to ‘brainwashing’, or as 
the fundamental basis for a more positive tendency toward reasoned agreement? 
Moreover, what difference would it make to a democratic outcome if, for example, we had 
reason to believe that a winning margin of voters were not internally persuaded, but in 
fact made to feel that they ought to comply?  
There are other tendencies within the literature of Social Psychology that are worthy of 
some preliminary consideration. The field has a particular way of referring to the extent of 
an individual’s propensity to think carefully about the information or arguments with 
which they are presented. The range of behaviours observable here are described in terms 
of ‘need for cognition’, or NFC. People who seem to avoid detailed thinking in this sense 
are described as being ‘low in need for cognition’, while those who find some value in 
careful consideration are said to be ‘high in need for cognition’. I would characterise this 
terminology as polite; other social scientists, in their discussions of individuals who appear 
disinterested in furthering their political knowledge, typically pull fewer punches (even as 
they sometimes characterise such behaviour as being in line with a model of ‘rational 
ignorance’). Psychological studies focused specifically on NFC have revealed some 
interesting and politically relevant results. For example, high NFC does not appear to be 
particularly linked with a tendency for ‘open-mindedness’ (Fleischhauer, Enge, Brocke, 
Ullrich, Strobel, & Strobel, 2009); while it may seem intuitively correct to associate careful 
thinking with the capacity to adjust preferences in the face of new arguments or evidence, 
this is not necessarily borne out by the psychological literature. This way of understanding 
human epistemic engagement could therefore contribute part of an alternative analysis of 
the evidence of widespread public ignorance presented in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Other findings in the field of social psychology take on a different aspect under careful 
theoretical scrutiny. In particular it is important at the outset of this survey to engage with 
one set of findings which are, at first glance, potentially damaging to the thesis being put 
forward in this chapter. Many studies have been conducted with the intention of 
discovering the ‘freeing’ effects of anonymous, rather than non-anonymous, speech 
situations. Interestingly, these studies have sometimes failed to find a significant tendency 
toward increased sincerity under anonymous circumstances (Pearlin, 1961; Malvin & 
Moskowitz, 1983; Gardner, 2011, p. 945). These findings, while significant and repeated, 






psychological experiments seem to have yielded results which are at least indicative of 
some difference in individual behaviour when their standing within a certain group is at 
stake (some of which are discussed below). It may be that the potential impact of 
identifiability and anonymity may best be discussed within the context of group behaviour 
and the impact of the threat, perceived or otherwise, of social exclusion or ostracism.  
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, it is worth noting that these studies are 
analysing substantive results – visible behaviours in the participants of each experiment. 
What is not measured by these experiments is the possible psychological and behavioural 
impact of the potential for identifiability. Specifically, if a citizen is more likely to self-
exclude from political participation (rather than falsify their views) as a result of the 
perceived threat to their standing within a certain group that might be posed by their 
identifiability with unpopular political views, then such self-exclusion would be 
impossible to measure in psychological experiments of this sort. The participants in these 
studies, by dint of their very participation, have not had the opportunity to choose not to 
participate, or simply represent the set of individuals who are happy to participate even in 
the face of publicising their views. The political context is thus rather different from the 
experimental ones that have yielded these results, a fact that must be borne in mind 
throughout the following survey. 
This chapter now turns to a consideration of evidence from psychological research, and its 
implications for deliberative and non-anonymous politics. 
Persuasion, Attitude and Change  
Social Psychology has developed several explanatory models for the processes of attitude-
change and persuasion.69 The ‘Hovland-Yale Model’ was inspired by an attempt to explain 
the apparent effectiveness of the state propaganda employed during the Second World 
War for shifting popular beliefs and attitudes (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, Communication 
and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change., 1953). It sets out several very 
broad features that are considered to be of central importance to the ultimate 
persuasiveness of a communication:  
1. The attributes of the communicator – their perceived expertise, 
trustworthiness, likeability, status, similarity to the audience, and so on. 
                                                             
69 For the sake of clarity: the Oxford Dictionary of Psychology defines persuasion as "the process by 
which attitude change is brought about", while attitude can be defined as "an enduring pattern of 






2. The nature of the communication – whether it is built around emotional content, 
perceptions of its fairness (‘fairness’, in this context, being the extent to which the 
communication honestly presents several sides of an argument), and its explicit or 
implied conclusions.  
3. The characteristics of the audience – their initial position relative to the stance 
of the speaker, their intelligence and personality traits, and their self-esteem. 
These features would together dictate the lion’s share of the persuasiveness of a given 
communication. Its effect is understood by this model to operate over four distinct 
processing stages:  
a. The extent to which attention is paid to communication,  
b. The extent to which content of attentively-received communication is actually 
understood,  
c. How much of the content of this understood communication is also accepted,  
d. The extent of retention of received, understood and accepted communication. 
Finally, the model also sets out the ways in which persuasiveness can be determined. 
Successfully persuasive communications might effect changes in opinion, behaviour, 
knowledge, perception, or emotional responses on the part of its audience. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its broadness, there is substantial evidence in support of 
this model. Studies have shown that otherwise-identical communications are more 
persuasive when they are presented as originating from sources that are considered to be 
more prestigious or authoritative: for example, the contents of a communication are 
considered to be more reliable if they originate from a medical journal rather than from a 
newspaper (Hovland & Weiss, 1951). Prestige can also be communicated on the basis of 
personal qualities that, on the face of things, should have no bearing on the authenticity or 
reliability of their thought processes. Beautiful people are more likely to be persuasive, for 
example, which at least partially explains why advertisers use attractive people to 
advertise products which don’t necessarily have anything to do with enhancing 
attractiveness (sometimes known as the ‘halo effect’) (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983). 
This model also seems to have accurately predicted the importance of the appearance of 
even-handedness in a persuasive communication. Accounting for alternative explanations 
or arguments seems to be more persuasive than simply presenting a one-sided account 






representation of various responses to a given argument will ultimately create a context 
that is generally beneficial for the most persuasive argument – a good reason, perhaps, for 
the holders of popular views to engage in public deliberation (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & 
Sheffield, 1949). Threatening messages, meanwhile, seem to be persuasive if they also 
incorporate the notion that threats are avoidable. The most persuasive anti-smoking 
messages, for example, emphasise the risks of tobacco while at the same time arguing that 
giving up is plausible (Sturges & Rogers, 1996).  
The traits of the audience are also a significant factor. Individuals who are defined as being 
highly ‘in-need-of-cognition’ tend to be more influenced by strong arguments (within the 
terms of the Hovland-Yale model), whereas weaker arguments gain more traction with 
low need-for-cognition individuals (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). This is a result that 
perhaps confirms our intuitions; as other studies show, it seems reasonable that 
knowledge and familiarity about a given topic would render an individual less susceptible 
to attitude change (Eagly & Carli, 1981). In fact, informational content seems to be of 
minimal significance to the persuasiveness of a communication. More informative 
communications do not necessarily bring about changes in behaviour or attitude – the 
other attributes of a communication seem to be far more important (Kinder, Pape, & 
Walfish, 1980). 
The Hovland-Yale model is not universally confirmed by experimentation, then. 
Interestingly, studies have not found much basis to support this model's claim that self-
esteem is important for ease-of-persuasion.  
Alternative models have been developed – of particular importance is the Elaboration 
Likelihood model, which appears to be of widespread and increasing importance within 
the field of social psychology (Petty & Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion, 1986). The Elaboration Likelihood model argues that "people are generally 
motivated to hold [what they perceive to be] correct attitudes", and will engage in a range 
of behaviours in order to do so. According to this model, there are two distinct ways of 
processing persuasive messages - the Central Route, involving detailed and systematic 
consideration of a given communication’s substantive argument, and the Peripheral Route, 
where influence may originate from features other than the actual contents of the 
communication, such as the number of reasons given, the perceived nature of the speaker, 
and so on.  
Individuals with high ability, motivation, and 'need for cognition' are more likely to 






relevant knowledge or 'need for cognition' are more likely to use the Peripheral Route. 
Evidence for such divergent processing is provided by Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman 
(1981), whose study indicates that students were more likely to critically analyse plans for 
an exam that would affect them than one which would not. The personal salience of a 
communication thus increases an individual’s ‘need for cognition’, which in turn increases 
the depth of their engagement with said communication. This is an interesting finding. If 
epistemic engagement is at least partially predicated upon the salience or closeness of a 
given communication’s importance to an individual’s perceived concerns and best 
interests, then perhaps more reasonable decision-making and participation is likely to be 
found when individuals consider local, specifically targeted information – and perhaps the 
very act of introducing larger-scaled, nationally-but-not-personally salient questions to 
individuals will tend to direct their responses through Peripheral Route processing.  
Meanwhile, when responses to a given communication are channelled through the 
Peripheral Route, studies show that individuals are more likely to endorse a certain 
argument if they perceive that the argument is popular among other people (Axsom, Yates, 
& Chaiken, 1987). In a deliberative context, this raises some serious questions about the 
validity of persuasion. If popularity is a motivator for endorsement where individuals are 
less motivated to be engaged with the particularities of a given argument, then this may be 
perceived to be an in-built cognitive bias towards the views of a given majority.70  
Conformity 
Social Psychologists have devoted considerable effort to the exploration of the human 
tendency toward conformity, and no discussion of the possible psychological effects of 
anonymity-free deliberation would be complete without an engagement with the wealth of 
evidence that their studies have produced.  
The most defining of classic studies of human conformity are also among the most 
ethically controversial, as in the case of the (in)famous Stanford Prison Experiment 
(Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), whose findings (that under certain conditions, a 
significant percentage of human beings are quite liable to treat each other punitively 
and/or coercively when instructed or allowed to do so by perceived authority figures) 
caused massive social consternation, coming only a short time after, and seeming to 
confirm beyond doubt, Hannah Arendt’s argument that “evil” is “banal”: that perfectly 
                                                             
70 This finding seems to have particular potential for the study of democracy. It could help to 
explain, for example, the idea that greater social pluralisation has in fact resulted in a narrowing, 






ordinary people are capable of terrible acts when a specific set of norms and socially 
influential conditions pertain (Arendt, 1963 [2006]). 
Studies of the propensity to conform with expectations or perceived group norms do not 
need to also coincide with an examination of the human relationship with ‘evil’, however. 
Some early studies of conformity are worthy of consideration.  Jenness’ very early (1932) 
experiment found that participants’ second estimates of the number of beans in a jar 
would shift significantly towards the group's estimate following a short discussion. 
Unfortunately, given the parameters of this study, it is unclear whether such an outcome is 
properly to be understood as the result of normative social influence, some version of a 
‘wisdom of crowds’ or ‘cognitive diversity’ effect, or some combination of both. 
Sherif produced more interesting results with his tests of conformity in an ambiguous 
situation, themselves a more focused discussion of an effect catalogued by Adams as early 
as 1912. Sherif’s study was portrayed to participants as an examination of the so-called 
‘autokinetic effect’, where it is possible to perceive fixed images as moving given a lack of 
other visual stimuli (Sherif, 1935). The participants were placed in a darkened room, 
where the only visible feature was a pinpoint of light. Most believed that the light was 
moving. Interestingly, however, when invited to discuss the experiment with fellow 
participants, the individual descriptions of the motion of the point of light converged.  
Solomon Asch’s ‘line lengths’ experiments provide a powerful and well-known 
demonstration of normative social influence (Asch, 1951). Around a third (32%) of 
participants who were asked to compare the lengths of two lines would tend to modify 
their answers when in the company of a group of confederates who were instructed to 
give identical, incorrect responses. Perhaps more interestingly, about 75% of participants 
would conform at least once over the course of a series of experiments, with slightly 
different proportions of stooges to naives and experimental designs. Making the task of 
comparing the line lengths slightly more difficult – by making the lengths more similar – 
predictably resulted in higher levels of conformity. During the interviews following the 
experiments, some participants would say that they deliberately gave the incorrect 
answer so as not to be excluded or 'appear different'; others thought a mistake had been 
made and that they didn't want to hurt the study by being the only one to disagree; still 
others genuinely seemed to have come to believe that the group's incorrect answer had in 
fact been the truth.  
Asch found that unanimity of opposition appeared to play an important part in the 






voice, correctly answering the question about the relative lengths of the lines, was often 
enough to encourage participants to disagree with the majority of stooges. Beyond this, 
the scale of the majority seemed to play little part in influence once beyond a ration of 
around three stooges to one volunteer. Thus "a unanimous majority of three is, under the 
given conditions, far more effective than a majority of eight containing one dissenter". But, 
as other studies determined, this reduction in conformity when supported by at least one 
other participant appeared to vanish when dealing with opinions rather than perception 
tests (Allen & Levine, 1971).71  
(Interestingly, it is possible to see the effects of strong in-group behaviour when the line-
lengths experiment is reversed. With 16 naïve participants and only one stooge 
deliberately giving an incorrect answer, the experiment would degenerate as the stooge 
became subject to open mockery and ridicule!). 
Most significantly for the prospects of a non-anonymous politics, privacy when offering 
answers to questions about the relative length of the lines was shown to significantly 
reduce the scale of conformity to an obviously-incorrect majority opinion. Under private 
conditions, conformity was reduced in both Asch’s original experiment (from 32% to 
12.5%) and in repetitions of the study conducted by Deutsch and Gerard (1955). 
The significance of the line-lengths experiment is magnified by this generally high level of 
replicability, as shown in studies by Crutchfield (1955), Larsen et al. (1979), and Abrams 
et al. (1990), who established that the strength of normative social influence appears to be 
magnified when naïve participants perceive the influencing stooges to be a part of their 
‘in-group’ during his repeat of the line-lengths experiment. Crutchfield’s electronic version 
of the experiment is also worthy of specific consideration. Participants were placed in 
booths and told that they were the last respondent, before being presented with a series of 
lights to indicate the responses of ‘previous’ participants in order to create the impression 
of an incorrect majority. Crutchfield found 30% conformity with incorrect answers on an 
Asch-style line-lengths test, as well as with a test that required participants to input the 
last number in a series. Even higher levels of conformity (46%) were discovered when 
participants were asked to decide the larger of two shapes. 
Crutchfield’s results have an interesting bearing on any theoretical argument regarding 
the effects of anonymity. By placing participants in booths and simulating a body of 
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incorrect ‘public’ or ‘peer’ opinion to expose to participants, the immediate effects of peer-
pressure and other such group dynamics were arguably removed. The nevertheless high 
levels of conformity suggest either that one of the driving motivations of answer-
falsification was an effort to not appear to be inadequate in the eyes of those conducting 
the experiment, or that, once felt, normative social influence is capable of enormous 
influence even in a private, relatively anonymous setting. It is worth noting that secretly 
balloted democratic processes are more anonymous than most psychological experiments 
where, unless special efforts are made to convince them otherwise, participants will be 
conscious of the fact that, at a minimum, the administrators and designers of the 
experiments they participate in will be aware of the answers that are given.  
At a certain point, it became clear to psychologists that their understanding of conformity 
in groups would need to be more nuanced if it were to accommodate the very different 
types of behaviours that intuitively appear to be conformist. On the one hand, it seems 
likely that many individuals, under the psychological pressure exerted by normative social 
influence, would strategically modulate the presentation of their opinions in order to 
conform. Other individuals, however, seemed to become convinced not only that they 
should conform with the beliefs of a strong majority of their peers, but also that they 
would be right to do so, having been convinced (or having convinced themselves) that 
they were initially incorrect and, like a small percentage of the participants in Asch’s line-
lengths experiments or Rousseau’s notional citizen who mistook the true public interest, 
actually adopt a new perspective or belief.  
Psychological scholarship presents this distinction as one between compliance (where an 
individual conforms with a majority, concerned about the consequences of their 
difference, but keeps their private opinions unaltered) and internalisation (where a 
genuine ‘change of heart’ has been produced). Psychologists have varied in their 
explanation of the bases for these differences. Deutsche & Gerard (1955) tended to ascribe 
internalisation less to normative social influence than to ‘informational social influence’, 
suggesting that it would be more common for an individual to change their mind if 
presented with strong new evidence that contradicted their original stance and supported 
the majority’s, creating the conditions for what Mann (1969) refers to as “true 
conformity”. Insko et al. (1983) develop a more nuanced and more plausible view, where 
normative and informational social influence are both entailed in the productions of both 
kinds of conformity, inter-relating with each other in complex and all-but-untraceable 






fully problematized – concept of ‘information’, which cannot be considered to be wholly 
distinct from strategic normative communication.72 
Groupthink and Group Dynamics: Inclusion and Exclusion 
When political theorists turn their attention to the possible psychological effects of 
decision-making group dynamics, they will often turn first to the concept of ‘groupthink’, 
which has developed in its usage into a kind of catch-all term for failures of reason due to 
group dynamics that, for whatever reasons, prevent cognitive diversity. Irving Janis' 
(1972) original definition of the social-psychological phenomenon he called 'groupthink' 
is that it constitutes “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply 
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” ('T Hart, 1994, p. 9). 
This description, through several iterations and re-formulations, remains succinct and 
useful (even if, as 'T Hart points out, it seems to confusingly incorporate process, outcome 
and possible causes). The simplest, most effectively reduced definition, in ‘T Hart's words, 
would be any situation where a group dynamic tends individuals towards “excessive 
concurrence-seeking” (‘T Hart, 1994, p.7). Meanwhile, the closed-door decision-making of 
the Kennedy administration leading up to and during the Bay of Pigs Invasion has become 
a classic example of groupthink-in-action within the political sphere. 
Groupthink, however, may simply be the most politically visible product of the 
psychologically hard-wired tendencies that are often observed in the interactions between 
individuals and the social groups within which they operate and relate to one another. At 
its most fundamental level, the social psychology of group behaviour is marked by a strong 
desire to belong, and this desire appears to be strong enough to motivate a variety of 
behaviours, many of which would seem undesirable from the perspective of the 
deliberative democrat. The human desire for belonging may be the main motivator for the 
tendencies toward conformity set out above, and may even underpin what social 
psychologists refer to as ‘pluralistic ignorance’, where entirely untrue assumptions about 
the beliefs of an in-group of peers are adhered to, against the private preferences of the 
individual, so as to more completely conform with local norms (Kitts, 2003). The designers 
of democratic and deliberative experiments may feel compelled to avoid the intuitive 
implications of such tendencies, and so structure deliberative fora in such a way as to 
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minimise the impact of the automatic social groupings that will arise based on similarity of 
stated reasons and political sentiments.  
Cohesiveness – as a group-psychological phenomenon – is the subject of a considerable 
body of research, producing multiple definitions and research frameworks, and remains, 
according to 'T Hart, an “elusive” concept (‘T Hart, 1994, p. 32). It is the product of 
multiple causes, some of which remain unknown to psychological research, and any 
hierarchy within this array of causes is contextually variable and difficult to determine. 
The history of the analysis of group cohesiveness is worthy of academic research in itself, 
and 'T Hart's book would provide a strong beginning to such an effort. Briefly, the most 
broadly used understanding of cohesiveness seems to have shifted between two notions in 
the latter half of the Twentieth Century. A broadly-defined post-war definition deployed 
by Festinger (1950) and others, which described cohesion as revolving around a range of 
factors which increase individual- and group-based 'attraction', seems to have been 
generally discarded in favour of a revisionist approach which prioritises a negatively-
framed idea of cohesion (as exemplified by Cartwright and Zander (1968)), addressing 
questions such as: how do groups react to external pressures or divisive conditions? Is 
there a positive correlation between cohesiveness and a group-averse 'external' 
environment?  
The self-perceived status of an individual within a wider group is often an extremely 
important contributor to the wider psychological health of that individual. However, the 
definition and boundaries of groups – and the ways in which ‘membership’ and conformity 
to their norms can be achieved – are complex considerations in their own right. Some 
groups and sources of identity may revolve around purely descriptive concerns; one’s race 
or ethnicity may appear to be enough to qualify one’s membership for some groups, for 
example. In other groups, however, a nuanced pattern of behaviour, or the demonstration 
of the holding of certain key values, may be crucial. These different elements may also 
interact in subtle ways. For example, is it better – more conducive to group inclusion - to 
‘appear’ (descriptively) to belong to a certain group while acting in contravention of their 
norms, or to be an ‘outsider’ by appearances while agreeing strongly with the groups 
established set of beliefs and prescribed behaviours? Such questions as to the nature of 
groups and the basis for their coherence are frequently the basis for study by social 
psychologists, and may be able to shed some light on the kinds of group behaviours that 






One popular psychological approach to such questions is known as Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory, wherein individuals are thought to behave in ways that they 
consider to maximise the chances of achieving a balance between group inclusion on the 
one hand and individual distinctiveness on the other. This balancing act is thought to 
underlie all questions of social inclusion. In general, it is thought that individuality and 
consistency of the self is often calculated to be of lesser valuable than group membership. 
Interestingly, the objective of maximised belonging may also be served by a maximisation 
of the gap between different groups, which creates the opportunity for more clear-cut self-
identification with one group or another. As Pickett, Silver and Brewer put it: 
Because social groups satisfy very basic human needs (belonging, security, 
and assimilation), the potential loss of that group membership (as 
signalled by marginal ingroup status) can be extremely threatening. In 
response to this threat, individuals may attempt to change the self to 
become more prototypical, that is, engage in processes such as self-
stereotyping. However, because prototypicality is determined by both 
intragroup similarity and intergroup differences, marginal group members 
should also be very concerned (perhaps hyper-concerned) with 
maintaining clear intergroup distinctions and the integrity of ingroup and 
outgroup boundaries (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002, p. 107).  
Potential political implications of these group dynamics have been explored in some 
detail. For example, Castelli and Carraro tested ingroup responses to members performing 
different leadership functions: one sought to maximise benefit for the ingroup by selecting 
policies which would be of high utility to both ingroup and outgroup members. The other 
was determinedly decision-seeking, and briefed to select policies which would benefit the 
ingroup while specifically not benefiting any outgroup. Their findings clearly indicated 
that the distinctiveness-maximising leader was preferred. Managers who created many 
more jobs in total, but reserved a lower percentage of them for local people, would tend to 
be less well-liked than a manager who created far fewer new positions but dedicated the 
majority of them to locals alone (Castelli & Carraro, 2010, p. 889).  
Abrams et al. (2005) distinguish between 'pro-norm' deviance and 'anti-norm' deviance 
within groups. 'Pro-norm' deviants – that is, individuals who are literally (denotatively) 
different but act pursuant to the same prescriptive norms as the majority of the in-group – 
can tend to be tolerated far beyond 'anti-norm' deviants: individuals who share the 
attributes of the in-group but are critical of established norms or open-minded to external 
norms.  
In other words, group exclusion seems to be predicated more upon the views of individuals 






factionality may plausibly arise from the apparent or stated political stances of individuals 
in a deliberative setting. And, more significantly, these findings provide a basis for the 
concern that such a setting would also produce undesirable outcomes, with a views-based 
group tending to become more resistant to counter-arguments, rather than less, and more 
generally extreme in its perspective, instead of more consensus-oriented: 
This may hold the key to group extremity shifts, groupthink, and 
polarization … whereby a group's norms may become increasingly extreme 
under the influence of pro-norm deviants. As groups become more 
extreme, their “moderate” (i.e., anti-norm) members may lose the ear of 
the group, be vilified and either conform or be rejected. Thus, for all kinds 
of group decisions it may be that voices or reason – those who 
countenance the views of outgroups, for example, may be disregarded, 
coerced into conformity, and seen as vindicating the group's norm. … 
[F]orcing groups together may result in a hardening of intergroup norm 
differences, and a resistance to change rather than integration and 
tolerance (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & Viki, 2005, p. 182).  
 
Many of the most interesting psychological effects of group membership are observed in 
the behaviours of individuals who are at greater risk of being alienated from a certain 
ingroup. In general, occupying such marginal positions within a group’s structure seems to 
trigger more pro-ingroup behaviours, and a stronger tendency to vilify and isolate 
members who are peripheral, non-prototypical or external to the ingroup. For example, 
the more tenuous an individual’s association with an ingroup, the more likely are they to 
think and speak negatively about the outgroup-proper (and, in turn, the more likely that 
the vilified members of the outgroup will cohere more closely to one another as well) 
(Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999; Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995). Internally, they will also tend to direct greater 
criticism toward ingroup members who do not adhere very closely to ingroup norms 
(Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). These tendencies may help to explain some of the other 
features of group dynamics, some of which pose a risk for counter-anonymous, public 
deliberation as a venue for democratic participation, such as polarisation. Similarly, there 
are also implications here for the kinds of engagement which might be plausible in such a 
public deliberative scenario. Membership of a certain ‘faction’ during deliberation may not 
be the relatively simple business of agreeing or disagreeing (or seeming to agree or 
disagree) with others on a certain perspective or issue. Individuals on the periphery of a 
certain group, either descriptively or in terms of the strength or nature of their agreement, 
may come under significant psychological pressure to reach greater states of conformity, 






given group’s perspective. So it is not surprising that psychological researchers should 
find that 
perceivers systematically provided more positive spontaneous evaluations 
toward ingroup members who favoured the ingroup ... rather than 
behaving in an egalitarian way. ... Overall, respondents verbally appreciated 
egalitarian behaviours and this was probably due to the greater social 
desirability of fairness norms as compared to discriminatory norms. 
However, responses on more subtle measures indicated that the 
favouritism toward the ingroup gave rise to the most positive evaluations 
(Castelli & Carraro, 2010, pp. 881-2) 
 
These tendencies – toward the reinforcement of internal group norms, the desire to 
present oneself as prototypical so as to cohere with group peers, and the reactive 
strengthening of outgroups-as-ingroups upon the perception of prejudicial or 
exclusionary treatment – carry significant implication for the conduct of all public politics, 
and deliberative democracy in particular. So much of deliberative democratic theory can 
be understood as a structured attempt to escape the intuitively-understood power of such 
spontaneous group dynamics: the relevant question for deliberative democrats must 
necessarily be whether a political discussion forum can possibly exist without also 
importing, or even magnifying, these psychological tendencies.  
The outcome that people appear to instinctively avoid in their engagement in cohesive 
group behaviours such as those set out above is that of exclusion or ostracism. The 
following section considers the effects of ostracism, and the possible impact of even the 
threat of ostracism on behaviour. 
Ostracism: Risk and Effect 
The complex relationships between individuals and groups – the extent to which 
individuals seem willing to adopt a group’s interests over their own, to falsify or modify 
their behaviour in order to cohere with the norms and expectations of others, and thus to 
‘belong’ – is often explained in terms of the psychological effects of ostracism. In his 
conclusion to the final chapter of his survey of the psychological implications of ostracism, 
The Power of Silence, Kipling D. Williams writes most explicitly about fear of ostracism and 
the potential psychological leverage of ostracism-avoidance:  
Fear of rejection and exclusion has for years been assumed to explain the 
power of groups to influence individuals. In order to belong and be 
included, we conform, comply, obey, engage in groupthink, stereotype out-






group, we risk being excluded, ignored, and rejected; we risk being 
ostracised (Williams, 2001, p. 258).  
 
In a situation where potentially contentious political questions come under direct 
discussion – as in, for example, a formal deliberative forum – one plausible psychological 
effect is ostracism, or the threat of the same. Individuals or minorities who find 
themselves in disagreement with a wider majority could find themselves to be isolated if 
they pursue their side of an argument – with implications both for their ability to argue 
well (that is, the quality of their ‘speech situation’, as Habermas might have it), and for 
their societal situation beyond the debating chamber.  
Ostracism – the act of being severed from communication with others, and particularly 
with the other members of some group – has significant psychological ramifications for 
humans. Indeed, merely the perception of the threat of ostracism is itself often enough to 
trigger behaviour change in test subjects. The effects of ostracism is itself the subject of a 
number of studies, some of which also provide valuable insight into the lengths that 
people might go to in order to avoid situations which may result in their being ostracised 
from a group. For example, Williams describes the effects of one study involving 
psychology students who are asked to whistle-blow on a cheating colleague (who is, of 
course, a confederate of the designers of the experiment). Whistle-blowers were 
subsequently ostracised by the other test-takers, with effects indicating diminished self-
esteem and many of the other hallmarks of clinical depression (Williams, 2001, p. 203). 
Just as interesting, however, is the fact that this study suggests the rarity of whistle-
blowing when in a minority position. 
The experiment involves a group of psychology students who have been offered extra 
credit for doing maths problems under time constraints. Three people take the test under 
each iteration of the study: two confederates, and only one participant or volunteer. They 
are given explicit instructions that they must not use anything to help them with the test.  
One of the confederates, during the test, starts to make use of a concealed calculator (in 
full view of the participant) and completes the test with ease. After the exam, the 
administrator of the test gives a series of opportunities for the participant to ‘whistle-
blow’ on the cheating confederate: first immediately after the test, and secondly when 
filling in a questionnaire afterwards, which includes a question explicitly asking if anyone 
was seen to cheat (p. 201). If the participant still does not whistle-blow, the experimenter 






7% of participants whistle-blew immediately after the test, at the first opportunity to do 
so. 77% whistle-blew when filling in the questionnaire, another 12% in response to the 
first question, and a further 2% in response to the second and third questions 
respectively.  
While only 2% of participants failed to whistle-blow altogether, it is interesting to note 
that the overwhelming majority of participants (93%) were unwilling to make a claim 
against a fellow participant while in their presence, underscoring the significance of 
anonymous or non-public circumstances for the behaviour of individuals who have reason 
to fear ostracism. The main part of whistle-blowing took place under the anonymous 
conditions of the written questionnaire, and 16% of whistle-blowers resisted speaking 
against their fellow test-takers until directly questioned, of whom 4% needed several 
direct questions.  
It seems reasonable to draw a number of conclusions from this study. The fear of, or at 
least the willingness to avoid, ostracism and direct confrontation led to a very general 
unwillingness to whistle-blow while in the physical presence of the ‘cheater’. This 
situation broadly reversed under circumstances which were private and anonymous in 
nature, during the follow-up questionnaire (though a significant minority of participants 
were unwilling to risk any social stigma even under these conditions).  
There are obviously risks entailed when attempting to export such conclusions to political 
theory, but it nevertheless would seem uncontroversial – and quite intuitive – to argue 
that private, anonymised circumstances appear to be more conducive to truth-telling than 
the opposite, particularly in cases where the social standing of one or another of the 
parties involved is subject to question, or where the potential whistle-blower is seemingly 
unsupported by a majority of their peers. Deliberative democratic theory does not frame 
circumstances identical to those established by this study – in particular, one would not 
necessarily expect a deliberative process to involve competing truth claims regarding the 
conduct or law-abidingness of the participants themselves – but the freedom to frame 
potentially unpopular views under some circumstances is necessarily called into question 
by results such as these. 
Ostracism, and the perceived threat of ostracism, may therefore be indicative of some of 
the kinds of strategies that are consciously or unconsciously employed by groups in order 
to regulate and normalise their constituent members. It is also a phenomenon which may 
explain the possible self-exclusion of some individuals from a public deliberative forum. 






have similar in-group regulation effects, but will also reach between values-oriented 
groups and dictate the terms of political agreement and consensus within a deliberative 
democracy.  
Conclusion: The Need for a Psychology of Deliberation 
The survey offered in the second half of this chapter can clearly only constitute the 
beginning of a productive sharing-of-evidence between the fields of social and political 
psychology and democratic and deliberative-democratic theory. It is primarily limited to 
an account of the implications of some of the most classic findings in a range of 
psychological subject areas – group behaviour, conformity, persuasion – as well as some 
notion of how the analysis of these findings has developed and been refined in more 
recent experimentation. 
One clear trend that becomes clear from this collection of evidence is that, in many cases, 
the results of psychological experimentation could benefit from the close analysis of 
political theorists. While psychological experiments are often extraordinary achievements 
in research-design as problem-solving, and speak strongly of their architects as subtle 
thinkers, they also sometimes fall back upon overly simplistic causal explanations for the 
phenomena that they uncover. Many psychological analysts of conformity, for example, 
persist in believing that internalisation – real preference-change – is the product of 
exposure to new knowledge, while normative pressure will tend only to result in hollow 
compliance that does not reflect any fundamental shifts of opinion (Kelman, 1958). This 
may be a comforting interpretation of worrying examples of dangerous behaviour in the 
face of majoritarian or authoritarian influence (such as those uncovered by Zimbardo’s 
infamous prison experiments (Zimbardo, 2007)), but it is also a charitable one.  
Perhaps more urgent, however, is the need for advocates of popular deliberation to 
replace their folk psychology with some of these more plausible insights. As Rosenberg 
(2014) has argued, psychologists have already furnished us with evidence about the 
epistemic limitations that must be confronted by would-be deliberators, if only the 
theorists of deliberative democracy would take the time to look. This chapter has also 
argued that deliberative fora could prove to provide more fertile ground for various 







This is partly due to the fact that, by design or otherwise, the participatory anonymity of 
politics in liberal democracies provide a significant screen against many of the 
psychological effects described in this chapter. In, for example, contemporary British 
democracy, it is impossible to be wholly identified with a political belief or opinion unless 
one chooses to disclose this information publicly. This reduces the potential for outright 
discrimination or intimidation on the basis of political difference, which, as the originators 
of the secret ballot argued, is a crucial component of mass-participation electoral 
democracy, but also reduces the potential for group dynamics, rhetorical manipulation or 
self-exclusion from political processes. Anonymity (and voluntary position-taking) is not 
only more conducive to the psychological health (and likelihood of participation) of 
citizens, but could also ensure the maintenance and accommodation of cognitive diversity 






Conclusion: The Value of Certain 
Myths 
 
To wish to stop democracy would then appear to be to struggle against God himself. 
Tocqueville (2000, p. 7)  
 
 
Knowledge and Inclusion 
This thesis has sought to reorient the academic debate over democratic theory, offering a 
broadly sceptical approach to two theoretical justifications for trading-off the inclusivity of 
democratic institutions in exchange for epistemic benefits. At the same time, it has sought 
to offer grounds for the consequentialist endorsement of maximally inclusive liberal 
democracy, even if such inclusion comes at the cost of reduced depth of individual 
participation. To this end it has introduced insights garnered from a diversity of academic 
literatures that, while generally unfamiliar to these debates, have dramatic consequences 
for the core considerations of democratic theory. This final, concluding chapter will draw 
together the arguments put forth previously and set out a substantive defence of the 
argument for liberal, aggregative democracy. 
Maximal inclusivity is desirable because it creates the conditions for what this thesis has 
referred to in terms of ‘faith’ in a ‘democratic mythology’, a broader ‘folk theory of 
democracy’, and an acceptance of a ‘non-experimental consequentialist’ theory of 
democratic efficacy. Put simply, most members of the public say they are satisfied with 
democracy when asked in opinion polls (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004), even 
in the absence of meaningful evidence to underpin such satisfaction (Runciman, 2011, 
2013)). This general unwillingness to accept alternative forms of social order as viable 
alternatives coincides with a general acceptance that voting is important and personal 
participation is ethically significant, and produces a psychological bias in favour of 
democracies from among the possible set of plausible social orders. This thesis suggests 






social orders, but also that there is little evidence to suggest that alternative social orders 
will be productive of more desirable outcomes either. Given that democracies aren’t 
provably inferior or superior to any other social order, perpetuation of the folk theory of 
democracy and something approaching an evidence-insensitive faith in the mythology of 
democracy is, at a minimum, morally neutral. If the stability that these tendencies produce 
creates the conditions for other, more specifically desirable social forces (along similar 
lines as Jon Elster (1993) has argued), then the consequentialist case for democracy 
becomes clear. 
These desirable yet unintended consequences of democracies are contingent not upon the 
epistemic virtues of democratic citizens, but upon their unproblematic acceptance of 
democratic norms and the set of benefits that they believe to be derivable from 
participation. This ‘folk theory’ stands in contrast to much of the actual evidence, which 
suggests that the epistemic ‘quality’ of participation may have little to do with the eventual 
desirability of democratic outcomes. In fact, the real benefits of democracy may be 
undermined by attempts to ‘improve’ the input of participating citizens. 
There are two fundamental ways to improve the epistemic value of democratic 
participation. The first is to seek to educate or otherwise improve citizens’ preferences 
through information-pooling and exchange via other-regarding and reciprocal 
deliberation or some other means. However, such an approach has practical and ethical 
limitations. Practically speaking, the fact that most citizens are ‘rationally ignorant’ – 
ignorant because no meaningful incentives exist to make the development of any degree of 
expertise worthwhile – would suggest that even the easy availability of useful social and 
political information will not make much difference to citizens’ knowledge levels. Ethically 
speaking, serious questions over the potential for bias and propaganda are raised by the 
possibility of centrally-mandated education programmes. 
The alternative approach to improve citizens’ epistemic performance is simply to be more 
selective about which of them may participate directly to decision-making. This is already 
effectively practiced in contemporary democracies through the exclusion of, for example, 
children and incarcerated prisoners from the voting franchise. More radically, some 






who stand to be most significantly affected by a certain decision (and are thus more 
incentivised to vote wisely).73  
Though public deliberative democracy is generally conceived of as a way to realise the 
first set of approaches, of fostering a participatory culture that encourages better 
standards of knowledge and thus stronger democratic outcomes and enhanced legitimacy, 
this thesis has argued that, in fact, public deliberation will have an effect more in common 
with the second set of exclusionary approaches to the realisation of an epistemically 
enhanced public. An effective deliberative forum would necessarily be public, and non-
anonymous: circumstances that invite a host of undesirable psychological side-effects, 
most of which will undermine the epistemic value of such participation, and generally 
preclude the possibility of constructive cognitive diversity.  
In general, then, the efforts to ‘improve’ democratic citizens are, this thesis suggests, 
somewhat misguided. At best, they will prove to be ineffective. At worst, they will result in 
the deliberate or accidental exclusion of many citizens from democratic participation, 
either through the falsification of preferences or outright self-exclusion from deliberative 
venues where unpopular perspectives are unlikely to be respected. Perhaps more 
important, however, is the idea that there may not be a meaningful baseline of ‘good’ 
public knowledge or expertise against which to compare, and find lacking, the knowledge 
and reasoning of ordinary citizens. For some moral questions, there may be no discernable 
‘truth’ to find and disseminate. For many technical questions, controversies and subjective 
interpretations still hold importance. Necessarily, any approach to the improvement of 
democratic participants’ epistemic qualities will be in some sense partial or normative. 
And in so far as these approaches entail the exclusion of some would-be participants, they 
may also serve to undermine those desirable consequences of democracy that are not 
contingent on any specific epistemic expectation.  
Three Central Claims 
The beginning of this thesis included an attempt to draw out the three important claims 
that are at the core of an epistemologically fallibilist theory of democracy. As a reminder: 
                                                             
73 It could be argued that the electoral model of democracy itself , by relegating popular input to the 
occasional formal election, already prioritises the influence of political and administrative 
professionals, ‘experts’ and bureaucrats. Such a line of reasoning undermines the ‘Platonist’ 
arguments against the inclusion of the ignorant and/or irrational discussed in Chapter Three, and 






a. Requiring better participation involves having fewer participants. 
b. Better participation probably does not mean more desirable outcomes overall. 
c. Breadth of participation is more desirable than depth. 
Having presented a multi-part analysis in the intervening chapters, it may be worthwhile 
to look again at these claims at a more specific granular level. What sub-claims and 
premises are constitutive to, or necessary for, each of the three statements set out above? 
a. Requiring better participation involves having fewer participants 
‘Better voters’ would be produced by an increase in either or both the epistemic quality 
and motivations of voters, the presupposition being that voters’ motivations, knowledge 
and capacity for reason are not optimal at present. Educational and knowledge-pooling 
solutions will not necessarily be effective: after all, it is difficult to define what a public’s 
minimum standards should be with regards to moral knowledge, and public education 
could become a coercive or ethically questionable procedure for the promulgation of 
normative perspectives (arguments touched upon in Chapters One and Three).  
This only really leaves the possibility of discouraging or explicitly excluding the 
participation of those who are less epistemically capable, less reasonable, or seem to have 
unwholesome motivations. Chapter Three describes the position of some theorists who 
would explicitly prefer the disenfranchisement of some citizens on these grounds, or those 
whose theories of participatory ethics amounts to an endorsement of disenfranchisement 
in all but a literal sense. Chapter Six has set out some of the evidence from psychological 
research that suggests that, while deliberative democracy may usually be motivated by the 
objectives of educative and participatory reason-giving for whole publics (as discussed in 
Chapter Two), it risks producing results that fall into the category of exclusionism. The 
foundational and problematic concept of ‘public reason’ contributes significantly to the 
exclusionary potential for deliberative democracy (Chapter Four). 
b. Better participation probably does not mean more desirable outcomes overall 
Chapter Three offered an engagement with this claim, as did the discussion of 
instrumentalist and consequentialist justifications of democracy in Chapter One, and the 
treatment of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in Chapter Five. This claim may be broken 
down into a number of sub-claims. First, it seems reasonable to suggest that there is some 






democratic outcome, as shown by the range of instrumentalist accounts in Chapter One 
(which also suggested that several lines of justification do not require an especially 
epistemically capable citizenry in order to be realised). Second, the actual influence of 
individual democratic participants is so tiny in contemporary democracies that the 
‘quality’ of their participation, even in the aggregate, is unlikely to have ethical 
significance, as argued in Chapter Three. Finally, the potential for meaningless or arbitrary 
democratic outcomes (Chapter Five) significantly damages the idea that improving 
participants will place democracies on the high road to a better performance in terms of 
policies, decisions, or any other measure.  
c. Breadth of participation is more desirable than depth 
From the negative arguments above – which generally argue against participatory depth as 
an acceptable trade-off with breadth – this thesis also asserts that a maximally inclusive 
franchise of participation, even if that participation is no more involved than simple 
voting, is consequentially valuable, allowing its endorsement over deliberation, 
epistocracy, or what Dahl called Guardianship. Chapter One suggested that the unintended 
yet desirable consequence of democracy is a kind of non-experimental, stable political 
settlement. In the Introduction, the value of this settlement was described in terms of 
religious faith: not sensitive to the evidence that suggests that but few of the elements of 
the democratic mythos are real, rather than imagined, but nevertheless productive of an 
incontestability that is consequentially desirable. In Chapter Three, the ‘folk theory of 
democracy’ was another approach to this general idea. Although this folk theory has the 
potential to be self-defeating (in that it views votes as ethically significant and so 
encourages the attainment of political expertise which could be intrinsically damaging to a 
citizen’s faith in the democratic mythos), it nevertheless describes the general public 
position: endorsing the broad yet shallow distribution of political influence through a 
voting franchise.  
To reject inclusivity in favour of deliberative, participatory or epistemic virtue is thus to 
run the risk of trading the incontestability of contemporary liberal democracy for a far 
more contestable form of social order, and one which may not benefit greatly from the 
‘improved’ wisdom of its participants – and it is this simple claim that this thesis has 
sought to make persuasive. 
For some scholars and social commentators, of course, the very idea that contemporary, 
liberal, aggregative democracies enjoy the unproblematic support of their citizens is 






undermine the consequentialist case that I have outlined above. The next section will 
consider  the nature of democratic crisis, and whether the view presented by this project – 
that a naïve yet productive ‘folk theory’ of, and faith in, democratic institutions is itself 
those institution’s greatest virtue – is itself naïve to the point of untenability. 
Crisis? What Crisis? 
This thesis has argued that there are three distinct ways of thinking about democracy, 
modelled on varying epistemic presuppositions. Rousseauians believe in the possibility of 
designed social orders and in collective rationality, so that a public is able to both 
understand its own requirements, predict the best solutions to them, and administrate 
such solutions. Platonists accept that ‘best’ courses of action are possible and that real 
interests exist and may be tracked by careful institutional design. But they doubt that such 
knowledge is accessible to an entire public, and prefer government by ‘knowers’: they do 
not accept the concept of collective rationality. Hayekians doubt the capacity of any 
individual to understand the real interests of a wider society (though there may be some 
hope that they are able to understand their own immediate and contextually contingent 
interests). Indeed, a Hayekian may question the existence of ‘real’ interests altogether: 
interests, rather than being ‘real’ or objective, are subjective and temporal. Neither experts 
nor entire collectives are likely to be reliable predictors of a society’s needs, and even a 
successful prediction along these lines does not make the pursuit of such ends a simple 
matter. The unintended consequences of political action may deal more damage to the 
delicate, emergent balance of the social order than can be compensated for by the 
fulfilment of a centrally described objective.  
For the most part, this thesis has been concerned with an analysis of the first, Rousseauian 
position, which underpins contemporary theories of deliberative democracy as well as a 
generalised ‘mythology’ of democratic efficacy, value, and survivability, expressed here as 
a ‘folk theory’ of democracy. Importantly, this project has set out to argue that this set of 
epistemic assumptions is capable of being both dangerous and highly stabilising to a social 
order. It is dangerous when it seems to imply that we have good grounds to expect a great 
deal more from democratic participants than we currently observe, and sets about 
providing mechanisms for the ‘improvement’ of the public. It is stabilising when it informs 
a generalised faith in the efficacy and desirability of democracy that is not evidence-






stability of this form of government – the meta-agreement over it – would cease to provide 
consequentialist grounds for democracy’s justification. 
In these pages, democracy’s ‘mythological’ qualities – its capacity to inspire public faith 
without evidence – has been praised in warm terms (such as those in the preceding 
paragraph). In general, however, theorists and philosophers of democracy have argued 
that the democratic trait of earning consent and endorsement in the absence of an 
evidentially strong basis for doing so is deeply problematic. David Runciman, for example, 
writes of democracy’s “confidence trap”, which, despite more than a century of 
“contingency and confusion”, leaves citizens believing that democracies are productive of 
desirable outcomes (Runciman, 2013). Runciman offers an understanding of democracy as 
stumbling blindly through – and surviving – successive crises, effectively by accident. The 
fact of this survival leads to its general endorsement as a robust and efficacious form of 
government, even in the absence of any complete understanding of how democracy has 
proven resistant to crises of legitimacy, finance, war and natural disaster (Runciman, 
2011, p. 537). This perspective, which Runciman traces back to De Toqueville’s analysis of 
the early days of American democracy, makes the case for this form of social order not as 
an “incoherent form of politics but … [as] an essentially inadvertent one, based as much on 
faith as on reason. It succeeded despite the appearance it gave of not knowing what it was 
doing. That is why the inhabitants of a democracy are liable to assume that things will turn 
out for the best in the end: because they normally do, regardless of how bad things look at 
present” (Ibid., p. 540). 
Importantly, Runciman distinguishes between confidence tricks and confidence traps. If 
democracy were a confidence trick, it would be a kind of conspiracy, or at least a case of 
outright self-delusion on the public’s part. It would entail the systematic ‘defrauding’ of a 
consenting public that is given grounds to expect certain desirable outcomes. If democracy 
were a confidence trap, meanwhile, then the package of desirable outcomes associated 
with democracy would appear to be true, and come to fruition, with the potential down-
side being that at some point democracies will face a challenge of such immensity that 
their subsequent collapse would cause inestimable damage to the societies that they 
govern.  
Runciman points out that the challenge posed by climate change could very well constitute 
such a crisis for democracy (Ibid., p. 544). As a preliminary response, it is not altogether 
clear that democracy will be especially vulnerable to massive, unpredictable crises such as 






a way that most other social orders cannot.  No form of social order has a track-record for 
coping with and effectively responding to an out-of-context problem as significant as 
climate change: by their very nature, such challenges cannot be predicted and cannot be 
pre-emptively learned about in such a way as to more effectively confront them (Taleb, 
2008).  
More generally, this thesis can be read as an answer to Runciman’s analysis of democracy 
because it argues that the paradox that Runciman has pointed out is itself the basis for 
democracy’s seeming robustness and survivability, and thus offers grounds for its 
endorsement above alternative social orders. As a system of popular consent, a democracy 
can survive any crisis to the extent that a certain proportion of its citizenry still perceives a 
basis for consent. Democracy survives not because it has preferable solutions to the crises 
that confront it, but because the basis of its existence is unlikely to be threatened by even 
very damaging crises. Its mythology is so strong that the failures of democracy in the face 
of some crisis are most likely to be greeted with calls for more democracy. This means that, 
though democracy cannot be said to be instrumentally valuable in the ways that many of 
its supporters claim, it is also neither a confidence trick nor a confidence trap. Rather, this 
thesis suggests that confidence in democracy, however misplaced such confidence may 
seem from an objective standpoint, is itself the strongest basis for democracy’s 
justification. Where Runciman perceives the risk of blindly endorsing a form of social 
order on the basis of its mythos rather than its actual performance, this project suggests 
that democracy would not be especially vulnerable to the unanticipated problems that 
would spring Runciman’s ‘trap’, and that the folk-theory of democracy is in general a 
desirable, stabilising side-effect of human interaction and human epistemology, not a key 
ingredient in a ticking time-bomb.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the standpoint of many contemporary democratic 
commentators and theorists is that liberal democracy is already in the midst of a crisis of 
confidence. Where this project (and Runciman’s) is concerned with asking what gives rise 
to confidence in democracy in the face of some of its more obvious limitations as a form of 
social order, many others are concerned to ask why this confidence appears to be in 
decline, and what such a decline could mean. If a crisis of legitimacy is underway, it 
arguably undermines every part of the positive argumentation within this thesis. If this 
thesis is accurate, and public faith in democratic institutions itself offers them their 
primary source of value, then the decline and problematisation of this faith may be cause 
for real concern. It is worth reflecting, therefore, on the possibility that the unproblematic 






being eroded by the kind of ‘anti-politics’ trends that are described in many parts of the 
literature (Dalton, 2004; Hay, 2007; Castells, 2010; Zakaria, 2013).  
This analytical gap within democratic theory – between those who are surprised by the 
extent of popular confidence in democracy and those who are unnerved by and moved to 
analyse the apparent decline in such confidence – is worthy of detailed exploration, and 
would form an excellent basis for future scholarship in this area. At this point, however, 
this thesis offers two, possibly overlapping, bases for explaining such a difference in 
opinion. First, the ‘crisis of democracy’ literature may be misinterpreting changes in 
participatory and voting behaviours for substantive decline in perceived legitimacy. It is 
clear that the idea of democratic crises is a very old one: Schumpeter, for example, was 
convinced during the cold war that democracy was not a form of social order that could be 
highly competitive in the face of communism and command economies (Schumpeter, 1943 
[1965]). In historical context, therefore, the current wave of concern as to the state of 
democratic legitimacy seems to be an extension of well-documented concerns, rather than 
anything very new (O'Donnell, 2007). The specific phenomena that contribute to a sense 
of crisis may also benefit from a wider perspective of analysis. Increased voter apathy, for 
example, could just as easily be produced by high levels of satisfaction with democracy as 
by citizens’ alienation from the democratic process, implying that increasing levels of 
reported dissatisfaction are not telling the entire story in this era of historically high living 
standards.  
More pertinently for the lines of argument offered in this thesis, it is possible that the 
concept of democratic crisis can be incorporated into the account of the folk theory of 
democracy set out in these pages. The general belief that democracy is being confronted 
by fresh crises may give rise to a redoubled endorsement of democratic institutionalism 
and the ‘common sense’ of public participation. Tellingly, the current apparent legitimacy 
crisis has seldom given rise to any call for the adoption of some other less democratic form 
of social order (Rosenfeld, 2011). This appears to meet some of the expectations set up by 
the ‘folk theory’ set out in Chapter Three of this thesis, or indeed with Runciman’s 
democratic confidence thesis: since human reason is thought to be equal to dealing with 
all challenges, and whole publics capable of collectively offering coherent responses to 
policy questions (and since, however complex they seem, such questions are always 
resolvable by recourse to some self-evident and fair principle), the solution to democracy’s 
problems will always be thought to be more democracy. The fact that the decline of 
traditional forms of participation is viewed by so many theorists as a crisis is, from this 






participation should only be viewed as problematic if we also view participation as itself 
productive of desirable outcomes. 
What Should Democracy Look Like? 
This thesis has suggested that certain spontaneous consequences of democracy offer the 
strongest grounds for its justification. This places the democratic theorist into a 
paradoxical position, simultaneously acknowledging the lack of evidence for an 
instrumental endorsement of democracy, while also accepting that the mythologies and 
folk theories that exist around the preusppositions of democracy’s intrinsic and 
instrumental value themselves create the conditions for social stability and non-
experimentalism.  
However, this account has only glancingly indicated any of the particularities or 
descriptive features of the democratic system that would best foster, and do least to 
betray, the mythologisation and confidence of its citizenry. This thesis has argued, for 
example, that, ideally, democracies should aim to be maximally inclusive so as to visibly 
fulfil the expectations of the ‘folk theory of democracy’, which involves the presupposition 
of the possibility of ‘common sense’ and collective rationality, and thereby create the 
conditions for productive social biases in favour of democracy above alternative forms of 
social order. Chapter Three also argued that the benefits of wide participation outweigh 
the possible pitfalls because under no circumstances can the ignorance of any individual 
participant have significant ethical implications for the lives of another citizen. The size 
and complexity of liberal democracies precludes such a possibility, but perhaps 
institutional design can be oriented toward the inclusion, and not necessarily the 
maximisation of influence, of individual citizens.  
By implication, then, it seems that democracy ought to be founded upon a conception of 
minimal political equality. Access to democratic participation should be broad, but the 
extent of each individual’s capacity to influence outcomes via their participation should be 
limited in scope. This is essentially a description of the emergent form of participation that 
can be seen in any contemporary liberal democracy. 
Why Not Markets? 
One potentially problematic aspect of this thesis’ ‘mythology’ argument is that, in its 






arguably lead to a reduction in support for democracy and a destabilisation of democratic 
forms of government. Like the Austrian view of capitalism, democracy as it has been 
described in these pages makes a virtue of a significant collective knowledge-problem, 
spontaneously ordering the inputs of epistemically limited participants into outcomes 
which, if not necessarily always instrumentally preferable to the efforts of a central 
planner, will at least prove to be stable. In the Hayekian conception of markets, it is argued 
that individuals are able to automatically distil enough information from the prices of 
commodities as to make rational decisions even in the face of the incredible complexity of 
factors that contributed to that final price. To understand whether or not to make a 
purchase, an individual doesn’t need to understand on any sophisticated level the reasons 
that prices are where they stand, and in making a purchase (or choosing not to), they 
contribute slightly to the balance of supply and demand that decides that price. 
The epistemic features and knowledge levels that an individual needs to productively 
engage with a market are therefore very basic in comparison to those that are commonly 
argued to be important to democratic participants, particularly if said participants are 
expected to engage in public reason about their political opinions. We do not expect 
individuals who engage in markets to justify their purchasing decisions to anyone except 
themselves, and we do not expect them to offer a dissertation on their assessment of what 
constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ price, either. This thesis argues not that democracies should 
have some or all of their remit reassigned to markets (as, for example, Bryan Caplan 
(2008) does), but rather that democracies would be best served by placing epistemic 
demands on would-be participants that are not significantly greater than those 
intrinsically required of individuals who want to go shopping.  
Markets, with their ‘marvellous’ capacity for spontaneously ordering efficient outcomes in 
the face if the inescapable epistemic limitations of individuals, have a crucially important 
place in contemporary social orders (Pennington, 2011, p. 59). They are not, however, 
replacements for democracy. Markets are not in themselves generative of social order, 
since there is no version of a price system that will adequately address complex moral or 
ethical questions in a pluralised society, but they do depend on a minimal degree of social 
order in order to function properly. Unlike markets, democracies extend the temporal 
range of political action, and allow political actors to work toward non-immediate goals 
(Madison, 1998, p. 115). Markets are to some extent dependent upon political and social 
stability, and in so far as democracies are productive of such stability (through the effects 
of the ‘mythology’ described in this thesis), markets are also to some extent dependent on 






face of the moral disagreements that would quickly destabilise alternative forms of social 
order.  
Without the epistemic burdens imposed by the requirements of public reason, and thanks 
to the anonymity of formal engagements with representative democracy – the anonymity, 
that is, of voting – conventional aggregative democracy at least guarantees minorities 
recourse to votes without the need for moral justification. It also offers a tolerant sphere 
where deliberative activities are completely voluntary, ensuring there is no systematic 
basis by which holders of more popular preferences may compel such minorities or non-
public reasoners to self-exclude, ‘launder’ or falsify their preferences.  
There are some genuine efforts to reconcile market mechanisms with questions of rights 
and values that are usually reserved for democracy. Could market-like decision 
mechanisms also offer an alternative response to the issues of public reason raised 
throughout this thesis, harnessing something like the price-system to allow the 
satisfaction of our preferences in the face of disagreement in the public sphere? 
Where this thesis leans toward a response to knowledge problems that is policy-
conservative (in so far as it recommends the maintenance of existing forms of aggregative 
democracy), Ryan Muldoon emphasises a response that underscores a bargaining-based 
system of achieving mutual benefit between actors in the public sphere. "[R]easoning 'as 
citizen',” he writes, “is not neutral, but instead is privileging a certain conception of values 
that may not be universally held, particularly as societies become more diverse" (Muldoon, 
2010, p. 10). Since rights are "firmly a social conception, as opposed to a metaphysical 
one" (p. 23), if we are not to privilege a single values system, Muldoon argues that 
bargaining can become the basis for settlements, or at least mutually beneficial outcomes, 
between individuals with no basis for substantive agreement. Individuals are willing to 
commit to trade-offs in order, minimally, to improve their own positions during the 
bargaining.  
The idea of rights trade-offs has significant appeal. Contractualist theorists often view the 
arrangements of the state to be the product of a trade-off on the part of a public - that is, 
they are trading free use of force and various other freedoms in return for increased 
stability and personal security. And Muldoon could arguably put forward an 'already 
extant' account of his theory, describing the way that societies operate now as 
demonstrative of the 'bargaining' process. An immigrant group may surrender a 
significant set of values in return for the various values that they derive from membership 






is associated, in their mind, with other freedoms or capabilities which they do find 
valuable (for example, freedom of worship).  
Yet to come to a conceptualisation of rights or values where one is willing to allow a kind 
of modus vivendi, where we are not actively pursuing absolute goals or paternalistic 
influences, is to rule out certain comprehensive doctrines, just as Rawls does. To accept 
the "constraint that others have to agree to the bargain as well" is essentially to accept that 
your own values cannot 'trump' theirs (p. 27). In practise it seems that such a system 
would necessarily produce a large number of failed bargains, yet perhaps such failures 
would themselves be procedurally valuable. 
It is also easy to predict another kind of objection: that those who find themselves ‘rights-
rich’ in society will hold a bargaining advantage over minorities with fewer rights. It would 
seem that the economic law of comparative advantage might apply here, allowing all 
parties to benefit from trade-offs, but a generalised understanding of the existence of the 
law of comparative advantage has not stymied the critics of free international trade either. 
Muldoon points out that individuals are not bargaining with complete conceptual 
constructions, but with the top-layer outputs of their preference arrangements - not with 
the complex conceptual equation itself, but with whatever follows the ‘equals sign’. This is 
more responsive to empirical evidence of political ignorance, and more representative of 
true political choices, which are usually boiled-down abstractions derived from potentially 
exceedingly complex and manifold contributing considerations. Democratic norms 
facilitate such abstraction: we are not asked to express our complete preferences per se, 
but to reach a conclusion that leads to support for a given previously-settled option. But is 
this really bargaining? 
It is not clear that rights, and the values we attach to them, are always commensurable 
with each other; if incommensurable, how might they be bargained with? There needs to 
be a ‘currency’, a way of comparing the value that right a offers to Calvin and that right b 
represents to Susie. The price system responds elegantly to different evaluations of the 
worth of different commodities in a market, but as Muldoon accepts, political rights are a 
more emotionally charged subject. Could such relationships between individualised 
responses to political rights be discoverable (that is, can individuals plausibly rank or 
evaluate their own rights-preferences?), stable (are these evaluations not subject to 
change, and if so, are the changes themselves trackable?), or necessarily communicable? 
Social and customary pressures figure into our calculation of the value of a given right in 






How can one possibly compare the value that Calvin attaches to a right to bear arms to the 
value that Susie attaches to the right to free speech? 
Most individuals, in the end, will be quite ignorant of possible range of rights that they 
might value, and why; they may even, in the end, fail to value any rights at all. Social 
institutions, if they are to be robust, should be robust in the face of these outcomes as well. 
Adding to this the potential indistinguishableness of a truly irrational vote from an 
irrational-seeming (but legitimate) vote, and we are compelled to conclude that it behoves 
democracies to operate around combination and aggregation mechanisms that treat all 
expressed preferences equally. 
A Place for Deliberation?  
It has also been argued in this thesis that an ideal democracy would avoid deliberative 
mechanisms, particularly of the formal and public sort (as opposed to informal and public, 
or formal and reserved for representatives and legislators). It is worth asking whether the 
critique of deliberation offered in various chapters of this thesis precludes the inclusion of 
deliberative procedures at any level: can there be a role for deliberation in liberal 
democracy? 
Informal public deliberation is the handmaiden of democracy. To the extent that all 
democratic participants are necessarily immersed in a public sphere which, to differing 
extents, will involve the sharing of information, the giving and receiving of reasons, and 
the shaping of preferences, one might even say that all democracy is deliberative. This 
thesis is not, indeed cannot be, an argument against what it refers to at the end of Chapter 
Two as ‘emergent, popular deliberation’. The fact that deliberative preference-formation – 
though certainly not the ideal, structured and epistemically demanding kind that is 
preferred by most theorists of deliberative democracy – is a spontaneously-occurring 
feature of all contemporary democracies offers grounds from which to reject the 
commonplace dismissal of “raw” preference-aggregation as an inferior epistemic product 
to any process involving preferences that have been ‘refined’ by deliberation (Fishkin, 
2005, p. 72). A reasonably pragmatic definition of deliberation cannot limit itself to the 
kinds of interactions that can only occur in the presence of a moderator, or after 
significant amounts of training for those who would participate. It should also not 
presume, as this thesis has argued at length, that the benefits of formal deliberation will 






It is imaginable that the wholly spontaneous democratic practice of deliberation can be 
‘improved’ in a way that is unstructured enough to have no effect on inclusivity. Some 
fundamental issues – such as very often there being no ‘moral truths’ to share with 
citizens, or the possible ethical issues associated with a centralised information agency – 
are very difficult to avoid altogether. But, again, like informal public deliberation itself, 
efforts to facilitate and ‘raise the level’ of discourse within what Estlund has called the 
‘informal political public sphere’ are already a normal part of contemporary democracies 
(Estlund, 2006, p. 79). The existence of public service media, for example, may be 
generally ignored, and may be anathematic to those with suspicions as to the motivations 
and biases of centralised information-propagating institutions (sometimes with good 
reason (Somin, 2013, pp. 173-175)), but nevertheless fulfils a potentially deliberation-
enhancing role – one that, crucially, is highly unlikely to lead a would-be participant to 
self-exclude from the political process. 
The psychological implications of deliberative procedures arguably pose different risks in 
different democratic settings. In the public sphere, formal deliberation runs the risk of a 
host of undesirable psychological effects associated with the loss of anonymity. In a 
representative, legislative setting, however, the intuitive and practical case for political 
anonymity is strongly weakened. In many western democracies, the committee-scale 
deliberations of officials and elected representatives are now more publicly accessible and 
available for scrutiny than at any previous point.74 Most discussions that take place within 
legislative chambers, meanwhile, have long been a matter of public record. As Lever 
(2011) has argued, there are fundamentally different expectations attached to the political 
privacy of ordinary citizens on the one hand, and their elected representatives on the 
other – and, as a result, it is more normal to tolerate the psychological effects of formalised 
deliberation as an ordinary part of representative politics. Many of the implications for 
minority viewpoints are still important at the level of representatives, but in some sense 
these concerns are an accepted part of the norms of democratic politics.75 
Part of the reason that legislative deliberation is less likely to produce undesirable 
outcomes is that it is seldom associated with any explicit concept of public reason. 
Representatives and legislators are tasked simply with representing the interests or views 
                                                             
74 It is worth noting that in many cases, officials and politicians are permitted to deny freedom of 
information requests on the basis of a ‘public interest exclusion clause’, which may be brought to 
bear whenever there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the public interest would be better 
served by secrecy than by disclosure.  
75 We may even view the organised groupings of official political parties as a systematisation of the 






of their constituents, creating a basis of presumed reasonableness that allows the 
legitimate articulation of many reasons that would not be recognised by deliberative 
theorists as ‘reasons that all can accept’. Indeed, as argued in Chapter Four, the 
problematic concept of public reason is itself the basis for a range of epistemic 
requirements that eventually create the basis for an exclusive politics. Would formal 
public deliberation be more acceptable as a preliminary to an aggregative procedure if it 
were unattached to any systematic notion of public reason?  
There seem to be three remaining objections to public deliberative democracy even in the 
absence of requirements for formal public reasons: first, it seems unlikely that many 
theorists of deliberation would ascribe much value to a deliberative procedure that did not 
in any way require the giving and receiving of public reasons. Second, it is possible that a 
formal deliberative process could facilitate information-exchange to a sufficient extent as 
to undermine the folk theory of democracy, and thus the productive general sense of 
confidence in democratic fairness – revealing, for example, the depth of citizens’ mutual 
ignorance to one another. Third, many of the psychological side-effects associated with 
anonymity loss would persist even in the absence of the epistemic requirements of public 
reason: participants could still be lastingly moved to adapt their preferences and conform 
with others as the result of something other than the strength of a better argument.  
 There is an extent to which deliberation is intrinsic to democracy on the spontaneous and 
legislative levels. To intervene to reduce deliberative activity would be more coercive and 
more damaging than the simple maintenance of such emergent democratic norms. 
Formalised public deliberation, even in the absence of a systematic commitment to some 
notion of public reason, is arguably productive of more undesirable effects than positive 
outcomes, particularly given the paradoxical strengthening effect of public ignorance on 
public confidence in democracy.  
Defending Democracy from Democrats 
The paradoxical justification of democracy offered in these pages – one that recognises 
and harnesses a naïve folk-theory of democracy and its capacity to make democracy seem 
non-negotiable – is subject to another, overlapping paradox. The same assumptions that 
underpin the folk theory have also been shown here to form the basis for the radical 
theoretical positions that could do the most damage to public confidence in democracy: 






will’ that is able to track definitive truths, and a belief in the ethical significance of voting 
that seems to suggest reasonable grounds for the narrowing of the franchise. As suggested 
in the introduction to this thesis, a religion or mythology may be troubled not only by the 
spread of heretical non-conformism and the threat of the external ‘Other’, but also by the 
zeal of its greatest adherents. By attempting to epistemically ‘improve’ the public, 
democratic radicalism runs the risk of revealing the tenuousness of the democratic virtues 
that are currently assumed to be matter-of-fact. By leaning toward mechanisms that 
intentionally or unintentionally exclude some would-be participants on epistemic 
grounds, democratic radicalism runs the risk of dispelling the beneficial illusion of 
collective rationality that seems to make democratic norms unquestionable. 
If this thesis is correct in its analysis and justification of democracy, then it too could be 
viewed as part of the ‘problem’. In so far as it attempts to set out, in a matter-of-fact way, 
the limitations of most attempts to justify democracy and the plausibility of arbitrary and 
unresponsive outcomes from democratic processes, this thesis also contributes to a 
literature which, if read and accepted by most democratic citizens, would badly damage 
democracy’s ability to appear competitive in comparison to alternative forms of social 
order.  
Before this line of reasoning triggers accusations that this project is in some sense ‘anti-
philosophical’, it is at least clear to its author that the objective of this thesis – of finding 
consequentialist justifications for the extant norms of democratic institutions despite the 
fragility of most commonly-cited democratic virtues – is intended to discourage implied or 
deliberate opposition to the universal franchise and introduce alternative approaches and 
unusual literatures to the crucial and ongoing debates of democratic theory.  
This project has espoused, and attempted in its sixth chapter to offer the beginnings of, a 
realistic psychology of deliberative democracy, while also explaining and criticising the 
progression of deliberative democratic theory from consensus-seeking, to embodiment of 
public reason, and thence to attempts to reinforce the meaningfulness of aggregative 
democracy through meta-agreement and the restructuring of preferences. It has presented 
the case of ‘Platonist’ arguments against the universal franchise on the basis of public 
ignorance, and rebutted such arguments on the basis that democracy cannot be both so 
meaningless as to disincentivise knowledgeable and rational participation and threatened 
by such participation at the same time. Just as importantly, this project has offered a 






consequences and is not at all contingent on the efficacy of voting or the desirability of 
particular democratic outcomes, but rather upon the widespread perception of the same.  
This argument for democracy is robust in the face of differing contexts and social norms, 
and helps to explain the ongoing popularity of democracy today. It can only be 
compromised by well-intentioned attempts to safeguard and augment the meaning of 
democratic politics by enhancing the epistemic qualities of democratic participants. In 
fact, as has been argued in these pages, such efforts are unnecessary. We needn’t endorse 
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